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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-three years ago, in the course of debating the legisla-
tion that eventually was enacted into law as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,' Congress began-albeit very tentatively-to ad-
dress age discrimination in the workplace.2 While it rejected
attempts to amend the 1964 bill3 to include age within the
then-pending menu of proscribed bases for workplace decision-
making, i.e., race, color, national origin, religion, and sex,4 Con-
gress did direct the Secretary of Labor to undertake a study to
ascertain the nature and extent of age bias in employment and
to make recommendations for dealing with this discrimination,
if it in fact existed.5
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1996).
2. Actually, there had been some efforts at the federal level to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination as far back as the 1950s. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
90th Cong., 1st Ses. 23 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
While obviously not engaged in a legislative effort, President Johnson did issue
Executive Order No. 11141, 3 C.F.R. §§ 117-118 (1964), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301
app. at 401-02 (1996) (entitled Discrimination on the Basis-of Age). The order con-
demned age discrimination in employment and directed that government contractors
were not, either in solicitations or advertisements for workers, to specify a maximum
age limit unless such limit was based on a bona fide occupational qualification, retire-
ment plan, or statutory requirement. This order was supplanted on September 25,
1965, by a broader order, Executive Order No. 11246 (set out as a note under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e) that purported to bar discrimination in employment by federal gov-
ernment contractors on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Age
was nowhere mentioned in the 1965 order. In any event, the predecessor Executive
Order No. 11141 had had little more than hortatory significance, since it contained
no mechanism for its enforcement. Any prospect of an enforcement mechanism exter-
nal to Executive Order No. 11141 being developed was dashed in Kodish v. United
Air Lines, 628 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the court held that a pri-
vate right of action could not be implied from the order. See generally HOwARD
EGLiT, 3 AGE DISCRIMINATION § 11.18 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp.) [hereinafter EGLIT].
3. The House of Representatives rejected an amendment offered by Representa-
tive Dowdy by a vote of 123 to 94. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-99 (1964). In the Senate
an amendment offered by Senator Smathers was rejected by a 63 to 28 vote. See 110
CONG. REC. 9911-13, 13490-92 (1964).
4. Title VIrs prohibitions regarding decisions and actions based on the sex of an
individual were added to the House bill on the same day, February 8, 1964, that the
proposed addition of age to the list of forbidden decision-making criteria was rejected
by the House.
5. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 287, 316
(superseded by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
10, 86 Stat. 111, 132).
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The Secretary responded with a report in which he an-
nounced his conclusions that age bias in the workplace indeed
was a reality; that it was in particular a significant problem
insofar as hiring practices were concerned; and that federal
action was warranted to combat it.' He went on, however, to
suggest that age discrimination in employment was of a differ-
ent, less pernicious, dimension than other instances of charac-
teristic-based prejudice:
[W]e find no significant evidence of... the kind of
dislike or intolerance that sometimes exists in the case of
race, color, religion, or national origin, and which is based
on considerations entirely unrelated to ability to perform a
job.
We do find substantial evidence of... discrimination
based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect
of age on ability... in hiring practices that take the form
of specific age limits applied to older workers as a group.
We find that ... [with regard to] decisions made about
aging and the ability to perform in individual cases, there
may or may not be arbitrary discrimination on the basis of
age, depending on the individual circumstances.
Individual circumstances may similarly lead to arbitrary
discrimination... [in the context of] institutional arrange-
ments which operate indirectly to restrict the employment
of older workers.7
The Secretary concluded with a general recommendation for a
national effort involving several components:
First: Action to eliminate arbitrary discrimination in em-
ployment.
Second: Action to adjust institutional arrangements which
work to the disadvantage of older workers.
Third: Action to increase the availability of work for older
workers.
6. See SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER-AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER].
7. Id. at 5.
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Fourth: Action to enlarge educational concepts and institu-
tions to meet the needs and opportunities of older age.'
In 1966 Congress directed the Secretary to submit specific
legislative recommendations.9 In relatively short order Presi-
dent Johnson, on January 23, 1967, called upon the Congress to
enact the legislation we know today as the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA):'
Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily
retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age dis-
crimination. Despite our present low rate of unemployment,
there has been a persistent average of 850,000 people age
45 and- over. They comprise 27 percent of all the unem-
ployed, and 40 percent of the long-term unemployed.
In 1965, the Secretary of Labor reported to the Con-
gress and the President that approximately half of all pri-
vate job openings were barred to applicants over fifty-five; a
quarter were closed to applicants over forty-five.
In economic terms, this is a serious-and senseless-loss
to a nation on the move. But, the greater loss is the cruel
sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness
imposes on these citizens and their families.1
Congress responded affirmatively. The legislation was debated
in November and December of 1967, and was enacted into law
on December 15, 1967.' (It did not actually go into effect until
June 12, 1968, however).' This article, and the symposium of
which it is a part, mark the thirtieth anniversary of that legis-
lation.14
8. Id. at 21.
9. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80
Stat. 830, 845.
10. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
11. "Aid for the Aged," Message -from the President of the United States, Jan. 23,
1967, printed at 113 CONG. REC. 1089-90 (Jan. 23, 1967).
12. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
13. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 15, 81 Stat. 602, 606-07, the Act became
effective 180 days after enactment. This meant, given that 1968 was a leap year, that
the effective date was June 12, 1968. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 455
F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1972).
14. Not surprisingly, the Act has undergone a number of changes over the years,
although its core focus, i.e., discrimination in the workplace on the basis of age, has
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There are several matters to take up-not necessarily by
means of a seamless web of graceful transitions-in this article,
with the author being mindful that by virtue of its celebratory
nature the article's appropriate mode is more one of generalities
than intricate doctrinal analysis.
First, I undertake a very brief and admittedly very superfi-
cial historical review of the statute's first twenty or so
years-its infancy and youth, so to speak.'
remained the same. There have been a number of amendments, some relatively mi-
nor, some quite significant. Included in the latter category are the following.
In 1974 federal employees, applicants for jobs with the federal
government, and former federal employees were brought within the Act's
coverage. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74-75 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633a).
In 1974 state and local governmental employees were brought with-
in the coverage of the Act. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 630(b)).
In 1978 the Act was amended in several regards:
m the age cap, or ceiling, which was set at age sixty-five when
the statute was enacted in 1967, was increased to seventy for most
nonfederal employees;
" the age cap was removed entirely for federal employees;
" a guarantee of jury trials was established;
" involuntary retirement prior to age seventy was absolutely
barred, thus foreclosing employers' efforts to invoke the terms of the
Act's bona fide benefit plan exception as a basis for pre-age seventy
mandatory retirement.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
In 1984 the Act was amended to provide extraterritorial protection
to Americans working abroad for American-owned or American-controlled
companies. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-459, § 802, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f(1), (h)
and 630(f)).
In 1986 the age-seventy cap on protection for private sector em-
ployees was removed (subject to a couple of exceptions). See Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c),
100 Stat. 3342, at 3342.
In 1990 the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
433, 104 Stat. 978, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2278
(1990), made changes regarding-
a the ADEA's defense concerning bona fide employee benefit
plans;
" the ADEA's defense concerning seniority systems;
" the legitimizing of voluntary retirement plans; and
a the requirements for valid releases of liability.
15. It is appropriate, given the genre, to look back; but there has been so much
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Second, I devote much more attention to the current state of
affairs, thirty years after the natal event. My focus is on empir-
ical data, i.e., information concerning demographic trends, labor
force participation figures, and-most extensively-objective
data extracted from the cases, rather than on doctrinal and
interpretive issues.
Third, I address some of the demographic and scientific data
regarding the numbers, age ranges, and competencies of, and
costs attributable to, older men and women who are in the
work force today and/or who will be work force participants in
the coming twenty or more years.
Finally, I highlight what in my view are some of the key
doctrinal and structural issues that promise to occupy the at-
tention of employees, employers, lawyers, courts, and maybe
even legislators in the next five, ten, even fifteen years. (Be-
yond that, I will await the Act's fiftieth birthday commemora-
tion before venturing new predictions.)
H. THE ADEA IN EARLIER YEARS
There has never been a period of any perceptible duration
during which ADEA courts have not been called upon to reach
the substantive merits of plaintiffs' claims and defendants'
responses to those claims. Still, it is safe to say that in the
early years a very considerable percentage of the reported cases
generated by the ADEA (certainly more so than today) involved
the resolution of issues other than the substantive question of
whether, in a given situation, illegal age discrimination had or
had not occurred. Confirming this perception, Michael Schuster,
Joan Kaspin, and Christopher Miller, the authors of a compre-
hensive unpublished study that addressed the first eighteen
years of the ADEA's life, reported as follows:
The first 11 years of the legislation (1968-1978) account for
only 25.4 percent of the substantive cases [decided during
litigation, and so much written on the ADEA by this author and others, that it
would be both extremely laborious and pointlessly duplicative to go through the exer-
cise once again. See generally 1-3 EGLIT, supra note 2.
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the 1968-1986 period], with the remaining 74.6 percent
resolved in the period 1979-1986. [This is because] [i]n the
early years of the ADEA, the federal courts were required
to establish many procedural rules."6
A review of a few areas of judicial attention in the ADEA's
earlier years buttresses the observations of Schuster, Kaspin,
and Miller. The statute, for example, requires that an adminis-
trative charge (initially called a "notice of intent to sue") of
discrimination be filed with the ADEA enforcement agency, i.e.,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), with-
in a set time period (either 180 or 300 days of the occurrence of
the alleged discriminatory event or decision).17 The failure of
grievants either to comply at all with the requirement or, much
more commonly, their failure to comply in a timely manner,
generated a large body of cases during the Act's earlier years
that focused on a variety of issues concerning charge-filing:
n the consequence of a failure to file;"
a determination of when the time period for filing began to
accrue;'
16. Michael Schuster, Joan A. Kaspin, & Christopher S. Miller, The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act: An Evaluation of Federal and State Enforcement, Employer
Compliance and Employee Characteristics, A Final Report to the NRTA-AARP Andrus
Foundation ili-iv ((unpublished June 30, 1987) [hereinafter Schuster-Kaspin-Miller
Study].
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994).
18. See, e.g., Vaught v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir.
1984).
19. See, e.g., Kephart v. Institute of Gas Tech., 581 F.2d 1287, 1288 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1978); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975). Eventually,
the basic principle was established that the charge-filing period begins to accrue when
the grievant knows, or reasonably should know, that an unlawful action has occurred
or an unlawful decision has been made. This rule, given the stamp of approval in
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), a case arising under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, has been fully em-
braced in the ADEA context. See, e.g., Sawchik v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 783
F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1986); Price v. Litton Bus. Sys., Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir.
1982). Of course, there still remains much opportunity for a variety of issues to arise
in applying this rule. See, e.g., Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303,
309 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982) (ambiguity of employer's notice
to employee sufficient to delay accrual of discrimination claim, and therefore com-
mencement of charge-filing period). See generally 1 EGLIT, supra note 2, §§ 6.08-6.21.
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m whether a failure to timely file was a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to suit, or simply a failing that could be overcome
through equitable tolling or estoppel principles;"
m what constituted adequate justification for equitable tolling
of the filing period;2 ' and
m what constituted sufficient warrant to equitably estop an
employer from raising the untimeliness issue.'
Other courts (although much fewer in number) had to address
the question of whether a charge of discrimination (or its pre-
decessor, the notice of intent to sue) had to be in writing or
could be made orally.' The substance of the charge also occu-
pied courts' attention.' In earlier years numerous courts also
were called upon to decide other procedural matters, far afield
20. Compare Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975) (jurisdic-
tional prerequisite) with Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir.
1979) (charge-filing period is subject to equitable tolling or estoppel). The issue was
laid to rest years ago. The courts are now in accord, and have been for some time,
that the position embraced in rulings such as Slatin is the correct one. See, e.g., Kale
v Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir. 1988); Dillman v. Combus-
tion Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1986); see generally 1 EGLIT, supra note 2,
§ 6.08.
21. See Quina v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 575 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1978);
Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 494 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Downie v.
Electric Boat Div., 504 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Conn. 1980). See generally 1 EGLIT,
supra note 2, §§ 6.17-6.21.
22. See generally Kriegesmann v. Barry-Wehmiller Co., 739 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984) (effort by employer to mitigate harshness of termi-
nation decision); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (failure to post required notice of rights under the
ADEA); Baruah v. Young, 536 F. Supp. 356 (D. Md. 1982) (fraud or misrepresentation
on employer's part); Griffin v. First Pa. Bank, 443 F. Supp. 563, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(same); Woerner v. Bell Helicopter, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 480 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (failure by federal agency to inform grievant of need to submit proper filing).
23. See generally Reich v Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (oral notice insufficient); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F.
Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (oral notice sufficient). The generally accepted position
today is that the charge of unlawfiul discrimination must be in writing. See generally
Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1042 (1984); Salazar v. AT & T Corp., 715 F. Supp. 351 (S. D. Fla. 1989).
24. See generally Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), affd by
an equally divided Court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp.
617 (D. Kan. 1973); 1 EGLIT, supra note 2, § 6.04.
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from the matter of charges, such as whether prevailing plain-
tiffs could recover punitive damages' and/or compensatory
damages."
Of course, it should not be concluded that procedural issues
do not commonly arise anymore. Indeed, just in the past year
or so the Supreme Court has handed down several decisions
dealing with technical aspects either of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 7-- the interpretations of which commonly
are looked to by ADEA courts for persuasive analogical guid-
anceS-or of the ADEA, itself.29 In a similar vein, a number
of the decisions noted in the succeeding discussion of cases pub-
lished in 1996 address procedural or definitional (as opposed to
age-substantive) issues.0 Still and all, decisions defining the
25. See generally Murphy v. American Motor Sales Corp., 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.
1978); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich.
1977). The universally accepted position of the courts today is that such damages are
not recoverable. See Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982); Pfeiffer
v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); see
generally 2 EGLIT, supra note 2, § 8.42.
26. See generally Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981); Vazquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978). The universally accepted judi-
cial position today is that such damages are not recoverable. See generally Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980); Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726
F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984); 2 EGLIT, supra note 2, § 8.39.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
28. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
29. The ADEA only applies to employers having at least 20 employees for each
calendar day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the year in which the alleged discrimi-
nation occurred, or in the preceding year. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). Title VII has
a similar requirement, although the requisite minimum number of employees is 15,
rather than 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). In Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997), a Title VII case, the Court resolved the lower
court split that had existed as to how to go about counting part-time employees for
the purpose of determining whether the numerosity requirement was satisfied in a
given case. It embraced the so-called "payroll" method, i.e., the method of counting
employees whereby any person who receives a paycheck is counted, even if he or she
was a part-time employee who did not work a full week. In Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997), another Title VII case, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a former employee (as opposed to an individual currently working for an em-
ployer) could maintain a cause of action for unlawful retaliation against his former
employer, which had provided a negative reference about him to a potential employer.
The Court held in the affirmative. In Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783
(1996), the Court addressed-and answered in the negative-the question of whether
a 1986 amendment to the ADEA dealing with pension plans should be applied retro-
actively.
30. See infra Part III.
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contours, as opposed to fleshing out the application, of proce-
dural requirements certainly do not make up as great a portion
of the total rulings as they did in the early years.
It also should not be concluded that substantive issues were
of insignificant dimension during the formative and maturing
years of the ADEA. Indeed, most of the case law addressing the
requisites for establishing claims of discriminatory treatment3'
and discriminatory impact 2 was devised in this era. The same
is true regarding judicial fashioning of the defendants' tasks in
these cases.' The ADEA's bona fide occupational qualification
defense also was fleshed out during this time, 5 as were nu-
merous other substantive matters. Here, too, a cautionary note
is to be sounded: this "quick-and-dirty" drive-by of substantive
issues in no way should be read as implying that key substan-
tive rulings are historical phenomena-the legal artifacts of the
now-mature ADEA's youth. Quite the contrary. Employment
discrimination law today continues to be in considerable fer-
ment. For example, the Supreme Court in recent years has
issued major decisions dealing with discriminatory impact anal-
ysis,36 mixed motives analysis,37 the relevance of decision-
making criteria that are argued to be proxies for age,8 and
the question of whether an ADEA plaintiff who is seeking to
establish a prima facie violation must be able to identify some-
31. The classic formulation was set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), a case arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Hundreds of ADEA courts have looked to McDonnell
Douglas as setting the applicable formula. See, e.g., Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645
F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has never held that
McDonnell Douglas applies to the ADEA, although in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996), the Court assumed for the purposes of
the decision that it did.
32. See infra Part IV.D.3.
33. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (case
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17, and followed by many ADEA courts in which defendant's burden in discriminatory
treatment case was re-stated); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title
VII case followed by numerous ADEA courts in which defendants burden in disparate
impact case was prescribed).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
35. See generally 1 EGLIT, supra note 2, §§ 5.02-5.13.
36. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
37. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
58919971
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
one outside the ADEA-protected class as having replaced him or
her. " (Some of these recent doctrinal developments, and their
significance for the future, are discussed in Part IV of this ar-
ticle.) And certainly the lower courts have been, and continue to
be, busy dealing with substantive issues, as the ADEA cases
discussed in Part III of this article help to confirm.
As for demographic and statistical data, Schuster, Kaspin,
and Miller-in focusing on 280 cases decided on substantive
grounds between 1968 and 1986-arrived at several findings
that are of interest in and of themselves, as well by reason of
their use for purposes of comparison in the ensuing discussion
regarding present-day ADEA litigants and litigation:'
o 84.1% of the claims arising during the ADEA's first eigh-
teen years were made by white males;41
o 59.3% of the cases were filed by managerial and profession-
al employees;42
a 54% of the cases were filed by individuals between the
ages of fifty and fifty-nine;'
- various forms of discharge and involuntary. retirement ac-
counted for 67.5% of the cases;" and
o employers won in 67.7% of the cases.'
Ill. THE 1996 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
I thought it would be interesting-and maybe even, mirable
dictu, useful beyond the end of pure academic inquiry-to gath-
er current empirical data regarding ADEA litigants and ADEA
litigation. Perhaps some insights might be gained about the
nature of the age discrimination litigation enterprise: who wins
and who loses; how are the wins and losses chalked up; and so
on. Accordingly, I endeavored to collect every decision (federal
39. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
40. See Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at iii-iv.
41. See id. at iii.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at iv.
45. See id.
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and state) addressing a claim made under the ADEA that was
published in 1996.' The information I distilled from this effort
is addressed below. Before, however, I turn to the data-which
indeed do prove to be quite revealing as to ADEA litigation and
ADEA litigants-I want to highlight some significant caveats
which build up to the necessary disclaimer that this effort,
while informative, is undeniably at bottom a compromised un-
dertaking.
Let me be more specific.
A. The Caveats
There is little reason to believe that reported cases are an
accurate reflection of the actual incidence of age discrimination
in the workplace.' For one, it is a pretty sure bet (although,
concededly, I do not have the empirical data to document factu-
al bases for my conclusion) that many people who are (or may
be) the victims of unlawful discrimination are simply unaware
that a statutory violation has (or at least may have) oc-
curred.' In other words, they know that adverse workplace
decisions were made or actions were taken, but they do not
suspect-whether because of ignorance, misleading excuses of-
46. Another survey of cases, involving the ADEA over a 20-year period, was re-
cently published. This study, Employment Discrimination Against Midlife and Older
Women: How Courts Treat Sex-And-Age Discrimination Cases (Women's Legal Defense
Fund 1996), focused on individuals who brought combined age/gender discrimination
claims. Because this study was concerned only with these dual claims involving both
age and gender, it is difficult to mesh its findings with those here. Accordingly, I did
not look to this study as a useful basis for comparisons, or for the buttressing (or
refuting) of the data set forth infra.
47. A researcher who examined the statistical records of the Federal Judicial
Center for all employment discrimination cases that were litigated in federal court
and terminated during the period from June 1, 1992, to May 31, 1994, reported that
"only 8% of the[se] cases filed in federal courts ultimately proceeded to trial, which is
about the same rate as in civil litigation generally." William J. Howard, Arbitrating
Claims of Employment Discrimination, 50 DIsP. RESOL. J. 40, 42 (1995) [hereinafter
Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination].
48. The statute requires the posting in conspicuous places in each ADEA-covered
workplace of a notice describing workers' rights under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §
627 (1994). The existence of such a notice is no guarantee, however, that a given
individual who has been subjected to an adverse employment decision will suspect
that he or she is the victim of wrongdoing in violation of the Act.
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fered by the decision makers, or whatever-that a forbidden
criterion, i.e., age, was an animating force for those decisions.
What is more, some people likely are not even going to be
aware that an unfavorable decision was made. Suppose, for
example, an employer knows that a vacancy for a vice presiden-
cy is going to arise within a couple of months. Rather than
soliciting applicants, the employer decides to first consider em-
ployees from within the company. In the course of discussions
among the senior officers as to who might be promoted, these
individuals consider, but reject, assistant vice president Jones,
who would not be a naturally expectable candidate for the job
by virtue of her working in another department and therefore
being outside the normal promotional flow pattern for this par-
ticular position. They conclude, and openly so state (among
themselves), that she is too old for the job. Eventually the an-
nouncement is made that assistant vice president Smith is
being promoted. Jones has no reason to believe that she had
been rejected for the promotion. After all, she had not submit-
ted an application for the job (given that there had been no
disclosure that an opening was going to become available).
Moreover, she has little or no reason to suspect that she even
was considered for the post, since she works in another depart-
ment and typically cross-departmental promotions have not
been made in her company.
Moving beyond these scenarios involving lack of knowledge or
absence of suspicion on the part of the potential grievant, there
are, I am convinced (although again I cannot proffer empirical
data), many instances when job applicants, employees or former
employees, while indeed suspecting or even firmly believing
that they have been wronged, do not pursue legal redress.49 A
variety of reasons can explain one or more individual instances
of such inaction. The grievant may not have the financial re-
sources to undertake legal action. ° He may lack the psycholog-
49. Of course, underreporting of legally cognizable grievances is not unique to the
employment discrimination context. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reex-
amining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1,
27-28 n.99 (1996).
50. In response to a question concerning litigation expenses, a survey sample
made up of 330 members of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American
Bar Association reported that the average management attorney's fee in litigating
[Vol. 31:579592
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ical strength or will to challenge a supervisor's employment
decision.5 Or a discharged worker simply may not care: she
employment discrimination cases was $96,000. See Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination, supra note 47, at 44. The same researcher, reporting on the responses
of a sample group of 321 plaintiffs' attorneys, asserted that these attorneys typically
handled their cases on a contingent fee basis and for this reason, apparently, they
did not articulate any specific fee figures. See id. See also Ruth Simon, Too Damn
Old, MONEY, July 1996, at 118, 125 ("A typical age-discrimination lawsuit can easily
cost [the plaintiff] $25,000 or more and last two to five years.") It is true that one
can easily file a charge of unlawful discrimination with the ADEA enforcement agen-
cy, the EEOC, without the aid of an attorney or the expenditure of any money. The
EEOC is authorized to investigate the grievant's claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1994).
It also is authorized to file suit on behalf of grievants, as well as to initiate its own
suits. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
In fact, however, the agency's investigatory efforts regarding grievant's claims
are scanty. See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNi-EEOC AND STATE AGENCIES DID NOT FULLY INVESTIGATE DISCRIMINATION
CHARGES (1988). With regard to suits filed to enforce all of the statutes for which it
has enforcement responsibility-i.e., the ADEA; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1994); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213
(1996)-the EEOC filed 398 cases in fiscal year (FY) 1993, 373 cases in FY 1994, 322
in FY 1995, and 160 in FY 1996. (The federal fiscal year runs from October 1
through September 30). We do have some specifics regarding ADEA suits: in FY 1990
the EEOC filed 138 ADEA suits; it filed 102 in FY 1991; 84 in FY 1992; 114 in FY
1993; and 73 in FY 1994. See Drop in Fiscal 1995 EEOC Activity, FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
(BNA), Apr. 8, 1996, at 37. Just 37 were fied in FY 1995, and the number dropped
to twelve in FY 1996. See EEOC Backlog Down, Money Obtained Up, FAIR EMpI
PRAC. (BNA), Apr. 7, 1977, at 97. In a recent interview conducted by the Bureau of
National Affairs the chair of the EEOC was reported to have expressed discourage-
ment with the agency's lackluster litigation efforts:
EEOC Chairman Gilbert Casellas said he is frustrated by the low num-
ber and "quality" of suits fied by the EEOC since it set new enforcement
priorities last year. The EEOC's three other commissioners share with
him some frustration over the EEOC's litigation activities, Casellas add-
ed.
Interview with EEOC Chairman Casellas: Frustrations and Future Plans, FAIR ENIPL.
PRAC. (BNA), Jan. 9, 1997, at 3.
As a practical matter, then, an individual who believes himself or herself to be
a victim of a violation of the ADEA is going to have to pursue recourse on his or her
own.
51. Kristin Bumiller reviewed a survey that was conducted in 1980 whereby a
sample of 560 discrimination claims was obtained from a sample of approximately
5,000 households. The "[riespondents were asked whether they had experienced 'illegal
or unfair treatment' because of their 'race, age, sex, handicaps, union membership, or
other things." KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RiGHTS SOCIETY 26 (1988). Ms. Bumiller
reported the following.
Preliminary analysis indicated that approximately half of the aggrieved
individuals did not make a claim to the other party, nearly two-thirds
did nothing further to rectify their perceived mistreatment, and only a
very small percentage had achieved successful resolution of their claims.
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didn't like the job anyway. The grievant also may have con-
suited an attorney, found out that the money she was making
on her new job would offset any back pay award she might win
if she went forward with her discrimination claim," and con-
cluded that the financial equation did not justify pursuing a
legal claim which, even if successful, would produce no mone-
tary recovery.
There are still other factors that increase the gap between
the number of incidents of actionable workplace discrimination
in a given time period, on the one hand, and the number of
Discrimination grievances had a significantly lower rate of escalation into
court cases than other civil matters such as contract disputes and land-
lord-tenant problems.
Id. (endnote omitted). Ms. Bumiller then noted that the individuals who perceived
that they had been the victims of discrimination but had done nothing about it were
asked to explain their inaction. She concluded, on the basis of their responses, that
"people do not take action because they assume that their complaints will not be
taken seriously." Id. at 29. She further wrote as follows:
The model of legal protection would suggest that the failure of
persons to use the law stems from the victims' inability to serve their
own needs: lack of information and knowledge about their rights and
their limited resources for using legal channels. But these persons were
not rejected by unresponsive agencies, deterred by the cost and unavail-
ability of lawyers, or barred from pursuing legal claims by technicalities.
Although the anticipation of these factors played a role in their decision-
making, they did not take action primarily because they legitimized their
own defeat. For the most part, the problem is never conceptualized in
terms of public action. In this universe of discrimination problems far
removed from legal forums, the labeling of acts as discriminatory and the
eventual deflation of the conflict by apology or self-blame serve as coping
mechanisms for suppressing burgeoning discontent.
Id. at 28-29.
52. The case law establishes that there is a mitigation requirement imposed on
ADEA plaintiffs: a person who is discharged must seek other, comparable, employ-
ment, and his or her earnings from that other job will be deducted from the back
pay award. See Payne v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 924 F.2d 109, 110 (7th Cir.
1991); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461, 1468 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989). If the plaintiff does not seek other employment, and
the defendant can prove that with the exercise of reasonable diligence the plaintiff
would have been able to secure employment comparable to the job from which he or
she was discharged, the amount of money the plaintiff would have earned had he or
she sought and secured that job will offset the back pay award even if the plaintiff
did not actually receive that income because he or she did not actually secure that
other job. See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983).
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reported judicial rulings that actually result from those inci-
dents, on the other. People who initially were willing and able
to go through the legal process in its entirety may be discour-
aged by initial erroneous or unreceptive decisions made by the
administrative agencies with which they file their charges of
discrimination-to wit, the EEOC and/or a state anti-discrimi-
nation agency-and so what could have turned out to be win-
ning claims of discrimination, if only pursued to their legal
ends, suffer unwarranted demise. Much more significant for
assessing the accuracy of reported cases as being reliable indi-
cators of the actual incidence of discrimination is the settlement
factor. Claims that are clearly meritorious (and even claims
that, albeit dubious, are potentially meritorious) raise for the
alleged wrongdoers specters of litigation expense, institutional
and personal stress, unfavorable publicity, and potential find-
ings of liability. Consequently, such claims very likely will elicit
settlement offers sufficiently generous to induce the grievants to
forego pursuing redress through public channels. The result is
that the most unequivocal instances of discrimination disappear
before they ever become subject to public attention, let alone
formal recordation in reported judicial opinions.53 And because
settlement agreements typically contain confidentiality provi-
sions barring grievants from discussing even the existence of
the settlements, not to mention their terms, members of the
public generally-and even more relevant, other potential claim-
ants-are left in the dark.
53. As to the settling of legal claims generally, see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverd, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996). A recent survey of attorneys practicing in the employment
discrimination area reveals just how prevalent settlements are. The researcher sur-
veyed 321 members of the National Employer Lawyers Association, as well as 330
members of the Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Employment law made up 80% of their practices. The defense attorneys esti-
mated that 79% of their cases were settled prior to final adjudication, and the
plaintiffs' attorneys gave an estimate of 84% of employment discrimination cases
being settled prior to final adjudication. See Arbitrating Claims of Employment Dis-
crimination, supra note 47, at 43-44.
One must take care in interpreting these data. They should not be read as
suggesting that 79% or 84% of all claims, no matter how shallow or specious, gener-
ate settlements. These figures presumably only refer to those matters that make it
past the initial screening that any reputable plaintiffs attorney undertakes. (I state
"presumably" because the researcher from whose article these data are extracted did
not provide further detail.)
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Another point. Even if a claim does get to court, juries do not
write opinions and so, absent a written (and published) court
ruling on a losing litigant's motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the law or a court's indirect reference to a jury determina-
tion, such as in the course of a court's post-trial consideration
of issues involving relief, ADEA jury cases are going to escape
the collator's awareness. And finally, it must be noted that not
all judicial rulings are reported; thus, a given determination
may not be captured by an observer of the process because it
simply is not a matter of readily retrievable record.
All the appropriate cautionary notes having been sounded, I
now can proceed.
B. The Data Set
I did not include in my survey cases in which refer-
ence-whether passing or more substantial-was made to the
ADEA in the context of a court's addressing a lawsuit arising
under another statute. Typically, for example, courts consider-
ing claims litigated under Title VII look to ADEA decisions for
analogical guidance, as noted earlier. This well-established
practice flows from the facts that the two statutes share both
common language and a common goal, i.e., eradication of dis-
crimination from the workplace." A Title VII court's discussion
of ADEA doctrine, or of the meaning or interpretation of an
ADEA decision or statutory provision, would be mere dictum,
however. And so I did not deem such references to the ADEA
to be sufficiently focused on ADEA claims, per se, to justify the
inclusion of non-ADEA cases.55
I used the two main reporting systems-West Publishing
Company's Supreme Court reports, Court of Appeals reports,
and Federal Supplement, and the Bureau of National Affairs'
Fair Employment Practices Cases (FEP)-to collect all decisions
published in 1996. I did not survey the other reporter system
54. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-58 (1978).
55. See generally Pitak v. Bell Atl. Network Servs., 928 F. Supp. 1354 (D. N.J.
1996); Dubisar-Dewberry v. District Attorney's Office, 927 F. Supp. 1479 (M.D. Ala.
1996); Wisch v. Whirlpool Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. MI1. 1992).
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for employment discrimination cases, i.e., Employment Practices
Decisions (EPD), nor did I take account of rulings that only
may be found through one or more of the computerized data
bases, i.e., Lexis and Westlaw. Concededly, I thereby likely
missed a few additional decisions that do not appear in either
the West reporters or in the FEP reporter. Still, there typically
is a tremendous degree of replication: the opinions that appear
in EPD appear in FEP and/or in the West reporters. Thus, I
am confident that only a few rulings, if any at all, have been
missed. I also excluded decisions that had been published in
one or the other of the reporter systems prior to 1996. For
example, if-as not uncommonly happens-a case that was
decided in late 1995 was not published in Federal Supplement
until 1996, but had been published in FEP in 1995, I did not
count it.
More important than the reader's being apprised of the fore-
going ministerial aspects of collation is appreciation of the
fact-an obvious one, but one needful of recitation nonethe-
less-that even though a decision was published in 1996, it
does not follow that it was decided in that year. Indeed, a num-
ber of 1995 rulings did not appear on the publicly available
printed page until the following year. Since, for my sampling
purposes, publication in 1996 was key, it follows that these
1995 decisions are included in the data set (unless, as just
noted, they were earlier published in 1995). By the same token,
there are 1996 decisions that were not, or will not, be published
until some time in 1997 and these are not included in the data
base. The result is that one has a picture, more or less, of a
twelve-month period of decision-making, 6 with published cases
that were decided in 1995 (but certainly not the majority of
that year's rulings) making up some of that picture and most,
but not all, published cases that were decided in 1996 (since
some will not be published until 1997 or even later) making up
the rest of the picture. ' (In those very rare instances in-
56. Since the same lag times regarding publication apply to any calendar year,
with some decisions handed down in year A not being published until year B, and
some cases decided in year B not being published until year C, this 12-month period
is representative of any 12-month calendar year.
57. There were a few instances of 1994 decisions not being published until 1996.
See, e.g., Bell v. Specialty Packing Prod., 935 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Dickson
v. Amoco Performance Prods., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 629 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Chester v. AT
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volving a federal district court opinion that was affirmed or
reversed within the same period by a court of appeals, I only
included the higher court's ruling. However, in those slightly
less rare instances of a district court's issuing two (or more)
opinions over the course of the year,58 I included each of the
rulings for some data-gathering purposes; where I in fact count-
ed only one of the rulings involving the same parties, such as
with regard to the collation of the ages, genders and occupa-
tions of plaintiffs and of data regarding the fields of activity of
defendants, that single counting is noted infra.)
Two additional notes. There were two Supreme Court cases
decided and published in 1996: O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp.9 and Lockheed Corp. v. Spink." Seven state
court rulings also were published in that year.6 I have not
included these nine decisions in the compilations of data dis-
cussed below. My view is that the Supreme Court rulings are
& T Co., 907 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Zemel v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Bd., 918 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1994); Milwaukee Fire Fighters v. City of Mil-
waukee, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 121 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Thompson v. Runyon,
69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1619 (W.D. Mo.), affd without opinion, 31 F.3d 1172
(8th Cir. 1994). Gilbert v. Essex Group, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 683 (D.N.H. 1993), was an
even older case that was not published until 1996. I concluded that if I wanted a
snapshot, so to speak, of a year in the life of the ADEA, the inclusion of these 1993
and 1994 rulings would unduly blur the picture.
58. See, e.g., Moses v. K-Mart Corp., 922 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Fla. 1996), and Mo-
ses v. K-Mart Corp, 905 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Henderson v. AT & T Corp.,
933 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Tex. 1996), and Henderson v. AT & T Corp., 918 F. Supp.
1059 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Carlson v. WPLG-TV/10, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 646
(S.D. Fla. 1996), and Carlson v. WPLG-TV/10, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1596
(S.D. Fla. 1996); Sperling v. Hoffman LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1396 (D.N.J. 1996),
and Sperling v. Hoffman LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346 (D.N.J. 1996); Dalal v.
Alliant Techs., 927 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1996), and Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F.
Supp. 1374 (D. Colo. 1996); Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 941 F. Supp.
479 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 909 F. Supp. 268
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
59. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
60. 116 S. Ct. 1783 (1996).
61. See Cunningham v. Ardrox, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996);
Farrell v. Dolce, 648 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1996); American Mgmt. Ass'n v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 1996); Brayley v. Doehler-Jarvis Castings
Div. of NL Indus., 637 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1996); Jubic v. City of Troy City Corp.,
633 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1995); City of Phila. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 684 A.2d 204 (Penn. 1996); Newsom v. Textron Aerostructures, 924 S.W.2d
87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
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sufficiently sui generis that no generalizations, even as to gross
statistical factors such as the gender of the plaintiffs, ought to
be based on them. As for the state court rulings, they are the
decisions of courts of different levels, from different states, and
so they are simply too frail a base on which to build, or even
buttress, any generalizations.
To summarize: there were 325 ADEA decisions handed down
in 1995 and 1996 that were published for the first time in
1996. Of these, 316 make up the relevant data set-94 federal
court of appeals decisions and 222 federal district court rulings.
(All 325 decisions are listed in Appendix I, at the end of this
article.)"
C. Plaintiffs' Ages
The ages of the grievants-at the time of the alleged wrong-
ful acts which gave rise to their lawsuits-were identified in a
majority of the ninety-four court of appeals decisions that were
published in 1996. There were a total of seventy-three such
plaintiffs whose ages were indicated.' (In some instances
there was more than one plaintiff in a given case, and so the
seventy-three age-identified plaintiffs do not correlate with
seventy-three separate opinions.) Collection of the age data
establishes a median age of fifty-four for those age-identified
individuals who were plaintiffs (or who were represented by the
62. It seems tedious to list each case. However, I have found that in attempting
to parse other studies, such as the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, and
the study done by Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit that is reported in RicHAIW A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995)
[hereinafter POSNER], and which is discussed infra, the ability to check my figures
against theirs was foreclosed in some instances by those studies' lack of case-by-case
detail. I hope that someone will find the data base I have prepared useful as the
starting point for further work; to facilitate that possibility, it is necessary to identify
each case.
63. In one instance the same plaintiff generated two reported appellate court
decisions: Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996), dealing
with damages issues, and Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir.
1996), which dealt with the issue of liability. For the statistical purpose of recording
the numbers and ages of age-identified plaintiffs, the Rhodes plaintiff is only counted
once here.
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EEOC in suits filed by that agency on their behalf)." The dis-
tribution of ages is set forth in Table 1:65
TABLE 1
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF APPELLATE COURT
LrnGANTs WHO WERE PLAmTFFS
























































64. In some instances the EEOC was the plaintiff. Obviously, this entity has no
age in the sense that a human being does. However, if the age of the person on
whose behalf the agency was suing could be identified, that datum is included in
arriving at the figures in the text.
65. The age of each specific plaintiff is set forth, case by case, in Appendix II,
which appears at the end of this article.
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There were 222 federal district court opinions issued by
courts deciding cases that arose under the ADEA and that were
published for the first time in 1996. In a considerable number
of instances it was not possible (as was also the case regarding
the appellate court decisions) to identify the ages, at the times
of the alleged wrongs, of the plaintiffs. It also must be noted
that, as in the instance of appellate court opinions, there is not
a one-for-one correlation between the number of rulings and the
number of age-identified plaintiffs, since in some cases there
were multiple plaintiffs.' (Indeed, there was one case which
had the potential to really skew the totals: in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.7
the court noted that there were 431 plaintiffs, all age fifty-five
and over.e In another case-Bryson v. Fluor Corp.69 -there
were forty-four plaintiffs; their ages were not specified, howev-
er.) The age distribution for the 561 age-identified plaintiffs
(including the 431 individuals in McDonnell Douglas) is set
forth in Table 2.70
66. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published deci-
sion, I have only counted that suit once for the purposes of this tabulation.
67. 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
68. Class actions conducted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 may
not be maintained under the ADEA. See generally Price v. Maryland Casualty Co.
561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th
Cir. 1975); 1 EGLIT, supra note 2, § 6.45. But representative actions may be pursued,
whereby those individuals who wish to be represented by the party in court can (in-
deed must) affirmatively opt into a named plaintiff's lawsuit. This follows from § 7(b)
of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994), incorporating § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994),
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 200-219 (1994). Section 16 provides for
an opt-in representative action approach.
69. 914 F. Supp. 1292 (D.S.C. 1995).
70. The specific ages for each of the age-identified plaintiffs in the district court
cases are set forth in Appendix III, which appears at the end of this article.
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TABLE 2
AGE DIsTRIBuTIoN OF PLAuqTuI s IN
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The median age for the 131 age-identified plaintiffs (exclud-
ing all but one of the 431 age fifty-five plaintiffs, who of course
could range across the age spectrum from fifty-five up) is fifty-
five-very close, obviously, to that for the age-identified plain-
tiffs in the appellate court rulings.
In the earlier noted Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study1 the
researchers found that, in the 280 cases they identified as hav-
ing been decided over an eighteen-year period on substantive
grounds, 54% of the 219 age-identified plaintiffs-118 in to-
tal-were between ages fifty and fifty-nine.' Thirty-nine of the
219 age-identified plaintiffs, i.e., 18%, were between the ages of
forty and forty-nine; and sixty-two plaintiffs, or 28%, were be-
tween ages sixty and seventy. Of the 204 age-identified
plaintiffs in the 1996 cases (i.e., seventy-three plaintiffs whose
cases wound up being addressed by appellate courts, plus 131
plaintiffs in the non-appealed district court rulings), ninety-
three plaintiffs (including only one of the 431 age fifty-five plus
plaintiffs from the representative action suit)-or 45.6%--fit
within the fifty to fifty-nine age band. There were fifty-three
plaintiffs between ages forty and forty-nine, i.e., 25.5%. And
fifty-five plaintiffs, amounting to 27%, were between ages sixty
and seventy. (There were three plaintiffs who were over age
seventy.)
In sum, a comparison of the 1996 figures with the data de-
veloped for the period 1968-1986 reveals some notable changes.
Obviously, the sample sizes here are not particularly large, and
so it would be dangerous to draw any firm conclusions from the
numbers. Still, it is reasonable to take note, first, of the very
significant rise in the percentage of younger plaintiffs-an in-
crease of 41% more (25.5% of the total of age-identified plain-
tiffs in 1996 as compared to 18% in the earlier period) in their
forties, and, second, of the decline of 18% in the percentage of
plaintiffs in their fifties (45.6% of the total of age-identified
plaintiffs in 1996 as compared to 54% in the earlier period)."3
71. See Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at 39.
72. Because the researchers who conducted the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study,
supra note 16, did not separately set forth each plaintiffs age, it is not possible to
extract a median age from their data.
73. It must be acknowledged that these numbers are somewhat inaccurate since
they do not include the 430 uncounted age 55 plaintiffs in the earlier-noted EEOC
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In contrast, the percentage of plaintiffs in their sixties only
declined by 4% (27% of the age-identified plaintiffs in 1996 as
compared to 28% in the earlier period). What might explain the
shift towards younger plaintiffs (assuming that there is some-
thing more than normal statistical variation here and assum-
ing, further, that it is a legitimate tack to ignore the 431-plain-
tiff McDonnell Douglas suit, save for one of its 431 plain-
tiffS)?
74
The most apparent explanation is related to the fact that the
layoff rate for younger ADEA-protected workers, i.e., those in
their forties and early fifties, has increased dramatically in
recent years. Indeed, a study by Harvard University economics
professor James L. Medoff, published in 1993, showed that
workers ages thirty-five to fifty-four were 45% more likely dur-
ing the 1980s to suffer permanent job loss than was true dur-
ing the 1970s. 75 In a subsequent study Professor Medoff com-
pared the permanent layoff rates for middle-aged males (thirty-
five to fifty-four) in 1980, when the civilian unemployment rate
was 7.1%, and in 1992, when the civilian unemployment rate
was a comparable 7.4%. He found that the layoff rate more
than doubled, from just under 5% in 1980 to 11% in 1992. 7"
The more elusive matter is explaining why it is that middle-
aged workers have come to increasingly populate the ranks of
lawsuit, EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769
(E.D. Mo. 1996). Their exclusion seems reasonable, however, since but for the fortuity
of the case having been pursued by the EEOC, there would likely have been only one
plaintiff or perhaps a few, rather than 431 (unless the remaining 430 had opted into
the named plaintiffs suit, which, concededly, would be a viable Plssibility). In any
event, this massive multi-plaintiff suit is so unusual (although not unique) that not to
discount it would be to allow a legal rarity to swallow up a legitimate effort to make
sense of the remaining data. One more point: the actual plaintiff in the McDonnell
Douglas case was the EEOC, and so I could have just counted it-devoid of any age,
of course-as the plaintiff to be recorded in this tabulation effort. (The Schuster-
Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, which I am using for comparison purposes here,
does not indicate how the researchers handled EEOC suits for their tabulation pur-
poses).
74. See supra note 73.
75. See James L. Medoff, Middle-Aged and Out of Work, NSC REPORT SERIES
(National Study Center), Apr. 15, 1993.
76. See James L. Medoff, The Mid-Life Job Crisis-Growing Unemployed Due to
Permanent Layoff Among Middle-Aged American Men, NSC REPORT SERIES 2 (Nation-
al Study Center), May 12, 1994.
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the involuntarily unemployed. Professor Medoff offers as the
fundamental answer for the ouster of middle-aged male workers
from their jobs a cost-benefit analysis: middle-aged male work-
ers are paid significantly more than other workers, yet (1) on a
given job men do not rate higher in performance than do lesser-
paid women; (2) on a given job, senior employees do not receive
better performance ratings than do their younger, lesser-paid
counterparts; and (3) voluntary attrition of middle-aged male
workers is slight.7" Given these three factors, employers that
are interested in saving money see middle-aged male workers
as producing less benefit for the costs incurred than can be
produced by cheaper younger workers and female workers, and
so it is these thirty-five to fifty-four year olds who increasingly
bear the brunt of both individually targeted terminations and
larger-scale downsizing undertakings.7" Discharges in turn pro-
77. See id.
78. The New York Times in 1996 listed the 15 companies accounting for the
elimination of the most jobs in the years 1992-1996:
COMPANY JOBS CUT SHARE OF COMPANY'S
WORK FORCE (PERCENT)
AT & T 123,000 30
IBM 122,000 35
General Motors 99,400 29
Boeing 61,000 37
Sears, Roebuck 50,000 15
Digital Equipment 29,800 26
Lockheed Martin 29,100 17
BellSouth 21,200 23
McDonnell Douglas 21,000 20
Pacific Telesis 19,000 19
Delta Airlines 18,800 26
GTE 18,400 14
Nynex 17,400 33
Eastman Kodak 16,800 13
Baxter International 16,000 28
See Louis Uchitelle & N. R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of
Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at 14. The cited article was part of a series
done by the newspaper on the effects of downsizing. Based on its analysis of Depart-
ment of Labor and Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, the newspaper reported that of
office workers who lost their jobs in the years 1991-1993, 25% of the people laid off
were under age 30 and another 56% were between 30 and 50. Among factory work-
ers, 40% were under age 30 and 44% were between ages 30 and 50. See Patrick J.
Lyons & Josh Barbanel, More Than 43 Million Jobs Lost, Reaching Every Walk of
Life. . . , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at 14.
Reductions in force have generated a considerable number of ADEA suits. See
generally 2 EGLIT, supra note 2, §§ 7.20-.23.
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duce disgruntled former employees, and thus we see an in-
crease in the numbers of younger ADEA plaintiffs. 9
D. Gender Data Regarding Plaintiffs
The figures are more complete regarding the genders of the
1996 plaintiffs than they are regarding age, although again,
information could not be extracted from every ruling. Insofar as
the ninety-four court of appeals rulings are concerned, of the
113 litigants who were plaintiffs below (or were individuals on
whose behalf the EEOC sued)" and whose genders were iden-
tiffied in these decisions,81 eighty-six were males and twenty-
seven were females.8 2 In percentage terms, then, 76% of the
litigants who were plaintiffs below (or were represented by the
EEOC) were men and 24% were women. The numbers of course
are larger for the district court plaintiffs, given that there were
222 published decisions." The genders of 232 plaintiffs were
79. There clearly are correlations, albeit not perfect ones, between years on the
job, age, and wages. See infra Part IV.D.2. In other words, a veteran employee is
likely to be receiving a larger salary than that paid to a short-tenured worker, and a
longer-tenured, worker is likely to be older than one who has been on the job a short
period of time. Given these correlations, one might reason that an employer that
adopts a policy or pursues a practice of terminating employees who are deemed to be
earning too much is effectively terminating, in the main, older workers. Wages, in
other words, are a proxy for age. At one time this argument was a winning one,
albeit not in every instance. Perhaps the best-known decision embracing this wage-
age proxy analysis and applying it to hold an employer liable for violation of the
ADEA is Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). Metz was pretty
much consigned to desuetude by the Court in Haze'n Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604 (1993), a decision in which the Court not only debunked Metz but also seriously
undermined age-proxy analysis generally. See infra Part IV.D.2.
80. In some instances the EEOC was the plaintiff. Obviously, this government
agency has no gender, but if the gender of the person on whose behalf the agency
was suing could be identified, that datum is included in the foregoing figures.
81. Because some cases involved multiple plaintiffs, the number of gender-identi-
fied plaintiffs, i.e., 113, exceeds the actual number of published appellate court opin-
ions.
82. The gender of each plaintiff is identified, case by case, in Appendix II, which
appears at the end of this article. In one instance the same plaintiff generated two
reported appellate court decisions: Rhodes v. G'uiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615
(5th Cir. 1996), dealing with damages issues, and Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div.,
75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996), which dealt with the issue of liability. For the statistical
purpose of counting the number of gender-identified plaintiffs, the plaintiff in Rhodes
is only counted once.
83. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published deci-
sion, I have only counted that suit once for the purposes of this particular tabulation.
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identified.' Of these 147, or 63%, were men; 85 individuals,
equivalent to 37% of the total, were women.
Obviously, the district court figures differ considerably from
those for the appellate court decisions: the percentage of women
plaintiffs at the trial court level is more than 50% greater than
it is in the court of appeals cases. This disparity may be noth-
ing more than a statistical fluke. Or it simply may be attribut-
able to a bigger sample size, the larger number of district court
opinions being more reliable than the smaller data set of ap-
pellate court cases. On the other hand, the disparity may have
more substantive significance. If so, it then is worth conjectur-
ing as to what may account for the decline from 37% of the
plaintiffs at the trial court level being women to their being
only 24% of the total gender-identified plaintiffs in appellate
court cases.
Closer examination might reveal, for example, that generally
the jobs at stake in the appellate court rulings were both par-
ticularly remunerative and prestigious-and therefore more
worth fighting for-than the general run of jobs seen in the
district court cases. Given the oft-noted 'glass ceiling' that im-
pedes the opportunities of women to attain high level manage-
ment positions in the work world,' we would expect fewer
women (1) to have had those jobs and to thence have been dis-
charged from them or (2) to have been in line for promotion to
them. Ergo, we would expect to see fewer women litigants going
84. Because some cases involved multiple plaintiffs, the number of gender-identi-
fied plaintiffs exceeds the actual number of cases. However, it should be stressed that
it was not possible to identify the genders of the grievants in all 222 cases. The
gender of each plaintiff who could be so identified is set forth in Appendix III, which
appears at the end of this article.
85. See The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 202(aXl), 105 Stat.
1081, 1081: "despite a dramatically growing presence in the workplace, women and
minorities remain underrepresented in management and decisionmaking positions in
business." See generally Amy E. Decker, Women in Corporate Law: Rewriting the
Rules, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 511 (1996); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Pro-
fessional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1988).
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forward after having lost at the trial court level, given that
cost-benefit analysis now would cut against further effort.'
There is another, related factor as well: since women general-
ly are more likely to be occupying lower level, lower paying
positions, they would be less likely to have the financial re-
sources to pursue extended litigation, even if they wanted to,
than would their higher paid male counterpart plaintiffs. And
one more possibility: since a woman is more likely to be a vic-
tim of gender discrimination than is a man, she may win on a
claim made under Title VII, even while losing on the ADEA
claim.' If she does prevail on her Title VII gender discrimina-
tion cause of action, she will have less incentive to appeal the
86. The standard economic model for determining when a given individual is
likely to sue instructs us that a person will be most likely to do so when the expect-
ed return exceeds the expected cost. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC:
Reexamining the Ageney's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 28 (1996). Professor Selmi provides a useful list of the literature concerning eco-
nomic analyses of litigation decisions. See id. at 28 n.101, citing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes & Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. ITT.
1067 (1989); Earl Johnson Jr., Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation
Investment Decisions, 15 LAW & SOC'Y 567 (1981); Janice Madden & Jennifer Wissink,
Achieving Title VII Objective at Minimum Social Costs: Optimal Remedies and
Awards, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 997 (1985).
87. According to a survey of 335 cases decided between January 1, 1975, and
September 30, 1995, involving claims of both age and sex discrimination, the plain-
tiffs who invoked both the ADEA and Title VII prevailed about 34% of the time. See
Employment Discrimination Against Midlife and Older Women, supra note 46, at 26.
The significance of this datum is obscured, unfortunately, by the fact that "the 'win'
may have been on claims other than the ADEA or Title VII claims." Id. For example,
the actual basis for the decision could have been a state statutory or common law
claim or another federal statute, such as the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994).
The success rate for women plaintiffs in ADEA suits is discussed infra. See
infra Part 1.K5.
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ADEA loss' than would a losing male plaintiff, who either
prevails or fails solely on his ADEA claim.
Comparisons between the appellate court and district court
decisions aside, the foregoing data, when combined, establish
that of the 345 plaintiffs whose genders were identified,
233-or 68%-were men and 112, amounting to 32%, were
women. These findings reveal a notable change from the data
reported in the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study of 280 cases de-
cided on substantive grounds between 1968 and 1986.89 In that
study the researchers identified 84% of the plaintiffs as being
men, while only 16% were women.90 Thus, as compared to the
first eighteen years of the ADEA's life, we see today a dramatic
100% increase, from 16% to 32%, in the percentage of women
plaintiffs, while at the same time there has been a 20% de-
88. Double recoveries are not allowed. See generally Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
964 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993) (appellate court not-
ed, but did not directly address, fact that trial court had acted to bar recovery of lost
pension benefits under both ADEA and Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)). Thus, a plaintiff who prevails under Title VII is not
going to be able to recover a back pay award to compensate her for the wages she
lost as a result of the Title VII violation, and then recover the same back pay if she
prevails on her ADEA claim
Still, given that liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back pay recov-
ery may be obtained by a prevailing plaintiff under the ADEA but not under Title
VII, there is some incentive for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to pursue her ADEA
claim in the hope of obtaining a liquidated damages award. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994)
provides that '[a]mounts owing... shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages
or overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 [§ 16] or 217 [§ 17] of' the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 200-219 (1994), and in turn § 16(b) of
the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994), provides that an employer shall be liable for
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation "and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages."
Cutting against a plaintiffs ability to actually secure liquidated damages is the
fact that establishing entitlement to them is difficult because 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1994) requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted willfully. (The Supreme
Court most recently addressed the willfulness requirement in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).) In any event, the advantage that the ADEA provides
by authorizing such awards is offset by the fact that punitive damages-which until
Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071, were not available under that statute-now can be recovered by the pre-
vailing Title VII plaintiff (although the task of satisfying the statutory requirements
is a difficult one). In contrast, punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA.
See supra note 25.
89. See Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at iii
90. These percentages were based on there having been 239 individuals whose
genders could be identified: 201 males and 38 females.
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crease in the percentage of plaintiffs who are male.91 What
might account for this striking rise in women seeking ADEA
relief?
A first-stage explanation involves the increased number of
women in the work force. In 1982 52.6% of women sixteen
years of age and older were in the civilian labor force; by 1993
that percentage had increased to 57.9%.92 Much more signifi-
cant are the statistics regarding women who fall within the
ADEA's protection, i.e., those ages forty and over. As revealed
in Table 3, the numbers of ADEA-protected women increased
dramatically in terms of labor force participation: between 1982
and 1993 the number of women ages thirty-five through forty-
four grew by 63%, and the increase for women ages forty-five
through fifty-four was 53.5%. In absolute numbers the total in-
91. The 1996 published cases also depart considerably, although not to as great a
degree, from the figures reported by Judge Posner in his study of 430 ADEA cases
decided during an 18-month period in 1993 and 1994. He reported that 24.9% of the
plaintiffs were women. See POSNER, supra note 62, at 346 n.49.
Some, if not all, of the variances between my data and that reported in the
Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, and the Posner study, supra note 62,
may be explained by the fact that I counted all identifiable plaintiffs, so that if there
were four women plaintiffs in one case, each one was counted in arriving at the total
number of women plaintiffs. In the other studies, it is possible that no matter how
many women might have been plaintiffs in a given suit, the researchers only counted
the lawsuit, itself, rather than the number of litigants. So one suit, with five plain-
tiffs, would be counted as "one" for the purposes of establishing the number of female
plaintiffs. But that difference in approach (as to the existence of which I can only
speculate, since the authors did not address this matter, so far as I can tell) at best
could account for only a sniall portion of the variances, since there were only a few
cases with multiple female plaintiffs in my study: Mitchell v. Sisters of Charity of the
Incarnate Word, 934 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (two); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,
923 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Mich 1995) (three); Henderson v. AT & T Corp., 918 F. Supp.
1059 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (five); Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
aff'd. without opinion, 101 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996) (four). Moreover, these multiple
female plaintiff situations in any event were offset (for the purposes of computing
percentages of men and women plaintiffs) by multiple male plaintiff cases, for which
I counted-as with the women-each individual plaintiff in arriving at my totals. See
MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (two);
Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (five);
Ligon v. Triangle Pac. Corp., 935 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (two); Golombiewski
v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (two); Dittman v. General Motors
Corp.-Delco Chassis Div., 941 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1996) (four); Moses v. K-Mart
Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (two); Derthick v. Bassett-Walker, Inc., 904
F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Va. 1995) (two); Pollard v. Azeon Corp., 904 F. Supp. 762 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (three).
92. See Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., The 2005 labor force: growing, but slowly, 118
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Nov. 1995, at 29, 39.
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crease for these two age groups of women was approximately
ten million.
TABLE 393
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY WoMEN
AGE PARTICIPATION LEVEL CHANGE ANNUAL
GROUP RATE (1000's) (0) GROWTH
RATE
1982 1993 1994 1982 1993 1994 1982-93 1982-93
16-19 51.4 49.8 51.3 4,056 3,261 3,585 -19.6 -2.0
20-24 69.8 71.3 71.0 7,477 6,393 6,692 -14.5 -1.4
25-34 68.0 73.6 74.0 13,393 15,412 15,499 -15.1 1.3
35-44 68.0 76.7 77.1 9,651 15,727 16,259 63.0 4.5
45-54 61.6 73.5 74.6 7,105 10,907 11,357 53.5 4.0
55-64 41.8 47.3 48.9 4,888 5,228 5,289 7.0 .6
65+ 7.9 8.2 9.2 1,185 1,479 1,658 24.8 2.0
Elementary logic readily supports the conclusion that the
presence of more women workers in the workplace creates more
potential occasions for women to be the subjects of discriminato-
ry practices and decisions. Add to this demographic change
another factor: by 1996, as compared to 1986, there were more
women-both in absolute and relative numbers-who had been
in the work force long enough to have risen to positions of
relative importance within their companies and agencies, or
who by dint of seniority and experience at least had the poten-
tial for being promoted to such positions." Since, as noted in-
93. See id.
94. A front page article appearing in the February 10, 1997, edition of The Wall
Street Journal is apropos here:
A growing cadre of women who launched careers in the 1970s are
breaking through cracks in the glass ceiling, landing top front-line cor-
porate jobs once monopolized by men.
Just in the past few weeks, there have been several high-profile
ascensions ....
Of course, none of this means that American corporations have
suddenly become level playing fields after years of male domination. The
New York research group Catalyst made headlines last fall with a study
showing that just 2% of senior executives at large corporations are
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fra,95 management level and white collar nonmanagement level
employees typically are the individuals who confront (or at least
claim to be the victims of) age-based discrimination, increased
numbers of women of the right ages and at the right places in
corporate structures are going to increase the potential for more
age discrimination lawsuits.
Perhaps, also, there is an increasing willingness among wom-
en today to sue, in contrast to their (hypothetically) more com-
pliant and unassuming counterparts of the '70s and early '80s
who expected less by way of fairness in the workplace and so
more readily (albeit likely begrudgingly) accepted what they
thought was the inescapable natural order of things. Or, mus-
ings about female workers' psychology aside, perhaps the facts
are that more women today are suing because they have great-
er resources, i.e., money and/or willing attorneys, with which to
mount courtroom battles. Fifteen years ago, a woman who was
consigned to a low-level, low-paying, ministerial position would
have had neither much incentive nor the financial ability to sue
if she were discharged from that post or if she were denied
advancement to some only mildly better, but still uninspiring,
job slot. There was both little to gain, and considerable expo-
sure to litigation expenses which, if she lost, she would not be
able to recover. Today, in contrast, there are more women, at
higher levels, whose denials of promotion, or discharges, or
demotions, mean much more in terms of lost prestige, lost in-
come, and lost power. Thus, the incentive to sue is stronger
because the loss is greater, and the financial gains to be won
make suing more attractive from the economic perspective of
both the potential plaintiff and, particularly importantly, her
age discrimination-sensitized contingent fee attorney.
women.
But, at the same time, it would be a mistake to ignore obvious
evidence that something important is beginning to happen. The same
Catalyst study, after all, also found that a 'breakthrough generation" of
women is beginning to attain power ....
Joseph B. White & Carol Hymowitz, Watershed Generation of Women Executives is
Rising to the Top, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at Al, A6.
95. See infra Part II.F.
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E. Plaintiffs' Race
The racial categorizations of plaintiffs elicited mention so
rarely in the appellate court and trial court rulings which I




In most (but not all) of the ninety-four published court of
appeals decisions the occupations of the litigants who were
plaintiffs below (or on whose behalf the EEOC filed suit) were
reported. In generalizing, rather than detailing each plaintiffs
job individually, I have used broad categories which do not con-
form to any official dictionary of occupations. 7 There likely
could be disagreement, then, as to my rough-and-ready ap-
proach. Nonetheless, I think the exercise adequate to provide
clear, although not finely tuned, compilations of the plaintiffs'






WHITE COLLAR, NONMANAGEMENT 30
BLUE COLLAR 9
SALES 6
PUBLC SAFETY OFFICERS 4
EDUCATORS 4
FLGHT AirENDANTS 29
96. In the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at 38, the researchers
reported that the race of the plaintiff was noted in only 26 out of the 280 cases they
studied.
97. At any rate, the details of the plaintiffs' jobs typically were not fully de-
scribed; thus, in a number of instances one could not, with confidence, match the
plaintiffs with official job categories, even if one tried to do so.
98. A plaintiff-by-plaintiff identification of work activity is provided in Appendix
I1, which appears at the end of this article.
99. The total of 95 occupations listed exceeds the total of cases published because
in some cases there were multiple plaintiffs. In one instance, the same plaintiff gen-
erated two reported appellate court decisions: Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82
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The numbers obviously are higher for the 222 published
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Out of ninety-four published court of appeals decisions, there
were only three instances in which the ages of the defendants
(or of the individual employees of the defendants who were
responsible for the decisions that gave rise to the lawsuits)
were identified. These ages were forty-two, forty-six, and
sixty.' The data are no more elucidating in the instance of
the 222 federal district court rulings: the age of the employer or
decision maker was identified in only three cases. In one, the
F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996), dealing with damages issues, and Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996), which dealt with the issue of liability. For
the purpose of tabulating plaintiffs' occupations, Rhodes was only counted once.
100. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published
decision, I have only counted that suit once for this tabulation.
101. See Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996) (age 42):
Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 247
(1997) (age 46); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996) (age 60).
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employer or decision maker was identified as being age forty; in
a second he was identified as being age sixty-plus; and in the
third case the three decision makers were identified as being
ages forty-four, forty-four, and fifty-two. 2 Thus, while the
data set-93 appellate court rulings plus 216 district court deci-
sions,"°3 for a total of 309 decisions-would seem to afford an
adequate base for drawing generalizations, the specific data
provided regarding defendants' ages are far too meager to ven-
ture anything but the mere reporting of the handful of figures
to be gleaned from the decisions.
What makes this lack of data regarding the ages of decision
makers worthy of note here is its relevance to the position
staked out by Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit regarding the ADEA. Judge
Posner has addressed issues involving age and the law in Aging
and Old Age,'" in which he announces the sweeping conclu-
sion that the ADEA is "at once inefficient, regressive, and
harmful to the elderly." "°5 In partial support of his general po-
sition he relies (without apparent empirical support, as it turns
out) upon the ages of decision makers as an important linchpin
in his analysis. In this regard he makes the observation that
there are two types of discrimination-statistical discrimination,
i.e., stereotyping,' °s and animus-based discrimination, which
102. See Walker v. Southern Holdings, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 197 (M.D. La. 1996)
(three decision makers, ages 44, 44, and 52); Stratton v. Department for the Aging
for City of N.Y., 922 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (age 40); Waldemar v. American
Cancer Soc'y, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1411 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (age 60).
103. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published deci-
sion, I have only counted that suit once for the purposes of this tabulation. Thus, the
number of appellate court rulings counted here is 93, since two opinions involved the
same litigants. See supra note 99. Likewise, with regard to the data set of 222 pub-
lished district court decisions, there were six instances in which the pairs of litigants
generated two reported opinions, for a total of 12 opinions. See supra note 58. Count-
ing each of these sets of multiple rulings only once, the total number of district court
rulings reduces down-for the purposes of the instant tabulation-to 216.
104. See POSNER, supra note 62. This book has received both excessively effusive
praise, see Thomas S. Ulen, The Land and Economics of the Elderly, 4 ELDERLAW J.
99 (1996), and more balanced criticism, see Paul H. Brietzke & Linda S. Whitton, An
Old(er) Master Stands on the Shoulders of Ageism to Stake Another Claim for Law
and Economics, 31 VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REV. 89 (1996).
105. POSNER, supra note 62, at 319.
106. This type of discrimination entails "the failure or refusal, normally motivated
by the costs of information, to distinguish a particular member of a group from the
average member." Id. at 322. The phenomenon of stereotyping is, in Judge Posner's
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he defines as "a systematic undervaluation, motivated by igno-
rance, viciousness, or irrationality, of the value of older people
in the work place."' 7 Judge Posner rejects the latter type of
discrimination as a credible explanation for the supposed disad-
vantages older workers confront:
[T]he people who make employment policies for corporate
and other employers and most of those who carry out those
policies by making decisions about hiring or firing specific
workers are at least 40 years old and often much old-
er .... Employers-who have a direct financial stake in
correctly evaluating the abilities of their employees and for
the most part are not young themselves-are unlikely to
harbor either serious misconceptions about the vocational
capacities of the old... or a generalized antipathy toward
old people.
To put the point differently, the kind of "we-they" think-
ing that fosters racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is
unlikely to play a large role in the treatment of the elderly
worker. Not because a young person will (in all likelihood)
someday be old .... But because the people -who do the
hiring and firing are generally as old as the people they
hire and fire and are therefore unlikely to mistake those
people's vocational abilities.'
Granted, there is a superficial perspicacity to Judge Posner's
off-the-cuff ventures into demographic and psychological analy-
sis. But actual facts-i.e., the 1996 data-are more persuasive.
One set of data, discussed supra, establishes that the median
ages of age-identified plaintiffs in the appellate court and dis-
view, "more plausible and better substantiated than animus discrimination against the
old," and he explains how such stereotyping operates to disadvantage competent indi-
viduals:
[T]here is a great deal of variance in the capacities, behaviors, and atti-
tudes of persons in particular age groups and, partly as a result, great
overlap between the capacities of persons in different age groups. People
age at different rates and from different levels of capacity. So if age is
used as a proxy for attributes desired or disliked by an employer, some
people who are entirely competent to perform to the employer's specifica-
tions will not be hired, or will be fired or forced to retire to make away
[sic] for young people who actually are less able.
Id. at 322-23.
107. Id. at 320.
108. Id. at 320-21.
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trict court rulings were fifty-four and fifty-five, respectively. At
the appellate court level fifty-seven of the seventy-three age-
identified plaintiffs-77% were ages fifty or older. And at the
district level ninety-five, or 73%, of the 131 age-identified
plaintiffs (with only one of the 431 plaintiffs in the earlier-dis-
cussed representative action suit being counted)"° were ages
fifty and above. Given these data, it seems reasonable to conjec-
ture that a considerable number of the decision makers who
made the decisions that brought the ADEA plaintiffs to court in
the cases that were published in 1996 were years younger than
the plaintiffs. To make the same point with more hortatory
rhetoric: the 'up-and-comers' who, after a corporate buy-out, are
intent upon discarding the 'over the hill' managers who ran
Company X under the previous ownership, or the newly promot-
ed vice president at Company Y who regards her new subordi-
nates (who also happen to be long-term employees) as not being
'on the same page' as she is and so wants to promote her own
team members, quite likely are going to be in the thirty- and
forty-something age ranges and thus are not going to be con-
temporaries of those fifty-something men and women who they
fire, demote or reject.
In sum, Judge Posner's hypothesizing as to the motivations
that prompt decision makers in dealing with older employees
and job applicants can be countered by an equally reasonable
counter hypothesis. (Remember, also, that the data as to the
ages of decision makers, although painfully meager, largely
refute Judge Posner's basic assumption, i.e., that decision mak-
ers are the same age as those as to whom the decisions are
made: the eight decision makers whose ages were identified in
the 1996 cases were, as pointed out earlier, forty, forty-two,
forty-four, forty-four, forty-six, fifty-two, sixty, and sixty-plus. Of
these eight, the first six were younger than the large majority
of ADEA plaintiffs identified in the 1996 published cases. And
the first five-those whose ages were identified as forty, forty-
two, forty-four, forty-four, and forty-six-were considerably
younger.) To the extent, then, that Judge Posner's argument
dismissing age-based animus discrimination as playing a signifi-
cant role in the workplace is grounded on the proposition that
109. See supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text.
1997] 617
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:579
the decision makers in scenarios that wind up in the courts as
ADEA-based disputes are contemporaries of the plaintiffs-and,
indeed, his argument concerning animus as a motivating force
does rest in significant measure on that proposition-Judge
Posner simply does not have the data to support his analysis.
Make no mistake, however, about the depth of my disagree-
ment with Judge Posner's tack. My criticism of his assumption-
based, as opposed to data-based, assessment of the dynamics of
employer decision making does not lead me to further posit
that he is wrong in discounting animus, e.g., hatred, fear,
loathing, as being the dark, mean-spirited source of ageism in
the workplace. In fact, I agree with him in considerable degree.
I do not think that the same ugly psychological apparatus
which attends racism also accompanies, or accounts for, ageism.
But that is not because it is fifty-year-olds who are firing other
fifty-year-olds. Rather, it is because the whole culturally perva-
sive syndrome of ageism-whether manifested in the workplace,
or by way of the possible discounting of the veracity of older
witnesses in the courtroom, 10 or in the condescension, stereo-
typing, and use of caricatures that commonly accompany youn-
ger peoples' interactions with, and/or depictions of, the
110. See generally A. Daniel Yarmey, Accuracy and Credibility of the Elderly Wit-
ness, 3 CAN. J. AGING 79 (1984).
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old'1 --is milder in its generative forces and its expressions
than some other "isms.""
2
111. Dr. Robert Butler, in WHY SURVIVE? GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 6-7 (1975), re-
cited a litany of the demeaning and inaccurate stereotypes often inflicted upon older
adults:
An older person thinks and moves slowly. He does not think as he
used to, nor as creatively. He is bound to himself and to his past and
can no longer change or grow. He can neither learn well nor swiftly, and
even if he could, he would not wish to .... Tied to his personal tradi-
tions and growing conservatism, he dislikes innovations and is not dis-
posed to new ideas. Not only can he not move forward, he often moves
backwards. He enters a second childhood, caught often in increasing
egocentricity and demanding more from his environment than he is will-
ing to give to it. Sometimes he becomes more like himself, a caricature
of a lifelong personality. He becomes irritable and cantankerous, yet
shallow and enfeebled. He lives in his past. He is behind the times. He
is aimless and wandering of mind, reminiscing and garrulous. Indeed, he
is a study in decline. He is the picture of mental and physical failure.
He has lost and cannot replace friends, spouse, jobs, status, power, influ-
ence, income. He is often stricken by diseases which in turn restrict his
movement, his enjoyment of food, the pleasures of well being. His sexual
interest and activity decline. His body shrinks; so, too, does the flow of
blood to his brain. His mind does not utilize oxygen and sugar at the
same rate as formerly. Feeble, uninteresting, he awaits his death, a bur-
den to society, to his family, and to himself.
See also GEORGIA M. BARROW & PATRIcA A. SMrrH, AGING, AGEISM AND SocIETY 74
(1979); Erdman A.B. Palmore, Attitudes Toward Aging as Shown by Humor, 12 GER-
ONTOLOGIST 181 (1971).
112. This is not the forum in which to expound upon the possible factors that
account, either generally or in specific contexts, for age bias. Let me here offer just
some sketchy observations.
For one, I think it important to appreciate that age bias (like other biases) is
in part situational: what a bigot may find offensive in the workplace may not trouble
him in the least in his home setting. In other words, an age discriminator may reject
a 60-year-old for a job, while welcoming her as a neighbor or tenant. Second, there
seem to be a bunch of diffuse possible explanations for negative attitudes regarding
older people (again, however, one must understand that those attitudes may not exist
in each and every setting):
a Old age generally is accompanied by declines in physical well-being, which
few find enviable.
m The incidence of certain types of intellectual and cognitive disorders increas-
es with age, and again one has to strain mightily to find anything positive in
dementia. (It is erroneous to think that dementia or senility are every old
person's inevitable fate. The sad fact is, however, that the lifetime risk of de-
veloping Alzheimer's Disease, which is the most common cause of debilitating
dementia, is 15%; more to the point here, the prevalence of the disease doubles
every five years after age 65, so that 40% of the population age 85 and over
will have the disease. Steven G. Post et al., The Clinical Introduction of Genet-
ic Testing for Alzheimer Disease, 277 JAMA 832, 832 (1997).
a As a cultural matter, Americans value productivity and accomplishment, and
so to the extent that older people are unproductive, i.e., not working, we deval-
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H. The Defendants' Fields of Activity
Insofar as types of activities are concerned, the entities
whose actions or decisions gave rise to ADEA suits in the nine-
ty-four appellate court cases published in 1996 exhibited the
ue them.
Perhaps the old, because they are closer to the ends of their lives than are
the young, trigger negative responses because of the personal anxieties and
fears most of us have regarding death, itself.
o There are data supporting the view that the elderly have fared better eco-
nomically in recent decades than have the young, there is, in addition, a grow-
ing perception that the elderly are consuming more than their fair share of
public financial resources. Envy, resentment, even hostility, can flow from such
data and perceptions. See generally Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for
the Elderly: Age Discrimination by Another Name?, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 813, 823-
32 (1989).
For a further exploration of the roots of ageism, see Thomas R. Cole, THE JOURNEY
OF LIFE xxvi (1993):
One psychological explanation [for the denigration of old age] is
self-concept. Someone having a positive self-concept may be less prone to
believe the negative stereotypes of other groups. And when that person
ages, he or she may well choose to accept only positive stereotypes of
age. We find support for this hypothesis in a study which showed that
those who accept negative attitudes toward old people tend toward self
derogation .... Psychologists use the term "projection" here. If we feel
negative about ourselves, we project it onto others. This might explain
why prejudice against elders correlates with one's personal degree of
anxiety about death ....
Three well-known theories to explain racism may also explain age-
ism... : 1) "The Authoritarian Personality," in which less-educated,
rigid, untrusting, insecure persons are the ones who hold prejudices; 2)
"the Frustration-Aggression" hypothesis, in which those who are frus-
trated, perhaps by poverty and low status, take it out in aggression to-
wards others; and 3) "Selective Perception" in which we see what we
expect to see and selectively ignore what we don't expect to see. Our
perceptions then confirm our stereotypes. For example, we may "see" only
old drivers driving badly. We don't "see" young drivers mishandling a
vehicle. Nor do we "see" all the older drivers who do well ....
Of course, much of the foregoing does not really explain bias in the workplace
against men and women in their forties and fifties and maybe even sixties; these
individuals are just too young to be characterized as elderly and then subjected to
the stereotyping that goes along with that label But recognition of this fact is not
inconsistent either with my position or Judge Posner's regarding age bias in the
workplace: we beth are of the view that invidious animus plays a minor role, at
most, in explaining the difficulties older men and women confront in the workplace
(although we certainly disagree as to whether these difficulties should be denominated
as reflecting illegal discrimination and, more importantly, should serve as the bases
for legal redress).
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usual range of business and governmental niches." Not sur-
prisingly, the vast majority-sixty-were corporations; 4 they
engaged in a variety of activities: the manufacture and sale of
pharmaceuticals; the production of furniture; the processing and
marketing of petroleum products; and much more. There were
thirteen governmental defendants, ranging from United States
government agencies to city governments; these thirteen entities
included one public hospital and one entity acting as an em-
ployment agency. Educational institutions (one of which was a
medical school) constituted eight of the defendants. There were
five non-governmental health care providers, four of which were
hospitals; five financial institutions, four of which were banks;
one trade association; and one accounting firm.
Examination of the 222 nonappealed district court rulings
revealed a similar group of defendants."1 3
113. The individually identified entities are set forth in Appendix H, which appears
at the end of this article. Of the entities which made decisions that gave rise to the
ADEA suits which ultimately wound up in federal appellate courts, there were no
labor organizations and only one employment agency. All the rest were entities ac-
cused of wrongdoing in the context of their roles as employers. In one instance, the
same plaintiff generated two reported appellate court decisions: Rhodes v. Guiberson
Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996), dealing with damages issues, and Rhodes
v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996), which dealt with the issue
of liability. For the statistical purpose of identifying the nature of the defendant's
activity, Rhodes is only counted once.
114. The ADEA applies only to entities that have at least 20 or more employees
for 20 or more weeks for each working day in the current or preceding calendar year
(ie., the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred). 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
Thus, in ascertaining the size of the corporate defendants in the reported cases, one
can confidently infer that these defendants at least satisfied the 20-employee criterion
since satisfaction of the numerosity requirement was not at issue in these rulings.
Beyond that, however, it was difficult in many instances to readily determine whether
the entity was a small, mid-sized, or large corporation, although sometimes the facts
recited in an opinion provided an insight and sometimes a corporation was well
known and so one could, without more, conclude that it was indeed a large operation.
In any event, for my purposes I did not think it necessary to engage in research to
parse out the sizes of the numerous corporations that appeared as defendants either
in cases that were appealed or in the non-appealed federal district court decisions.
115. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published deci-
sion, I only counted that suit once for the purposes of this tabulation.
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TABLE 6
DEFENDANTS' AcTIVITIEs IN
FEDERAL DISTRCT COURT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS 76
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES OR CORPORATIONS 38
MANUFACTURERS 20
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(INCLUDING 7 PRrVATE AND 1 PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY, 1 MEDICAL COLLEGE, AND
1 ADDITIONAL INsTrUTION) 11
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS









NOT-FOR-PROFIT SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS 2
BEER BREWERS 2












CHARITABLE NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 1116
116. Judge Posner, writing in POSNER, supra note 62, at 334 argues that employ-
ers "have their own incentives, unrelated to law, to avoid firing competent employees
of any age, even if replacements are available," since the "employer has invested in
the employee, and if the employee is still productive the employer is continuing to
earn a return on the investment." From this perception Judge Posner proceeds to
posit that the ADEA may be of little effect in the private sector:
The analysis to this point suggests that insofar as the age discrim-
ination law forbids discrimination against individual employees, as distin-
guished from discrimination against age-defined classes of employees
(mainly through mandatory retirement at fixed ages . . . ), it may. . .
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I. Underlying Claims
The federal appellate court opinions which were published in
1996 that dealt with claims made in cases filed under the
ADEA involved a number of issues, almost all of which are fa-
miliar to students of the statute. Not uncommonly, however, the
alleged substantive wrong giving rise to the ADEA lawsuit in
the first instance was not the issue actually addressed by the
court. For example, while an allegedly discriminatory discharge
may have prompted a given plaintiff to sue, the issue presented
on appeal could have been whether the defendant's motion to
dismiss-based on the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff
have little effect. The abuse against which it is directed, the arbitrary
treatment of older workers, would be rare, at least in private markets,
even without the law. It would be rare because . .. employers have
market incentives to avoid the abuse.
Id. Judge Posner then goes on to note that his analysis, while apt (in his view) re-
garding the private labor market, would not necessarily hold up with respect to the
public and not-for-profit sectors:
Public and not-for-profit employers can be expected to discriminate more
than private for-profit employers, for two reasons. They face fewer mar-
ket pressures to minimize their labor costs; and the constraint on their
obtaining profits gives them an incentive to substitute nonpecuniary for
pecuniary income, and one form of nonpecuniary income is avoiding unde-
sired personal associations.
Id. Judge Posner goes on to report that in the 256 cases in his sample from which
he was able to extract the necessary information, "23 percent were brought against
government employers and 7.8 percent against nonprofit employers." Id. at 335. These
percentages, he recounts, "greatly exceed the percentages for the labor force for which
these two classes of employer account." Id.
Judge Posner's data jibe, more or less, with those set out in the text for the
1996 published cases. But while he attributes the higher ADEA case rate for govern-
ment employers to the lack of market forces and the concomitant willingness of these
employers to fire useful older workers in order to achieve removal of people with
whom younger people do not wish to associate, the more plausible explanation (and
one which need not rely on undocumented psychological speculation as to "avoiding
undesired personal associations") looks to the well-known public antipathy regarding
paying taxes, and to a more generalized public hostility toward, and distrust of, gov-
ernment. This resistance to paying taxes, combined with that hostility and distrust,
produce cutbacks both in existing personnel (ie., downsizing) and in the number of
higher level job slots available for potential promotees. (Supportive of this scenario is
a recent article in The New York Times reporting that "[b]etween 1979 and 1993,
454,000 public service jobs vanished." Louis Uchitelle & N. 1. Kleinfield, On the Bat-
tlefields of Business, Millions of Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at 1, 14, 16.)
Shrinking governmental agencies produce disgruntled men and women who, having
been terminated or having been denied the promotions they desired, proceed to seek
legal redress.
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had failed to timely file the required administrative charge of
discrimination with the EEOC117-- had properly been granted.
What follows in Table 7 is a list of the claims that in the
first instance gave rise to the lawsuits that ultimately made
their way into the appellate courts,"' In Part III.J. I list the
actual bases for dispositions by the appellate courts.1"
117. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
118. The totals confirm what anyone who has read even a few appellate opinions
knows: more than one issue can, and often does, arise in a given appeal. Thus, the
number of issues identified exceeds the number of published rulings. The individual
cases, with the issues initially giving rise to the lawsuits that culminated in these
appeals being specifically identified, are listed in Appendix 11, which appears at the
end of this article.
119. This is not to say, however, that I identified every aspect of legal analysis
that was utilized in the course of a court's disposition of a case. For example, in de-
ciding Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2500 (1996), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that disparate impact
analysis is inapplicable to ADEA claims. While that ruling was relevant to resolution
of the ultimate issue, the issue that in fact was presented for ultimate disposition by
the court was whether the employee had violated the ADEA by refusing to hire the
plaintiff. Thus, disparate impact analysis is not included in Table 7 as one of the
issues presented for resolution by the appellate courts.
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TABLE 7
CLAIMS INITIALY GIVING RISE TO SUIT
IN CASES DECIDED BY COURTS OF APPEALS
DISCHARGE (INCLUDING 3 RETALIATORY
DISCHARGES, BUT EXCLUDING
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGES) 12°  60
DEMOTION 8
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 7
REFUSAL TO PROMOTE 7
RETALIATION (NOT INCLUDING 3 RETALI-
ATORY DISCHARGES OR I RETALIA-
TORY DEMOTION) 5
REFUSAL TO HIRE OR RE-HIRE 5
REFUSAL TO TRANSFER 2
REMOVAL OF PLAINTIFF FROM BOARD OF
DIRECTORS 2
PRIVILEGES OF EMPLOYMENT
(FAILURE TO ASSIST PLAINTIFF IN
FINDING NEW JOB; NONSELECTION
OF PLAINTIFF FOR SABBATICAL) 2
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT; HARASSMENT 2
BENEFITS 1
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER 1
MANDATORY RETIREMENT POLICY 1
EEOC's INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY 1
DISCRIMINATORY TESTING BY STATE
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY 1
COMPENSATION 1
DENIAL OF TENURE 1
120. I did not make a distinction between (1) a discharge based on an alleged
failing of an individual employee, such as his or her inability to perform the job; (2)
a discharge made in the context of a reduction in force, where the employer typically
claims that economic imperatives were the animating force in its decision to fire the
individual; and (3) a retaliatory discharge, ie., a discharge allegedly resulting from an
employee's (a) having earlier opposed the employer's alleged wrongdoing or (b) having
participated in enforcement of the ADEA-typically by filing a charge of unlawful
discrimination with the EEOC. I did separate out constructive discharges (i.e., a dis-
charge flowing from an employee quitting a position when he or she felt, so he or
she later claimed, that the job situation was an intolerable one). I concede that a
case could be made for greater precision. Indeed, I hope that the data base set forth
in this article will assist future researchers in looking more deeply. For my purposes,
I thought it sufficient simply to identify those cases in which the plaintiff claimed
that he or she was the victim of age-based discrimination that ultimately manifested
itself in his or her being ousted from the job.
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Thus, in ninety-two collated appellate court rulings"2 dis-
charge claims (including claims of constructive discharge)-gave
rise to suit in sixty-seven, or 73 %,' of the cases." To look
121. In one instance it was not possible to determine what gave rise to the suit.
See Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996). This case is thus excluded from the
computations here. In another instance, the same parties generated two reported
appellate court decisions: Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir.
1996), dealing with damages issues, and Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d
989 (5th Cir. 1996), which dealt with the issue of liability. For the statistical purpose
of identifying the issues giving rise to suit, Rhodes is only counted once. Thus, the
total data set here is reduced down to 92 cases.
122. If one were to look more broadly-as it certainly would be legitimate to
do--to involuntary terminations generally, one would add three more cases: the two
involving removals of employees from their companies' boards of directors, Le., Adam-
Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1996), and EEOC v. John-
son & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996), as well as the case involving a
state mandatory retirement policy, EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Department, 80
F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996). Thereby, one would arrive at
a total of 70 cases, or 76%, in which involuntary ouster from a position was the
underlying issue giving rise to suit.
123. DISCHARGE: EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996);
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat
Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466
(8th Cir. 1996); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996);
Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1996); Greene v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996); Testerman v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp.,
98 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d
Cir. 1996); Murff v. Professional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Gathright
v. Teachers' Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir.
1996); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Burger v.
New York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94
F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1996); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 94 F.3d 338 (7th Cir.
1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996); Armstrong v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 93 F.3d 1505 (11th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d
248 (5th Cir. 1996); Dranchak v. Azko Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hop-
per v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1996); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over
Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270
(7th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d
Cir. 1996); Atkinson v. Denton Pubrg Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996); Mills v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuka v. Thomson
Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d
980 (10th Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 684 (1997); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996);
Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533 (1st Cir. 1996); Haun v.
Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1996); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81
F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38 (5th Cir.
1996); Hall v. Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach.,
Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 295 (1996); Grayson v. K-Mart
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at a different set of figures, of the total of 107 underlying
claims that could be identified in the ninety-two cases, the
sixty-seven discharge claims made up 63% of the total-still a
very considerable majority.'
In the 222 federal district court rulings a familiar array of
underlying claims, i.e., claims giving rise to suit in the first in-
stance, again is seen, as set forth in Table 8. Again, one must
be mindful that the issue giving rise to the plaintiff's claim
may not have been the one addressed in the reported decision.
Table 8 addresses the basic issues giving rise to the law-
Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447 (1996); O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996); Weisbrot v. Medical
College of Wis., 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1996); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78
F.3d 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs.
of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); Garner v. Arvin Indus., 77 F.3d 255
(8th Cir. 1996); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck
Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996); Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th cir. 1996); Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,
75 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Smith v. Cook County, 74
F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996); Swaim v.- Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1996); Sutera v.
Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72
F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995); Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995);
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995); Gadsby v. Norwalk
Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container
Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE: Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d
727 (8th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Diez v. Minneso-
ta Mining & Mfg., 88 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Burks v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 81
F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76
F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996).
This prevalence of discharge claims is consistent with what is seen in the case
law developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17. See John J. Donohue, DI & Peter Siegelnan, The Changing Nature of Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991). Professors
Donohue and Siegelman reason that the higher the wages attached to the job from
which an individual was discharged, the greater his or her willingness to sue. Id. at
1006-11.
124. The claim or claims giving rise to each lawsuit are set forth in Appendix 11,
which appears at the end of this article.
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suits;' in Part III.J. I address the grounds on which the cas-
es were actually decided.
TABLE 8
CLAIMS GIVING RISE TO
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES
DISCHARGE 142
RETALIATION 27
DENIAL OF PROMOTION 27






REFUSAL TO TRANSFER 4
COMPENSATION 3
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 2
INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 2
DISCRIMINATORY REASSIGNMENT 1
DISCRIMINATORY PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL 1
Loss OF SENIORITY 1
CHANGE OF DUTIES 1
REFUSAL TO RECERTIFY ATTORNEY 1
OBLIGATION OF INSURER TO DEFEND INSURED 1
OTHER 1
Not surprisingly, discharges-including constructive discharg-
es-again made up the majority of claims: of 216 reported cas-
es 6 158, or 73% (the same percentage derived for the appel-
late court data), involved a discharge claim. Looking at a differ-
125. The specific claim(s) giving rise to each lawsuit is set forth on a case-by-case
basis in Appendix III, which appears at the end of this article. More than one claim
could exist in a given lawsuit. For example, f plaintiff may have contended both that
she was the victim of a discriminatory demotion and, following that, a discriminatory
discharge. Thus, the totals for issues exceed the total number of published rulings. In
a few cases, it was not possible to identify the issue generating the lawsuit in the
first instance, since the reported opinion focused exclusively on some other matter,
such as a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence.
126. In those instances where one lawsuit generated more than one published deci-
sion, I only counted that suit once for the purposes of this tabulation. Thus, the data
set for this particular compilation is 216 cases, given that there were six instances
when the same pair of litigants generated two decisions. See supra note 58.
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ent set of figures, of the total of 277 identified claims, the 158
discharge claims still made up a majority, i.e., 57%.
By combining the appellate court and district court cases, one
finds that in the 308 total cases (92 appellate court rulings plus
216 district court decisions) discharge was an issue in 225, or
73%. Of the total of 384 issues for the two levels of courts, 59%
involved discharge.
In the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study of 280 cases decided on
substantive grounds between 1968 and 1986,' 7 the research-
ers identified 119 cases, or 42.5%, as ones in which discharge
was the principal issue, and another 70 cases, or 25%, in which
involuntary retirement was the principal issue.' s Thus, 67.5%
of the cases, in total, involved age-based ouster from the job.
However, inasmuch as involuntary retirement is now virtually
outlawed by the ADEA, 9 the (more, but not exclusively) rel-
127. See Schuster-Kaspin-Miler Study, supra note 16, at iii.
128. During the period covered by the researchers' study, involuntary retirement
requirements were legal in some instances. At first, the ADEA only covered persons
until they attained age 65, and so mandatory retirement on the basis of age could be
imposed at that age (or thereafter). See supra note 14. The statute was amended in
1978 to raise the age ceiling, or cap, to age 70 (except for federal employees, as to
whom the age cap was removed entirely). See supra note 14. Therefore, mandatory,
or involuntary, retirement still could be imposed outside the federal sector, albeit not
until the employee attained age 70. Finally, in 1986 the age cap was lifted (with a
couple of exceptions concerning certain high level policy-making executives who can be
forcibly retired upon attainment of age 65, 29 U.S.C. § 631(cXl) (1994), and
firefighters and law enforcement personnel, for whom state and local government
bodies can impose both age-based mandatory retirement at age 55 or later, as well as
age maxima vis-a-vis eligibility for hiring). The retirement provision regarding
firefighters and law enforcement personnel expired on December 31, 1993, but it was
reintroduced into the ADEA by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009. See 29 U.S.CA. §
623j) (Supp. 1997).
In addition to involuntary retirement having been an option for employers to
pursue in the past simply because at some point in the life of an employee the em-
ployer was freed of any constraints imposed by the ADEA, there was another factor
that for a time allowed the imposition of involuntary age-based retirement: until the
practice was outlawed in 1978 by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, involuntary retirement could
be imposed pursuant to a bona fide benefit plan.
In sum, it could well be that an employer in 1980, let us say, would wait until
its employee reached age 70 and then terminate her. Today, we would call that a
discharge; then, it would have been termed involuntary retirement. The different
nomenclatures do not matter--both discharge and involuntary retirement entailed age-
based removal of the employer from his or her job.
129. See supra note 128.
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evant comparator is the 42.5% figure. 13 The conclusion readi-
ly follows that discharge is an even more dominating generative
force for ADEA claims today than it was in the eighteen-year
period covered by the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study.
J. The Procedural Postures of the Cases, and the Substantive
Bases for Disposition
1. Appellate Court Rulings
In the majority of the ninety-four published appellate court
decisions, i.e., fifty-five, the appellate courts addressed trial
court rulings on motions for summary judgment."' Five ap-
130. Concededly, one can surmise that employers today, being largely barred from
forcibly retiring employees at age 65 or 70, as they could in the past, may more
commonly discharge older employees than they did in the past, when they only would
have to wait a few years for the age of legally permissible mandatory retirement to
be reached. Nonetheless, the ADEA still constrains employers' freedom and so it is
very unlikely that one could further surmise that the now-proscribed practice of im-
posing involuntary retirement has been supplanted by an exactly equivalent incidence
of discharges.
131. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996); Simpson
v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99
F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir.
1996); Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1996); Testerman v.
EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National West-
minster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996); Kalvinskas v. California Inst. of Tech., 96
F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir.
1996); Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1247 (1997); Noreul v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996); MacDonald
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Wobl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc.,
94 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996);
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 93 F.3d 1505 (lth Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Johnson
& Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d
310 (8th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Gallagher v.
Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 1996); Diez v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg., 88 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996);
Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (199);
Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier
v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Bohac v. West, 85 F.3d
306 (7th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir.
1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Atkinson v. Denton Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir.
1996); Mills v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.
1996); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Brown v.
CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana, 82 F.3d 533 (1st Cir.1996); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304
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peals grew out of motions to digmiss.5 2 There were twenty-six
appellate court rulings generated by grants or denials of mo-
tions for judgment as a matter of law."8
One appeal arose out of a plaintiff's motion to set aside a
trial court judgment that had been entered in favor of the de-
(2d Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38 (5th Cir. 1996); Hall v.
Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d
1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 295; EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 80
F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996); Evans v. Technologies Appli-
cations & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996); Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wis., 79 F.3d 677
(7th Cir. 1996); Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1996); Stults v.
Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 77 F.3d 572 (1st
Cir. 1996); Garner v. Arvin Indus., 77 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck
Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996); Jameson v.
Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459
(4th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); Sutera v.
Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72
F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995); Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995);
Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995).
132. See Murff v. Professional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Panaras
v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 94 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1996); Sherlock v. Montefiore Med.
Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690
(3d Cir. 1996); Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1853 (1996).
133. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Koger v. Reno,
98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir.
1996); Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir.
1996); Gathright v. Teachers' Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Kehoe -,.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Burger v. New York Inst. of
Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727 (8th
Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1996); Padilla v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89
F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996);
Dranchak v. Azko Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopper v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1996); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980
(10th Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc, 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 684 (1997); Burks v. Oklahoma Publg Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.
1996); Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. HCA
Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996); Slathar v. Sather Truck-
ing Corp., 78 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Corneveaux v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson
Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th
Cir. 1996); Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995).
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fendant pursuant to an arbitrator's recommendation;" an-
other arose out of a default judgment entered against the de-
fendant;135 a third involved a defendant's motion to compel ar-
bitration;36 one concerned a motion for fees;'37 another arose
out of an order directing compliance with a subpoena;' one
involved a plaintiffs motion to allow opt-in plaintiffs; 9 still
another arose out of a plaintiffs motion to amend;' there
was an interlocutory appeal arising out of the denial of a pre-
liminary injunction; and there was one case' in which
the disposition below could not be determined.'
In looking at the actual bases for dispositions by the appel-
late courts, one finds that in twenty-three of the ninety-four
published rulings the appellate courts' dispositions were made
on non-age grounds,'" whereas in sixty-six cases the courts
134. See Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
135. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996).
136. See Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995).
137. See Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996).
138. See EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996).
139. See Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 447 (1996).
140. See Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995).
141. See Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1996).
142. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996).
143. In Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996), the appeal arose
out of trial court rulings on both a motion for summary judgment and a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Thus, while there were a total of 94 published rulings,
there are 95 dispositions recounted in the text.
144. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996); Murff v. Pro-
fessional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic
Indus., 94 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1996); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 93 F.3d
1505 (11th Cir. 1996); Gallagher v. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275 (6th Cir.
1996); Diez v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 88 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Bohac v. West,
85 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 1996); Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir.
1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996); Burks v.
Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996);
Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Tire King-
dom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 80
F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996); Evans v. Technologies Appli-
cations & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d
1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447 (1996); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp.,
78 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Blanciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996); Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996);
Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996);
Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1996); Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d
648 (8th Cir. 1995); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995);
Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
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disposed of the cases by addressing the age claim alone-either
(1) in terms of addressing a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, which motion had been made at the end of the plaintiffs
case or after a jury verdict was rendered for the nonmoving
party, or (2) in terms of addressing the grant or denial of a
motion for summary judgment.' In the remaining five cases
145. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods,
99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996); Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir.
1996); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996); Testerman v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297
(7th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996);
Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1986);
Gathright v. Teachers' Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Kalvinskas v. Cali-
fornia Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp.,
96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996); Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d
297 (8th Cir. 1996); Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996);
MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Burger v. New
York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d
353 (7th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996); Parrish v.
Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92
F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir.
1996); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996); Holt v. JTM
Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
1996); Miller v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996); Dranchak v. Azko
Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983
(8th Cir. 1996); Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996); Hartsel v. Keys, 87
F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over
Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270
(7th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Atkinson v. Denton Pubrg Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th
Cir. 1996); Mills v. First Fed. S & L Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1996);
Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Furr v. Seagate
Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 974 (1997); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82
F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d
533 (1st Cir.1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1996); Nichols v.
Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38 (5th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d
35 (5th Cir. 1996); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 295 (1996); Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th
Cir. 1996); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc); Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wis., 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. HCA
Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996); Kuhn v. Ball State Univ.,
78 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 77 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1996);
Garner v. Arvin Indus., 77 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1996); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Group, 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996); Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528
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the court resolved the appeal both on age-based and non-age
grounds.'
I term those decisions that focused only on the age discrimi-
nation issue "age-substantive," but my terminology should not
be understood as meaning that the appellate court actually
made a determination that illegal age discrimination indeed
had occurred. Rather, in the instance of the summary judgment
cases, which make up the large majority of the dispositions,47
all that an "age-substantive" decision amounted to was a ruling
that there either was or was not a genuine issue of material
fact outstanding as to whether illegal age discrimination had
occurred; no ultimate determination as to the defendant's liabil-
ity for having violated the ADEA was made. It is really only in
those cases that involved motions for judgment as a matter of
law that had been made following jury verdicts that one can, in
most of the cases, read the appellate court rulings as being
dispositions on the ultimate question of legal culpability.
In the sixty-six cases resolved on age-substantive grounds,
the party that had been the plaintiff below prevailed at the
appellate level in eighteen cases;' the party which had been
(11th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996);
Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61
(1996); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Cook
County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13 (2d
Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995); Duart
v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995); Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture
Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir.
1995).
146. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Kehoe v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d
756 (9th Cir. 1996); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
147. The increasing use of summary judgment as the mechanism for dispositively
addressing employment discrimination claims generally, and age discrimination claims
in particular, has been noted. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tor-
tured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases,
34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); Thomas J. Piskorski, The Growing Judicial Acceptance of
Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination Cases, 18 EMPLOYEE REL, L. J. 245 (1992).
As to summary judgment generally see Gregory A. Gordillo, Note, Summary Judg-.
ment and Problems in Applying the Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 CLEVELAND ST. L.
REV. 263 (1994).
148. See Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1996); Greene v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National Westminster
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the defendant below prevailed in forty-four;'49 and there was a
split ruling in the remaining four, with the plaintiff and defen-
dant each prevailing on one or more issues. °
Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996); Kalvinskas v. California Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305
(9th Cir. 1996); Burger v. New York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Wohl
v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1996); Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr.,
92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir.
1996); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996); Atkinson v.
Denton Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d
541 (5th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. HCA
Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Massachusetts,
77 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1996); Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996); Sutera v. Schering
Corp., 73 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326
(3d Cir. 1995).
149. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods,
99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Testerman
v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 1996); Isenbergh v. Knight-Rid-
der Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1986); Gathright v. Teachers' Cred-
it Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830
(6th Cir. 1996); Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1996);
Noreul. v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir.
1996); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996); Holt v. JTM
Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
1996); Miller v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996); Dranchak v. Azko No-
bel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983
(8th Cir. 1996); Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996); Hartsel v. Keys, 87
F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over
Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84
F.3d 718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Mills v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer
Eles., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980 (10th
Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 684 (1997); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Pages-
Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533 (1st Cir.1996); Nichols v.
Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38 (5th Cir. 1996); Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys.,
Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wis., 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir.
1996); Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.),
Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); Garner v. Arvin
Indus., 77 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996); Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 75 F.3d
343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74
F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Ellis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996);
Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995); Gadsby v. Norwalk
Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420
(2d Cir. 1995).
150. See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
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Confining attention to the sixty-two cases in which there was
a single winner on appeal, the party that was the plaintiff
below prevailed 29% of the time on appeal (i.e., eighteen wins
out of sixty-two cases) and the defendant below prevailed in
71% of the cases (i.e., forty-four wins out of sixty-two cases).
In the twenty-three cases in which the appeal turned on a
non-age-substantive issue (such as the question whether the
plaintiff was an employee for the purposes of the Act,"5 or
whether there had been compliance with the procedural re-
quirements applicable to federal employees' suits) 2 the party
that was the plaintiff below prevailed at the appellate level in
ten cases," 3 the defendant prevailed in ten,"s' and there
were three in which each of the parties prevailed on one or
more issues." Thus, in the non-age-substantive category, if
one excludes the split rulings, the litigants who were plaintiffs
below won in 50% of the twenty cases and the defendants like-
wise prevailed in 50% of the appeals.
S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996);
Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
295 (1996); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
151. See, e.g., Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1853 (1996).
152. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995).
153. See Murff v. Professional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Panaras
v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 94 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1996); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 93 F.3d 1505 (11th Cir. 1996); Burks v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 81 F.3d 975
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81
F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996);
Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447
(1996); Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711
(7th Cir. 1996); Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir.
1996).
154. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996); Gallagher v.
Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 1996); Diez v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg., 88 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Bohac v. West, 85 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 1996); Evans
v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Slathar v.
Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996);
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996); Americanos v. Cart-
er, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996); Pulla v. Amoco Oil
Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50
(7th Cir. 1995).
155. See Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996); Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Kentucky State Po-
lice Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996).
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In sum, plaintiffs fared much better, e.g., they had a 50%
win rate, in appeals concerning non-age-substantive issues than
they did in appeals addressing age-substantive issues, where
they only had a 29% win rate. (Of course, the more useful data
concern how many of the litigants who lost at the trial court
level were able to secure reversals on appeal, or, to put the
same proposition differently, how many of the litigants who
prevailed at the trial court level were able to preserve their
victories in appeals pursued by the losing party. These data are
discussed infra, in Part I.K.)
2. District Court Rulings
In terms of the procedural postures of the district court liti-
gants in the 222 nonappealed district court rulings,5 ' 128 in-
volved dispositions of motions for summary judgment. 7 There
were forty-three cases in which the courts addressed motions to
dismiss.' Three opinions were published in cases involving
156. These data are set forth for each case in Appendix m, which appears at the
end of this article. The totals derived exceed the total of 222 cases because some
cases involved resolution of more than one issue.
157. These data are set forth for each individual case in Appendix I, which ap-
pears at the end of this article. What follows are the abbreviated citations to these
cases, whose names and citations are set forth in full in Appendix El: Agugliaro, Al-
len, Armbruster v. Erie Civic Ctr. Auth., Barvick, Bedwell, Bern, Blackburn, Boyd,
Bozner, Braziel, Brown V. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Bryson, Bumstead, Camacho,
Carlson, Carlson, Causey, Caussade, Cecilia, Chastain, Chenoweth, Chiaramonte, Col-
lier, Crossman, Day, Denman, Denty, Derthick, Dittman v. Ireco, Inc., Douglas,
Dryden, Duffy, Dungee, Dunn, Elguindy, EEOC v. Doremus & Co., EEOC v. Sara Lee
Corp., Faix, Farmer, Figueroa, Forren, Francescon, Fries, Fronduti, Giannapoulos,
Gallo, Golder, Gosnell, Goss, Grinnell v. General Elec. Co., Hartley, Henderson (933 F.
Supp.), Herrero, Hidalgo, Hill, Huff, Hurd, Kelleher (71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.), Kenne-
dy, Kerber, Kern, Knox v. Brundidge Shirt Corp., Kotas, Kotlowski, Kramer, Lamb,
Lewis, Ligon, Luis, Majahad, Mania, Manos, Matthews, McDonald, McKenny, Missis-
sippi Power & Light Co., Moebus, Morrow, Metsopoulos, Nakai, Newsome, Odaiyappa,
Odunmbaku, O'Keefe, Orisek, Paquin, Patterson, Payne, Perdas, Penchesin, Philippeaux,
Pina, Pollard, Posey, Pouncey, Rivers, Roemer, Rogic, Saeli, Sastri, Shapiro, Sharkey,
Shaver, Shenker, Shivers, Simon, Smith v. Chrysler Corp., Smith v. CIBA-Geigy Corp.,
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., Sorenson, Sperling (924 F. Supp. 1346), Stahlke, Taylor
v. Brown, Taylor v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., Tipsword, Tobin, Tucker,
Waldemar, Walker, Wanamaker, Washington, Wester, Whitchurch, Wilde, Wilvers,
Woythal, Young v. Easter Enter., Inc., Young v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp.
158. See Walsh v. City of Auburn, 942 F. Supp. 788 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); DeJoy v.
Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1996); McNulty v.
New York State Dep't of Finance, 941 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Thomas v. Held,
941 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Dittman v. General Motors Corp.-Delco Chassis
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bench trials,'59 and eleven involved rulings, typically on mo-
tions for judgment as a matter of law, that followed either
closure of the plaintiffs' cases or jury verdicts."6 Four opinions
Div., 941 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1996); Tsai v. Helfer, 940 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996);
Graboski v. Giuliani, 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Fernandez v. Community
Asphalt, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Vitello v. Liturgy Training Publi-
cations, 932 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Guadagno v. Wallack Ader Levithan
Assoc., 932 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Elias v. Naperville Eye Assocs., Ltd., 928 F.
Supp. 757 (N.D. IMI. 1996); Nixon v. New York City Hous. Auth., 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Walaszek v. Reinke Wholesale Supply Co., 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 162 (N.D. M11. 1996); Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 72 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Storr v. Anderson Sch., 919 F. Supp. 144, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Amos v. Housing Auth. of Birmingham Dist., 927 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.
Ala. 1996); Kelleher v. Aerospace Community Credit Union, 927 F. Supp. 361 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); Secrist v. Burns Internat'l Sec. Servs., 926 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Wis. 1996);
Swartzbaugh v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 924 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Wray v. Ed-
ward Blank Assocs., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Jungels v. State Univ.
College of N.Y., 922 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Mukhtar v. Castleton Serv. Corp.,
920 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Tomasello v. Rubin, 920 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1996);
Koslow v. Hundt, 919 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1995); Cadelinia v. Hilton Internatl, 71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Collins v. Old Republic Title Co.,
71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1584 (D. Kan. 1996); Brown v. IBM Corp., 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 898 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Metsopoulos v. Runyon, 918 F. Supp.
851 (D.N.J. 1996); Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 917 F.
Supp. 1282 (N.D. IM. 1996); Gallo v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 916 F. Supp.
1005 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Robins v. Max Mara, USA, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Pardasani v. Rack Room Shoes, 912 F. Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Gregor v.
Derwinksi, 911 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Stafford v. Radford Community Hosp.,
Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1369 (W.D. Va. 1995); Johnson v. Cadillac Plastics Group, 908 F.
Supp. 847 (D. Colo. 1995); Gorman v. Hughes Danbury Optical Sys., 908 F. Supp.
107 (D. Conn. 1995); Caldwell v. Federal Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29 (D. Me.
1995); Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F. Supp. 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Zellars v. Lib-
erty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Ford v. City of Oakwood,
905 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Griswold v. Alabama Dep't of Indus. Relations,
903 F. Supp. 1492 (M.D. Ala. 1995). In a couple of instances a court addressed both
a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.
159. See Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Ellis v. Provi-
dent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Brook v. City of
Montgomery, 916 F. Supp. 1193 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
160. See Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Del. 1996); Phuong v. Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, 927 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1996); Kirsch v. Fleet Street,
Ltd., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1413 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Fine v. Interpublic
Group, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Shea v. Icelandair, 925
F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Mitchell v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 924 F. Supp.
.793 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Stratton v. Department for the Aging for City of N.Y., 922 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Nembhard v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 918
F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 104 F.3d 353 (2d C ir. 1996); Newhouse
v. McCormick & Co., 910 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Neb. 1996); Mulqueen v. Dalea, Inc., 909
F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), affd without opinion, 104 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1996).
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were generated by motions for judgment on the pleadings.'61
There were a variety of other rulings, as well, including four on
motions to compel arbitration; 2 seven on motions in limine
regarding the exclusion of evidence;" three involving motions
to remand removed cases to state court; twelve involving
motions or requests regarding relief, fees, and/or costs;" and
numerous others."
In the 222 cases a ruling of an age-substantive nature (as op-
posed to one addressed to a procedural matter or to a matter
tangential to the actual claim of discrimination, such as a mo-
tion to compel arbitration or a motion in limine to exclude
certain evidentiary material) was rendered in 125 decisions, 67
161. See Mennella v. Office of Court Admin., 938 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1996);
Golombiewski v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Maher v. Runyon, 70
Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wray v. Edward Blank Assocs.,
Inc., 924 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
162. See Topf v. Warnaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762 (D. Conn. 1996); Durkin v. Cigna
Property & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481 (D. Kan. 1996); Alcaraz v. Avnet, 933 F.
Supp. 1025 (D. N. Mex. 1996); Smith v. Lehman Bros., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
163. See Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 941 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Sperling v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1396 (D.N.J. 1996); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp.,
914 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Burress v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1582 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Burger v. Litton Indus., 70 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Knox v. First Natl Bank of Chicago, 909 F. Supp.
569 (N.D. MIl. 1995); Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 909 F. Supp. 268 (E.D.
Pa. 1995).
164. See Brown v. Intercity Federal Bank, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 318
(N.D. Miss. 1996); Heckelmann v. Piping Cos., 904 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Okla. 1995);
Cook v. Travelers Cos., 904 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. IM1 1995).
165. See Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 941 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Caraballo v. South Stevedoring, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 932 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1996); Pollis v. New Sch. for
Soc. Research, 930 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F.
Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1996); Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Colo.
1996); LeFevre v. Harrison Group, 71 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 449 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Reynolds v. Octel Com-
munications Corp., 924 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Stratton v. Department for the
Aging for City of N.Y., 922 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.NY. 1996); Nembhard v. Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 104
F.3d. 353 (2d Cir. 1996); Moses v. K-Mart Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
166. See Appendix III, which appears at the end of this article.
167. These data are set forth for each individual case in Appendix III, which ap-
pears at the end of this article. What follows are the abbreviated citations to these
cases, whose names and citations are set forth in full in Appendix I: Agugliaro, Al-
len, Amos, Armbruster v. Erie Civic Ctr. Auth., Barvick, Bedwell, Bern, Blackburn,
Boyd, Braziel, Brook, Brown v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Bumstead, Camacho,
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which is equivalent to 54.5% of the cases. The defendants pre-
vailed in eighty-six of these rulings, i.e., 69%." The plaintiffs
won in thirty-one, constituting 25% of the rulings.'69 In eight
Carlson, Carlson, Causey, Caussade, Cecilio, Chastain, Chenoweth, Chiaramonte, Col-
lier, Day, Denman, Diehl, Dittman v. General Motors Corp., Douglas, Dryden, Duffy,
Dungee, Dunn, Elguindy, Ellis, EEOC v. Doremus, Faix, Farmer, Finch, Forren,
Francescon, Fries, Giannapoulos, Golder, Gosnell, Goss, Griswold v. Alabama Dep't of
Indus. Relations, Hartley, Henderson (933 F. Supp.), Herrero, Hidalgo, Hill, Huff,
Hurd, Kelleher (71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.), Kennedy, Kerber, Kern, Kirsh, Knox v.
Brundidge Shirt Corp., Kotas, Kotlowski, Kramer, Lamb, Lewis, Ligon, Luis, Maher,
Majahad, Mania, Manos, Matthews, McDonald, McNulty, Metsopoulos, Minetos, Mitch-
ell, Morrow, Mulqueen, Nakai, Nembhard, Odumnbaku, O'Keefe, Orisek, Paquin,
Patterson, Payne, Pendas, Penchisen, Philippeaux, Phuong, Pina, Pollard, Posey,
Roemer, Rogic, Saeli, Sastri, Shapiro, Shenker, Shivery, Smith v. Chrysler Corp.,
Smith v CIBA-Geigy Corp., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., Sorenson, Sperling,
Sperling, Stahlke, Stratton, Taylor v. Brown, Taylor v. Washington, Tipsword, Tucker,
Vakharia, Waldemar, Walker, Walsh, Wanamaker, Washington, Wester, Whitchurch,
Wilde, Wilvers, Woythal, Young v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp.
168. These data are set forth for each individual case in Appendix III, which ap-
pears at the end of this article. What follows are the abbreviated citations to these
cases, whose names and citations are set forth in full in Appendix I: Agugliaro, Al-
len, Amos, Armbruster v. Erie Civic Ctr. Auth., Bedwell, Bern, Blackburn, Boyd,
Braziel, Brook, Brown v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Bumstead, Causey, Caussade,
Cecilio, Chenoweth, Chiaramonte, Collier, Day, Denman, Diehl, Dittman v. General
Motors Corp., Douglas, Dryden, Duffy, Dungee, Dunn, Ellis, Faix, Farmer, Finch,
Forren, Giannapoulos, Golder, Goss, Hartley, Herrero, Hidalgo, Hill, Huff, Kelleher (71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.), Kennedy, Kerber, Knox v. Brundidge Shirt Corp., Kotlowski,
Kramer, Lamb, Lewis, Luis, Maher, Majahad, Mania, Matthews, McDonald, Minetos,
Nakai, Orisek, Paquin, Patterson, Payne, Penchisen, Pina, Pollard, Rogic, Saeli,
Shenker, Shivers, Smith v. Chrysler Corp., Smith v CIBA-Geigy Corp., Smith v. Mid-
land Brake, Inc., Sorenson, Sperling (924 F. Supp. 1346), Stahlke, Stratton, Taylor v.
Brown, Tipsword, Tucker, Vakharia, Wilde, Waldemar, Walker, Wanamaker, Washing-
ton, Wester, Woythal, Young v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp.
169. See Barvick v. Cisneros, 941 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Kan. 1996); McNulty v. New
York State Dep't of Finance, 941 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Camacho v. Sears
Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F. Supp. 113 (D.P.R& 1996); Ligon v. Triangle Pac.
Corp., 935 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Henderson v. AT & T Corp., 933 F.
Supp. 1326 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Pendas v. Runyon, 933 F. Supp. 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1996);
Carlson v. WPLG/TV-10, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 646 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
Odunmbaku v. New York Blood Ctr., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1413 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Shapiro v. Kelly, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 351 (E.D. La. 1996); Carlson
v. WPLG/TV-10, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1596 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Kotas v.
Waterman Broad., 927 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Phuong v. National Academy
of Sciences, 927 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1996); Gosnell v. Runyon, 926 F. Supp. 493
(M.D. Pa. 1995); Sperling v. Hoffnan-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1396 (D.N.J. 1996);
Mitchell v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 924 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Tex.
1996); Hurd v. JCB Int'l Credit Card Co., 923 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); EEOC v.
Doremus & Co., 921 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Nembhard v. Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 104 F.3d.
353 (2d Cir. 1996); O'Keefe v. General Accident Ins. Co., 918 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y.
640
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cases, representing 6%, both parties won on one or more of
several age-substantive issues on which the courts ruled. ' °
In the ninety-five cases in which a disposition was rendered
exclusively or primarily on a non-age-substantive issue,"
such as the question of whether the charge of discrimination
had been timely filed with the EEOC' 2 or a damages ques-
tion,' 3 defendants did not fare as well: they won in fifty-sev-
1996); Whitchurch v. Apache Prods. Co., 916 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. ]11. 1996); Fries v.
Northside Distribs., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1293 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Wilvers v.
DDB Needham Worldwide Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Roemer v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 911 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1996); Kern v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468 (W.D. Pa. 1995); Posey v.
Anheuser-Busch, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1465 (E.D. La. 1996); Mulqueen v.
Dalea, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), affd without opinion, 104 F.3d 351 (2d
Cir. 1996); Griswold v. Alabama Dep't of Indus. Relations, 903 F. Supp. 1492 (M.D.
ALa 1995); Elguindy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 903 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. I11.
1995); Chastain v. USF & G Corp., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1443 (W.D. Okla.
1996); Manos v. Bunzl-Papercraft, Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1189 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
170. See Walsh v. City of Auburn, 942 F. Supp. 788 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Morrow v.
City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Francescon v. Fairmont Ho-
tel, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 582 (E.D. La. 1996); Taylor v. Washington Metro.
Transit Auth., 922 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996); Philippeaux v. County of Nassau, 921
F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Metsopoulos v. Runyon, 918 F. Supp. 851 (D.N.J.
1996); Sastri v. KIM Royal Dutch Airlines, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1537
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
171. These data are set forth for each individual case in Appendix I, which ap-
pears at the end of this article. What follows are the abbreviated citations to these
cases, whose names and citations are set forth in full in Appendix III: Alcaraz,
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., Biggins, Bozner, Brown v. IBM Corp., Brown v. Intercity
Federal Bank, Bryson, Burger, Burress, Cadelinia, Caldwell, Caraballo, Carr, Collins,
Cook, Crossman, Dalal, Dalal, D'Anna, DeJoy, Denty, Derthick, DiRussa, Dittman v
Ireco, Inc., Durkin, Elias, EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Marietta, McDonnell, EEOC v.
Sara Lee Corp., Falbaum, Fernandez, Figueroa, Fine, Ford, Fronduti, Gallo, Gerzog,
Golder, Golombiewski, Gorman, Grabowski, Gregor, Grinnell v. General Elec. Co.,
Griswold v. New Madrid County Group Practice, Inc., Guadagno, Hawes, Heckelmann,
Henderson (917 F. Supp.), Hodge, Johnson, Jungels, Kelleher (927 F. Supp.), Knox v.
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, Koslow, Kraemer, Kraemer, Kunzman, LeFevre,
MarPherson, McGreevy, McKenny, Mennella, Mississippi Power & Light Co., Moebus,
Moses (905 F. Supp.), Mukhtar, Newhouse, Nixon, Odaiyappa, Pardasani, Pollis,
Reado, Reynolds, Rivers, Robins, Secrist, Sharkey, Shaver, Shea, Simon, Smith v.
Lehman Bros., Stafford, Stratton, Swartzbaugh, Teichgraeber, Thomas, Tobin,
Tomasello, Topf, Tsai, Tyson, Vitello, Walaszek, Wray, Young v. Easter Enters., Inc.,
Zellars.
172. See Collins v. Old Republic Title Co., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1584
(D. Kan. 1996); Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), affd without
opinion, 101 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996).
173. See Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1996).
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en, i.e., 60%, of these cases.'1 4 Plaintiffs did no better, howev-
174. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 943 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Topf v.
Warnaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762 (D. Conn. 1996); Durkin v. Cigna Property & Cas.
Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481 (D. Kan 1996); DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications,
Inc., 941 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1996); Thomas v. Held, 941 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Tsai v. Heifer, 940 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hodge v. New York College
of Podiatric Med., 940 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Figueroa v. Mateco, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 106 (D.P.R. 1996); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785
(N.D. Ala. 1996); Mennella v. Office of Court Administration, 938 F. Supp. 128
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Moebus v. Ob-Gyn Assocs., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Graboski v. Giuliani, 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tobin v. Haverford Sch., 936
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Shaver v. Corry Hiebert Corp., 936 F. Supp. 313 (W.D.
Pa. 1996); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Bozner v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 935 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Wyo.
1996); Golombiewski v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Fernandez v.
Community Asphalt, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Odaiyappa v. Board of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 933 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. La. 1996); Teichgraeber v.
Memorial Union Corp. of Emporia State Univ., 932 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Kan. 1996);
Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 932 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1996); Guadagno v. Wallack
Ader Leviathan Assoc., 932 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Fronduti v. Trinity Indus.,
928 F. Supp. 1107 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Elias v. Naperville Eye Assocs., Ltd., 928 F.
Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1996);
Dalal v. Alliant Techs., 927 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Colo. 1996); Kelleher v. Aerospace
Community Credit Union, 927 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Secrist v. Burns
Internatl Sec. Servs., 926 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Reynolds v. Octel Communi-
cations Corp., 924 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex. 1995); McKenny v. John V. Carr & Son,
922 F. Supp. 967 (D. Vt. 1996); Griswold v. New Madrid County Group Practice, Inc.,
920 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Tyson v. Pitt County Gov't, 919 F. Supp. 205
(E.D.N.C. 1996); Koslow v. Hundt, 919 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1995); Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. Locals 605 & 985, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 771 (S.D. Miss.),
affd without opinion, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996); Nixon v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Brown v. Intercity Fed.
Bank, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 318 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Armbruster v. Unisys
Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); McGreevy v. CSS Indus., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1644 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Collins v. Old Republic Title Co., 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1584 (D. Kan. 1996); Smith v. Lehman Bros., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Golder v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1425 (D.N.H. 1996); Rivers v. Northwest Airlines, 71 Fair EmpL Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Brown v. IBM Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 898 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Young v. Easter Enters., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 58 (S.D. Ind.
1995); Robins v. Max Mara, USA, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pardasani
v. Rack Room Shoes, 912 F. Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Gregor v. Derwinksi, 911 F.
Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Knox v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 909 F. Supp. 569
(N.D. IlM. 1995); Gorman v. Hughes Danbury Optical Sys., 908 F. Supp. 107 (D. Conn.
1995); Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Grinnell v. General Elec. Co., 907 F. Supp. 544 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Zellars v. Liberty
Natl Life Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Ford v. City of Oakwood, 905
F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), afld without opinion, 101 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996); Derthick v. Bassett-Walker,
Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Va. 1995); D'Anna v. MIA-Com, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889
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er-they prevailed in twenty-four cases, constituting 25% of the
total, which is the same percentage that was derived for age-
substantive rulings.' 5 There were fifteen rulings, i.e., 16% of
the total, in which each of the parties won on one or more
issues. 6 The various bases on which the district courts
grounded their rulings are set forth in Table 9.
I
(D. Md. 1995).
175. See Alcaraz v. Avnet, 933 F. Supp. 1025 (D.N. Mex. 1996); Carr v. Allegheny
Health, Educ. & Research Found., 933 F. Supp. 485 (W.D. Pa. 1996); Caraballo v.
South Stevedoring, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Polls v. New School for
Soc. Research, 930 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Dala v. Alliant Techs., 927 F.
Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1996); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 72 Fair Empl Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D. Mo.
1996); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 923 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Mukhtar v.
Castleton Serv. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Bryson v. Fluor Corp., 914
F. Supp. 1292 (D.S.C. 1995); Burress v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1582 (S.D. Ohio 1996); LeFevre v. Harrison Group, 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 449 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Fine v. Interpublie Group, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Marietta Corp., 70 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1457 (D. Md. 1996); Burger v. Litton Indus., 70 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 910 F. Supp. 1451
(D. Neb. 1996); Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 909 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Johnson v. Cadillac Plastics Group., 908 F. Supp. 847 (D. Colo. 1995); Caldwell
v. Federal Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29 (D. Me. 1995); Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL
Ltd), 906 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Moses v. K-Mart Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1054
(S.D. Fi. 1995); Heckelmann v. Piping Cos., 904 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Okla. 1995);
Cook v. Travelers Cos., 904 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. I1 1995); Dittmann v. Ireco, Inc., 903
F. Supp. 347 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
176. See Walaszek v. Reinke Wholesale Supply Co., 72 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 162 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 941 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Iowa
1996); Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall College, 941 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Hawes v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.J. 1996); Vitello v. Liturgy
Training Publications, 932 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. M. 1996); Reado v. Texas Gen. Land
Office, 929 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Cadelinia v. Hilton Internatl, 71 Fair
EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Swartzbaugh v. State Farm Ins. Cos.,
924 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Wray v. Edward Blank Assocs., Inc., 924 F. Supp.
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Jungels v. State Univ. College of N.Y., 922 F. Supp. 779
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Tomasello v. Rubin, 920 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1996); Henderson v. AT
& T Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Gallo v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 916 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Stafford v. Radford Community Hosp., Inc.,
908 F. Supp. 1369 (W.D. Va. 1995); Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F. Supp. 590
(E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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TABLE 9
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ACTUAL BASES
FOR DISPOSITIONS OF ADEA CASE
LIABITY OF INDIVIDUALS 18
TIMELINESS OF EEOC CHARGE 15
LACK OF EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP
(INCLUDING ISSUES OF STATUS OF
PLAINTIFF AS EMPLOYEE AND DEFENDANT
AS EMPLOYER) 12
ADEQUACY OF EEOC CHARGE (NOT INCLUDING
ISSUE OF FAILING TO NAME DEFENDANT) 6
FAILURE TO NAME DEFENDANT IN EEOC CHARGE 6
EVIDENCE ISSUES 6
ARm AmLrY 5
AToNEY's FEES AND COSTS 5
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FILING SUIT 4
REMAND OF REMOVED CASE TO STATE COURT 3
FAILURE TO FILE CHARGE WITH EEOC
(INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVE ACTION ISSUES) 3
VALIDITY OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY 3
BENEFITS ISSUES 3
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2
DISCOVERY 2
EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES 2
SEPARATE TRIALS FOR MULTIPLE PLAINTIFFS 2
SUBPOENA 2
RES JUDICATA ISSUES 2
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT mmuNrr 2
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT 2
SEPARATE TRIALS FOR LIABILITY AND DAMAGES 1
CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT IMPOSED ON EEOC 1
FAILURE TO ALLEGE AWAITING 60 DAYS BEFORE
FILING SUIT 1
RELATION OF ADEA TO STATE REMEDY 1
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF PLAMNTIFF'S APPLYING
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS 1
AVAILABILITY OF 42 U.S.C. §1985 (3) TO
MAINTAIN ADEA sur 1
SURVIVAL OF DAMAGES CLAWS FOLLOWING DEATH
OF PLAINTIFF 1
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 1
TRANSFER OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE TO ANOTHER
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1
PREEMPTION OF CITY ORDINANCE BY ADEA 1
AVAILABILITY OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 TO MAINTAIN
ADEA SUIT 1
APPOINTED COUNSEL CLAIM 1
WRIT OF EXECUTION 1
IN FORMA PAUPERIS PETITION 1
UNPROTECTED STATUS. OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
HOLDING CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS 1
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AVAILABILITY OF JURY TRIAL IN SUIT AGAINST
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF CITY GOVERNMENT 1
ENFORCEABILITY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT PROVISIONS 1
EXTRATERmRIAL REACH OF ADEA 1
AVAILABILITY OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 AS A
BASIS FOR ADEA surf 1
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION ISSUE 1
VALIDITY OF ARBITRAL AWARD 1
K. The Win-Loss Ratios
1. Appellate Court Dispositions
In seventy-one of the ninety-four published appellate court
rulings, judgment had been entered for the defendant at the
trial court level. In twenty-one cases the plaintiffs won below.
In two additional instances, both the plaintiff and the defen-
dant won on one or more of their issues.177 For simplicity's
sake, I have focused only on the ninety-two single victor deci-
sions.
In these ninety-two decisions, the entity that was the defen-
dant below prevailed on appeal in fifty-six of the cases;17 the
177. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v.
Kentucky State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385
(1996).
178. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996); Marfia
v. T. C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996); Smith v. City of Des Moines,
99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir.
1996); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Testerman v. EDS Technical
Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 1996); Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper
Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996); Gathright v. Teachers' Credit Union, 97
F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir.
1996); Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1996); Noreuil
v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
flD J
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plaintiff below prevailed on appeal in thirty cases;179 and in
94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996);
Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc.,
89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996);
Gallagher v. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 1996); Miller v. Butcher
Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996); Diez v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 88 F.3d 672
(8th Cir. 1996); Dranchak v. Azko Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopper v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1996); Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956
(7th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996);
Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997);
Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996); Nelson v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 85 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Bohac
v. West, 85 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 1996); Blistein v. St. John's College, 84 F.3d 1459 (4th
Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83
F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir.
1996); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate
Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 684 (1997); Brown
v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996); Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas
de Espana, 82 F.3d 533 (1st Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d
38 (5th Cir. 1996); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir.
1996); Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996); Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996); Weisbrot v. Medical College of
Wis., 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1996); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330 (7th
Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
175 (1996); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996); Garner
v. Arvin Indus., 77 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1996); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th
Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2552 (1996); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Americanos v.
Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996); Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); Pulla v.
Amoco. Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995); Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d
117 (10th Cir. 1995); Matthews v. Rollings Hudig Hill Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir.
1995); Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); Fisher v.
Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995).
179. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Mulero-Rodri-
guez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1996); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98
F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d
Cir. 1996); Murff v. Professional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996);
Kalvinskas v. California Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1996); Kehoe v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Burger v. New York Inst. of
Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (7th Cir.
1996); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 94 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1996); Armstrong v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 93 F.3d 1505 (11th Cir. 1996); Parrish v. Immanuel Med.
Ctr., 92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248 (5th
Cir. 1996); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996);
Atkinson v. Denton Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996); Burks v. Oklahoma
Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1997); Haun v. Ideal
Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1996); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d
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six cases there was a mixed ruling, with the plaintiff and de-
fendant below each prevailing on one or more issues at the ap-
pellate court level. 80 More useful is an analysis of affirmances
and reversals.
In forty-eight of the seventy-one cases in which the defen-
dants had won below, the courts of appeals straightforwardly
affirmed the judgments that had been entered for them. 8' In
304 (2d Cir. 1996); Hall v. Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Tire
Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996); Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447 (1996); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. of Mid-
west, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 77 F.3d 572 (1st Cir.
1996); Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996); Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d
1528 (11th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir.
1996); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th Cir 1996); Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73
F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir.
1995); Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
.180. See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996);
Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson
Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80
F.3d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 295 (1996); Cornevaux v. CUNA Mut.
Ins. Group., 876 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
181. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1486 (8th Cir. 1996); Demisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods,
99 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631 (D. C. Cir. 1996); Testerman
v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 1996); Isenbergh v. Knight-Rid-
der Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996); Gathright v. Teachers' Cred-
it Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830
(6th Cir. 1996); Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1996);
Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir.
1996); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena,
89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Gallagher v. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275 (6th
Cir. 1996); Miller v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996); Diez v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., 88 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Dranchak v. Azko Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d
457 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1996);
Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d
1311 (8th Cir. 1996); BohAc v. West, 85 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 1996); Blistein v. St.
John's College, 84 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996); Mills v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuka v. Thomson Con-
sumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651
(5th Cir. 1996); Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533 (1st
Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vaught Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38 (5th Cir. 1996); Evans v.
Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Douglass v. Unit-
ed Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996); Weisbrot v. Medical College of
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sixteen cases, the appellate courts straightforwardly reversed or
vacated the judgments that had been entered for the defen-
dants below." 2 There were four mixed appellate court rulings,
i.e., decisions involving partial affirmances and partial reversals
or vacations, that arose out of trial court decisions which had
been favorable to the defendants and in which the critical rul-
ings for the defendants below were reversed on appeal.1" (In
addition, there were three appellate court rulings which arose
Wis., 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1996); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330 (7th
Cir. 1996); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
175 (1996); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996); Garner
v. Arvin Indus., 77 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1996); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th
Cir. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2552 (1996); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996); Americanos v.
Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996); Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); Pulla v.
Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995); Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d
117 (10th Cir. 1995); Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir.
1995).
182. See Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1996); Greene v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996); Lawrence v. National Westminster
Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996); Murff v. Professional Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289
(8th Cir. 1996); Kalvinskas v. California Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1996);
Burger v. New York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996); Wohl v. Spectrum
Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1996); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 94 F.3d
338 (7th Cir. 1996); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 93 F.3d 1505 (11th Cir.
1996); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996); Hall v.
Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996); Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1996);
Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996); Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73
F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir.
1995); Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
183. In Atkinson v. Denton Publishing Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996), the defen-
dant lost at the appellate stage on the key issue: the trial court's grant of its motion
for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's age discrimination claim was reversed. In
Burks v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
302 (1996), the court reversed as to an evidentiary issue that had been decided in
the defendant's favor. In Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group, 76 F.3d 1498(10th Cir. 1996), the court reversed the district court's granting of the defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, which motion was made after the plaintiff
rested her case. In Sherlock v. Monteflore Medical Center, 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996),
the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim as being time-
barred, while it affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs effort to invoke 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) as a basis for pursuing her ADEA claim-a mixed result. (Since the § 1985
claim was, given a string of adverse precedents, very dubious to begin with and
therefore one that the plaintiff likely did not regard as the core of her suit, one can
regard the ruling as essentially being a pro-plaintiff decision since the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff on her main issue.)
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out of trial court rulings for the defendants that amounted to
draws between the two parties.)'"
In brief, the success rate for defendants in preserving their
victories in the sixty-eight cases in which there was a clear
winner at the appellate court level was 70%, i.e., forty-eight out
of sixty-eight decisions, while the success rate for plaintiffs in
securing reversals was 28% (twenty of seventy-one cases).
As for plaintiffs, there were eleven instances in which the
judgment won at the trial level was straightforwardly affirmed
on appeal," and eight in which the judgment won by the
plaintiff below was reversed or vacated on appeal." In addi-
tion, there was one case in which the plaintiff had prevailed at
the trial court level and in which an appellate court ruling
involving mixed results, i.e., a partial affirmance and a partial
reversal, amounted to an affirmance in the plaintiffs favor."7
184. In Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1247 (1997), the court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion
for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs constructive discharge claim, but reversed
as to the trial court's grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion as to the
plaintiffs demotion claim. In Schnidrig v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 80 F.3d 1405 (9th
Cir. 1996), the court reversed the grant of the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment as to the plaintiffs denial of promotion claim, but it affirmed as to the court's
grant of the defendant's motion regarding the plaintiffs constructive discharge claim.
In Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996), the court af-
firmed as to the trial court's grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion
regarding the plaintiffs transfer claim, but it reversed as to the trial court's grant of
summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs retaliation claim.
185. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Kehoe v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr.,
92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir.
1996); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996); Haun v.
Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d
449 (11th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 77 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson
Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th
Cir. 1996).
186. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996); Holt v. JTM
Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 85 F.3d
343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d
980 (10th Cir. 1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 974 (1997); Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th
Cir. 1996); Matthews v. Rollings Hudig Hill Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995); Fisher v.
Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995).
187. In Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
447 (1996), the rulings favorable to the plaintiffs were affirmed on appeal; the rever-
sal did not work to the defendant's favor.
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There also was one appellate court ruling which arose out of a
trial court ruling for the plaintiff that amounted to a draw be-
tween the two parties." Thus, plaintiffs succeeded in preserv-
ing on appeal their victories below in twelve of the twenty-one
rulings in which there was a clear winner at the appellate lev-
el-a success rate of 57%.
In sum, the success rate of defendants in securing reversals
was considerably better than was that of plaintiffs: defendants
who had lost at the trial court level were able to win on appeal
43% of the time, while losing plaintiffs prevailed on appeal only
30% of the time. To put the same point differently, defendants
who won below were able to preserve their victories 70% of the
time; plaintiffs who won below were able to do so only 57% of
the time.
a. Treatment of Jury Cases by Appellate Courts
There is another aspect of the appellate court decisions that
deserves attention: these courts' treatment of jury verdicts.
There is, I believe, a general perception that appellate courts
increasingly have been willing to overturn jury verdicts in
ADEA cases when juries return verdicts for plaintiffs."5 9 The
188. In Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996), the plain-
tiff won on some damages issues on appeal and the defendant won on others.
189. In a note published 10 years ago, the author asserted that "[clonducting jury
trials under a burden of proof scheme developed for non-jury Title VII actions [i.e.,
the decisional framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973)] has . . . resulted in a considerable number of.. . reversals on appeal
in ADEA cases." Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 603
(1987). The author supported this assertion in a footnote by citing eight cases in
which appellate courts had reversed lower court denials of motions for judgments
n.o.v. (now called motions for judgment as a matter of law), and five decisions in
which appellate courts had affirmed such judgments. See id. at 603 n.15. Later in the
article the author reported that "a review of ADEA cases illustrates that the courts
are overturning jury verdicts at an alarming rate." Id. at 615. She referred back to
the same footnote as support for this claim. Some years later the three dissenting
Justices in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting), a Title VII case concerning mixed
motives analysis, cited this article for the proposition that the use of the Title VII
framework in ADEA cases accounted for a "high" reversal rate. (It is that reliance by
these dissenters that prompts this review of the student note here.)
In fact, the original student note only cited a few decisions (those noted earlier,
as well as a handful more, later in the article); no effort was made to provide empir-
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data, scanty at best, only somewhat support this assessment; in
other words, they do not reveal an overwhelmingly hostile ap-
pellate court response to jury verdicts rendered in favor of
plaintiffs.
In nineteen of the ninety-four 1996 published appellate court
opinions the courts addressed jury verdicts in the context of
reviewing the grant or denial of motions for judgment as a
matter of law that were made after jury verdicts were ren-
dered.' ° The jury determination was affirmed in eleven of the
nineteen cases-an overall affirmance rate of 58%. As is de-
tailed in Table 10, in the seventeen cases in which a jury ver-
ical data to support the assertion that there was even a "considerable" number of
reversals, let alone a "high" reversal rate, resulting from the use of Title VII doc-
trine. Certainly, moreover, the author did not establish that there was generally a
high reversal rate in ADEA appellate court rulings. Thus, while the author conceiv-
ably may have been right about the general reversal rate, the data was not provided
to enable one to determine whether she was or was not. (The author also made no
attempt to parse out the difference, if any, as between appellate court treatment of
jury verdicts for plaintiffs as compared to jury verdicts for defendants-an issue of
concern here.)
190. It was earlier noted in Part III.J.1. that there were actually 26 cases in
which defendants had moved for judgment as a matter of law in the trial court. But
there were only 19 cases in which the appellate court addressed a jury determination.
In three of the other seven cases a bench trial had been conducted. In Fisher
v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), the defendant's motion for judgment
as a matter of law, made after a ruling for the plaintiff, was denied at the trial
court level. This ruling was reversed on appeal, and so the defendant ultimately pre-
vailed. In Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the court ruled against the
plaintiff after a bench trial, and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. Here, too, then,
the defendant prevailed in the appellate court. In Burger v. New York Institute of
Technology, 94 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 1996), the judgment handed down for the defendant
by the court was reversed on appeal.
In Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group, 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1996), the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law,
which motion was made after the plaintiff rested her case; the appellate court ren-
dered a split ruling-it affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed and remanded
in part. In Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996), the
defendant's motion, which the trial court granted, was made at the end of the trial.
The appellate court reversed. Likewise, in Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d
983 (8th Cir. 1996), the defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of the trial. It prevailed in both the trial and appellate courts.
In Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1996), the defendant's motion
was made after entry of a default judgment against it. The appellate court affirmed.
In Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995), in which the jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed a negative ruling on its
motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence; the appellate court af-
firmed.
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dict was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant then
moved for judgment as a matter of law, the defendant prevailed
on the motion at the trial court level in only four instances; in
the other thirteen cases the trial court denied the defendant's
motion. In both of the two cases in which a jury verdict was
rendered for the defendant, the plaintiffs' motions for judgment
as a matter of law were denied. On appeal, of the thirteen
plaintiffs whose jury verdicts survived defendants' motions at
the trial court level, five lost at the appellate level. In other
words, five defendants which had lost below prevailed on ap-
peal. Thus, the plaintiffs experienced a 38% reversal rate.
(Moreover, in the four cases in which a jury verdict for a plain-
tiff had been nullified by the trial court's grant of the
defendant's motion, only one plaintiff was able to secure a re-
versal.) In the two cases involving defendants which won their
jury cases, the defendants had a 100% success rate at the ap-
pellate court level.
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Obviously, defendants who won in jury cases did far better
on appeal than did plaintiffs. However, since the number of
cases in which defendants prevailed at the trial court stage was
so small, i.e., two, there is no way to arrive at any useful con-
clusion based on the comparative data.
191. The full names of the cases are set forth in Appendix I, which appears at the
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2. Trial Court Dispositions
At the trial court level there were 222 published decisions.
We also have available to us, from a reading of the ninety-four
court of appeals rulings, data regarding those ninety-four dispo-
sitions at the trial court level. As already discussed, in the
ninety-four cases that went up on appeal, defendants had won
at the trial court level in seventy-one instances. Plaintiffs had
prevailed in twenty-one cases; and there were two cases in
which both litigants had won on one or more issues. For the
222 nonappealed district court rulings the breakdown is as fol-
lows: the defendant prevailed in 140, or 63% of the cases; the
plaintiff prevailed in 53 cases, or 24%; and in 29, or 13%, of
the rulings there was a split decision-the plaintiff prevailed on
some issues, the defendant on others. 2
a. Jury Case Dispositions at the Trial Court Level
No doubt most ADEA jury cases do not generate opinions.
Even where there is an opinion, it typically will deal with pre-
trial issues and so the student of ADEA litigation still will ob-
tain no insight as to who ultimately prevailed in those cases
that actually were decided by juries. Sometimes, however, there
will be written rulings on post-trial motions, and from these it
may be possible to glean information as to judicial treatment of
jury verdicts.
As discussed above, there were nineteen instances in which
courts of appeals ruled on the merits of trial court rulings on
post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law.93 In four
of the seventeen cases in which the jury had rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff, the trial court granted the defendant's motion.
In the other thirteen the defendant's motion was denied. In the
two cases in which the jury had found for the defendant, the
plaintiff's post-trial motion was denied. In analyzing the 222
district court rulings, one finds ten in which a post-jury verdict
192. A case-by-case listing is set forth in Appendix III, which appears at the end
of this article.
193. See supra Table 10.
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motion for judgment as a matter of law was made. In nine of
these cases a verdict had been returned for the plaintiff.' In
seven of these nine cases, the trial courts denied outright the
defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law. In one,
the court responded to the defendant's motion for a partial new
trial on damages or for remittitur by holding that remittitur
was appropriate. In another, the court denied the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and also
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial based on exces-
siveness of the verdict, but did so conditioned on the plaintiffs
agreeing to a remittitur."' In the tenth case the jury had ren-
dered a verdict for the defendant; the plaintiff moved for a new
trial based on Batson v. Kentucky," which concerns jury se-
lection; and the court denied the motion.9
In sum, trial courts typically were very resistant to overturn
jury verdicts insofar as the issue of liability was concerned:
they did so only in four cases out of twenty-nine (i.e., the nine-
teen cases of which we have knowledge based on their having
been addressed by appellate courts, and the ten non-appealed
district court rulings).
Another conclusion can be drawn. Plaintiffs were strikingly
successful when they managed to get their claims before juries:
the juries found for them in seventeen of the nineteen cases
that subsequently were considered by appellate courts, and in
nine of the ten district court cases which did not go up on ap-
peal. This is an incredible win rate of twenty-six out of twenty-
nine cases, or 90%.' (Of course, as noted earlier, in four of
194. See Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Del. 1996); Kirsh v. Fleet
Street, Ltd., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1413 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Phuong v. Nation-
al Academy of Sciences, 927 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1996); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F.
Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Mitchell v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 924
F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Stratton v. Department for the Aging for City of N.Y.,
922 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Nembhard v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 104 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996);
Mulqueen v. Dulea, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), affd without opinion, 104
F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1996).
195. See Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
196. See Stratton v. Department for the Aging for City of N.Y., 922 F. Supp. 857
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
197. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
198. See Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
199. This figure is very much out of line with another statistic derived by another
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the seventeen appealed cases the trial courts granted the
defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and in so
doing nullified the pro-plaintiff jury verdicts.)
What is one to make of these data? One could well conclude
that they confirm the views of the management bar (and, actu-
ally, the plaintiffs' bar, as well) that juries in ADEA cases are
particularly sympathetic to plaintiffs' claims." But there is at
least one explanation, albeit a not altogether persuasive one,
that turns less on assumptions of jury favoritism for older
plaintiffs who claim victimization at the hands of domineering
bosses (claims which resonate with many people, including
jurors) and more on the matter of the merits of the cases that
juries address. Remember, very few cases survive preliminary
challenges-most typically, defendants' motions for summary
judgment and motions to dismiss.2°' Thus, the cases that are
researcher, who reviewed the statistical records of the Federal Judicial Center for the
period June 1, 1992, to May 31, 1994, and reported the following-
Of all dispositions (pre- and post-trial) [in employment discrimination
cases generally], employees received some recompense in 71% of the cas-
es. On the other hand, if the case proceeded to trial, employees won only
28% of the cases, and in court (non-jury) trials, only 19% of the cases.
This was in sharp contrast to jury trials where employees prevailed 38%
of the time, or twice as frequently as in court trials.
Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, supra note 47, at 42. While the
author of this article did not provide a breakdown, chances are that most of the non-
jury cases in the sample involved Title VII claims, which are litigated much more
frequently than are ADEA claims. However, insofar as the data regarding jury ver-
dicts is concerned, these almost certainly were derived primarily-and maybe even
exclusively-from ADEA cases, since until the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-166, 105 Stat. 1071, went into effect on November 21, 1991, jury trials were not
available in Title VII cases (and, in fact, jury trials also were not available as to
claims that arose prior to that date. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct.
1483 (1994).) Thus, the 38% figure for plaintiffs who prevailed in jury cases probably
entailed just ADEA cases. Obviously, this figure is enormously far from the 90%
figure derived for the 1996 sample.
200. See Prohibition of Mandatory Retirement and Employment Rights Act of 1982,
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1982) (testimony of Charles Bakaly); Thomas J. Piskorski,
The Growing Judicial Acceptance of Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination Cases,
18 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 245, at 245 (1992). See also Stephen R. McConnell, Age Dis-
crimination in Employment, in POLICY ISSUES IN WORK & RETIREMENT 159, 186-87
(Herbert S. Parnes ed., 1983). The view that juries are particularly sympathetic to
plaintiffs is not confined to the ADEA context. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1124, 1127-28 (1992).
201. See supra Part III.J.
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placed before juries for resolution have run a legal gauntlet the
survival of which, if the judges are doing their jobs well (or
even if they are doing them in an overly and negatively aggres-
sive manner insofar as plaintiffs' claims are concerned, as some
contend),"2 presumably ensures that only strong claims for
redress reach the juries. Ergo, one sees striking success on the
part of plaintiffs in these cases. There is a counter-analysis
however. If these claims were so strong, presumably a number
of these cases would have been settled. For the defendants pre-
sumably would have realized-at least in a good number of
them-that their chances of prevailing were sufficiently dubious
to warrant, even urge, foregoing the risk of placing their fates
in the hands of juries. Therefore, explanation for the dramatic
success of plaintiffs before juries becomes less obvious, after all.
Perhaps the best one can hypothesize in response to these
countervailing lines of reasoning is that there are going to be
some instances where stubborn plaintiffs are determined to go
to juries for reasons of principle, or the need to vent their
grievances in public fora, or-more likely-because they deem
the defendants' settlement offers to be inadequate. And there
are going to be stubborn defendants who, for reasons of princi-
ple, or to avoid establishing precedents that may spur other
employees or former employees to seek redress, or for some
other reasons, are going to be unwilling to make offers of set-
tlement sufficient to secure the grievants' acquiescence. These
are the cases, one can surmise, that the juries see.
3. Combined Totals
Adding the appellate court decisions and the non-appealed
decisions together, the totals are 211 wins for defendants; 74
for plaintiffs; and 31 split decisions. In terms of percentages
and based on a total of 316 decisions, these figures translate
into a win rate of 67.7% for defendants (which is just one per-
centage point less than that reported by the Schuster-Kaspin-
202. See Ann McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203
(1993).
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Miller Study for the 1968-1986 period) °3 and 23.4% for plain-
tiffs, with the remaining 10% being split decisions."'
4. The Posner Study
Chief Judge Posner, of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, conducted a survey of the 430 ADEA cases that were
decided on "other than procedural grounds" over an eighteen-
month period in 1993 and 1994.205 He came up with a much
more paltry figure of forty-nine plaintiffs' victories, equivalent
to 11.4% of the total dispositions. In contrast, I found in my
survey that plaintiffs prevailed in 29% of age-substantive cases
at the appellate level (i.e., they either secured a reversal of an
adverse trial court decision or they preserved their victory won
below)2" and in 25% of the age-substantive cases at the trial
court level.0" (In non-age-substantive cases, as discussed earli-
er, plaintiffs prevailed on appeal, i.e., they either secured a
reversal of an adverse trial court decision or they preserved
their victory won below, in 50% of the cases;s at the trial
level they prevailed in 25% of the cases.)2"
203. See Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at iv.
204. It is difficult to know what to make of these figures in a larger sense than
their revealing information about the world of age discrimination in employment.
Professor Eisenberg, reviewing data for the years 1978 to 1985, found that the suc-
cess rate in employment discrimination cases litigated to judgment was 22%--a figure
almost exactly the same as that for the 1996 ADEA cases. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1567, 1588 (1989). However, the fact that his data included prisoners' rights
cases undercuts the usefulness of his findings here. Further mitigating the relevance
of his findings is the fact that most of the employment discrimination cases he in-
cluded in his survey arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. What even further compromises the usefulness of his study is
the fact that Professor Eisenberg was looking to cases litigated to judgment. Here,
very few of the cases involved disputes that actually went to trial, and most did not
dispose of the merits of the discrimination claim.
Professor Selmi reports that "the success rate plaintiffs obtain in most tort-type
cases ... tend[s] to approximate . . . fifty percent." Michael Selmi, The Value of
the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 41 (1996). Certainly, that statistic expresses a success rate for
plaintiffs far in excess of that in the ADEA context.
205. See POSNE1, supra note 62, at 330-31.
206. See supra Part Im.J.1.
207. See supra Part III.J.2.
208. See supra Part III.J.1.
209. See supra Part III.J.2.
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
No ready explanation is apparent for the disparities between
the findings here and Judge Posner's numbers. Judge Posner
did not segregate appellate court rulings from trial court deci-
sions. Nor did he explain what he meant by decisions rendered
on "other than procedural grounds." While one might conjecture
that perhaps he excluded decisions rendered on motions for
summary judgment, which decisions I include, that exclusion on
his part does not seem possible, given that his total data set of
430 cases simply could not have been derived from just the
relatively rare reported decisions involving either bench trial
rulings or post-trial motions growing out of jury cases. (Even if
some of the cases which I deem to be non-age-substantive here
were added to the category of age-substantive cases, which I
equate with those decided on other than procedural grounds,
that would only raise the win rate for plaintiffs, given the fore-
going findings showing higher plaintiffs' win rates in the non-
age-substantive 1996 cases, and thus would make the disparity
between my figures and Judge Posner's even greater.)
5. The Gender Factor
With regard to the 280 cases decided between 1968 and 1986
that the Schuster-Kaspin-Miller group addressed, they reached
the conclusion that "[emale plaintiffs had considerably greater
success in ADEA suits than their male counterparts."210 They
210. Schuster-Kaspin-Miller Study, supra note 16, at 47. The researchers offered
three suggestions as to why this was so:
First, while none of these cases were decided upon a Title VII sex
discrimination claim, the fact that women have been granted the added
protection of Title VII is undoubtedly not lost upon the courts. This add-
ed expression of legislative concern may lead the courts to be particularly
sensitive to personnel actions affecting women, and thus more likely to
decide on their behalf ....
Second, most of [the] cases brought by females (45 percent) in-
volved a job status issue (hiring, promotion, transfer or demotion), while
only 20 percent of the male plaintiffs raised a job status issue .... The
courts may be less willing to intrude upon management prerogatives
when the personnel action has major financial or productivity-related
ramifications, such as discharge or retirement. At the same time, the
right to be hired for a job that one is qualified for is a central theme in
employment discrimination laws.
In addition, female plaintiffs fell into the clerical occupation catego-
ry 47 percent of the time, while male plaintiffs were considered clerical-
type workers just 4 percent of the time .... It may that be that at the
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did not distinguish between appellate court and trial court
dispositions, as I have done. Moreover, they focused only on
cases that had gone to trial. Here, no such focus for the one-
year span of time which I addressed was even attempted. (Had
it been, there would have been very few cases left to review.)
Still, inquiry as to the gender factor is worth pursuing. As it
turns out, female plaintiffs in 1996 did fare better, in some
respects, than did their male counterparts:
o In the seventy-four cases in which the plaintiff was a fe-
male, the plaintiff prevailed in seventeen instances-23% of
the total, while in the 132 cases in which the plaintiff was
male, the plaintiff won in twenty-seven cases-20%. On the
win side, then, men and women did about the same.
3 Female plaintiffs lost in forty cases, i.e., 54%. In ninety of
the male-plaintiff cases-68%--the male plaintiff lost. Here,
clearly, there is a considerable disparity in the loss rates as
between female and male plaintiffs.
o In seventeen female-plaintiff cases, making up 23% of the
total, there was a split decision-the plaintiff won on some
issues, the defendant on others. In fifteen of the male-plain-
tiff cases, constituting 11% of the total, there was a split
decision-the plaintiff won on some issues, the defendant on
others.211 (Here, there is a considerable difference in results;
whether a split decision should be considered a win or a loss,
however, is problematic, so I do not draw a conclusion as to
whether it could be said that women fared better than men,
insofar as these split decision cases are concerned.)
low-paying clerical levels of jobs, companies are not as attentive to per-
formance appraisal issues, or situations that could breed claims of dis-
crimination. Thus[,] the organization is less prepared to defend actions
brought by those type employees.
Id. at 47-48.
211. There were four cases in which there was both a male and a female plaintiff.
Here, the plaintiffs won in one case, lost in two, and achieved a split ruling in one.
In the remainder of the 222 district court rulings it was not possible to identify the
gender of the plaintiff, or the plaintiff had no gender. That is, the plaintiff was a
government agency, i.e., the EEOC, and the genders of the individuals on whose be-
half the agency was suing could not be identified.
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a. Jury Cases
In the nineteen jury trial cases in which the appellate courts
reviewed grants or denials of motions for judgment as a matter
of law, there were five cases in which the plaintiffs below were
women, thirteen in which the plaintiffs were men, and one in
which there was both a male and a female plaintiff. In the five
cases involving solely female plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had won
below in two cases" and had lost in three." In the two
cases in which the female plaintiff had won below, she, pre-
served her victory on appeal. In the three in which she had
lost, she succeeded in securing a reversal in one case; 4 in the
other two, she lost.2" Thus, the alffrmance rate for the mea-
ger two cases in which a female plaintiff won before a jury was
100%; the reversal rate in the three cases in which the female
plaintiff lost was 33%.
In the thirteen cases involving solely male plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs won in ten cases at the trial court level and lost in
three. On appeal, the ten male plaintiffs who had prevailed
below preserved their victories in six cases 6 and lost in
four.21 Thus, the affirmance rate for victorious trial court
male plaintiffs was 60%-considerably worse than that for the
female plaintiffs (although there were only two of them) who
212. See Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodhouse
v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
213. See Gathright v. St. Louis Teacher's Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir.
1996); Miller v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996); Burks v. Oklahoma
Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 302 (1996).
214. See Burks v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 302 (1996).
215. See Gathright v. Teacher's Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Miller
v. Butcher Distribs., 89 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1996).
216. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Kehoe v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.
1996); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99 (8th Cir. 1996);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996).
217. See Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); Doan v.
Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 684 (1997);
Kusak v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. J.C. Pen-
ney Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996).
1997] 661
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
had prevailed below and then prevailed once again on appeal.
In the three cases in which the male plaintiffs had lost at the
trial court level, 18 they lost again on appeal. So, while the
three losing women trial court plaintiffs were able to win one
out of three appeals, the males won none.
L. Summing Up
In large measure the foregoing discussions of particular data
speak for themselves. But it is worth summarizing some of the
more notable findings-again with the already-articulated cau-
tionary notes that (1) one cannot draw too much from a skewed
sample, i.e., grievances that in the first instance are unrepre-
sentative (insofar as the universe of discriminatory workplace
practices is concerned) in that they have been litigated, and
that are even more unrepresentative because they have been
taken all the way through to some sort of courtroom or jury
response (as opposed to being settled), in the second instance;
and (2) one must be aware that the sample here, apart from
presenting a distorted view of workplace reality, also is not an
overly large one and so is subject to reliability concerns on that
score. Conceding the validity of these disclaimers, what conclu-
sions can be drawn with some respectable degree of certitude?
What do the (flawed) data show?
o For one, the ADEA appears to be undergoing a "de-aging"
process (so long as one discounts the aberrational case in
which the EEOC sued on behalf of 431 plaintiffs who were
age fifty-five and over)." In other words, there are more
younger ADEA plaintiffs (although the median age of ADEA
plaintiffs has not dropped) and fewer of the traditional ADEA
plaintiffs, i.e., those in their mid-fifties. This change is likely
not a one-year aberration, but rather is reflective of larger
workplace demographic issues.
o Second, and in contrast, one can glean very little from the
cases as to the ages of the individuals-i.e., employers, super-
218. See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir.
1996); Dranchak v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1996); Slathar v. Sather
Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996).
219. See supra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
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visors, and so on-whose decisions prompted pursuit of legal
redress.
m Third, we are seeing a feminization, if you will, of the
ADEA. The number of female plaintiffs has increased strik-
ingly. This development is almost certainly no one-year phe-
nomenon, but rather is reflective of changing workplace de-
mographics. Moreover, those demographics suggest that we
are going to see even more women mounting ADEA claims.
m Fourth, the data confirm a fact already known, but per-
haps not so strikingly established until now: discharges are
by far the most common basis for generating litigation activi-
ty.
w Fifth, the data confirm another fact already known: most
ADEA cases are resolved at a stage short of a determination
of the ultimate merits of the discrimination claim. More spe-
cifically, the summary judgment stage of the case is critical
for both plaintiffs and defendants, because that is the stage
at which the largest group of claims are resolved.
m Sixth, the data offer striking support for the commonly
held view that federal juries disproportionately render ver-
dicts for ADEA plaintiffs. Indeed, the data far more dramati-
cally confirm this proposition than any I have seen before.
Still, one must take care as to how to interpret these data.
The numbers do not necessarily reflect jury bias, but rather
they may simply constitute confirmation of the fact that the
rare case that gets to the jury is a very strong one insofar as
affirmative evidence of discrimination is concerned.
n Seventh (increases of women, younger plaintiffs, and what-
ever other changes aside), the bottom line is that plaintiffs
who go to court fare far worse than do defendants. Certainly,
this is most dramatically the case with regard to decisions
made on substantive or quasi-substantive grounds (as in the
instance of motions for summary judgment, where a court is
not reaching the ultimate merits but is at least determining
whether there is enough in terms of disputed material facts
to warrant ending the matter or allowing it to proceed).
When substance is at issue, defendants come out ahead.
When the matter is a procedural one, the plaintiff has a
better chance of winning. But overall, defendants win much
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more often than they lose or, to say the same thing different-
ly, plaintiffs lose much more often than they win.
n Eighth, in the ADEA's period of youth and adoles-
cence-the first twenty or so years-procedural issues were of
particular significance. That has changed to some extent.
IV. 1997 AND BEYOND
What of the future? What can we predict, with some degree
of confidence, about the workplace of the next five or ten, may-
be even twenty or thirty years, insofar as older men and wom-
en are concerned? And what can we foresee, with some modi-
cum of accuracy, about the legal issues that are going to be of
dominance over the next five or ten years?
A. Labor Force Demographics
There have been striking developments in the demographics
of the American workplace in this century insofar as older
workers are concerned. For one, there has been a very signif-
icant increase in the numbers of individuals departing the
workplace at relatively young ages." ° Second, and this is a
key point, in absolute numbers older workers still rank in the
multi-millions, as Tables 11 and 12 disclose. Third, and most
significant, their numbers-which are set forth in the same ta-
bles-are going to greatly increase as the baby boomers, i.e.,
those men and women born between 1946 and 1964, move into
their fifties, sixties and beyond.
These generalizations can be elucidated with more specific
data. In 1982 there were 110,204,000 men and women in the
220. In 1950, almost half (46 percent) of all men 65 were in the labor
force .... This figure had dropped to 33 percent by 1960 and to 27
percent by 1970. By 1989, only 17 percent of older men were in the
labor force .... The decrease in male labor force participation extends
even to men in their 50s. By 1989, the labor force participation rate
among men age 55 to 59 had dropped to 79.5 percent from almost 92
percent in 1960.
UNITED STATES SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING ET AL., AGING AMERICA-TRENDS
AND PROJECTIONS 94 (1991 ed.).
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civilian labor force. By 1994 the number had risen to
131,056,000 and by 2005 the total-using only moderate rate
projections-will be 147,106,000, an increase in the eleven years
between 1994 and 2005 of 16,050,000, or a slight 1.1%.221 Ob-
viously, these particular numbers are not notable-they show
only slow growth in the labor force. However, the changes in
numbers regarding older workers are far different: there are
very significant increases, both in absolute numbers and in
percentages, for men and women in the prime ADEA-litigating
years, i.e., ages forty-five to fifty-four, fifty-five to sixty-four,
and sixty-five and up. The following tables set forth the figures.
TABLE 112


































































221. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., The 2005 labor force: growing, but slowly, 118
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Nov. 1995, at 29, 43 [hereinafter Fullerton]. A more conservative
projection yields a total of 143,642,000, and a high-growth scenario entails a total of
153,390,000. See id. For the purpose of the discussion here, I use the middle choice,
i.e., the moderate growth figures.
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TABLE 1222
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY WOMEN
AGE PARTICIPATION LEVEL CHANGE ANNUAL
GROUP RATE (1000'S) (%) GROWTH
RATE
'94- '94-
1993 1994 2005 1993 1994 2005 2005 2005
16-19 49.8 51.3 50.7 3,261 3,585 4,211 17.5 1.5
20-24 71.3 71.0 70.7 6,393 6,592 7,149 8.5 .7
25-34 73.6 74.0 76.4 15,412 15,499 14,186 -8.5 -.8
35-44 76.7 77.1 80.0 15,727 16,259 17,078 5.0 .4
45-54 73.5 74.6 80.7 10,907 11,357 17,070 50.3 3.8
55-64 47.3 48.9 56.6 5,228 5,289 8,613 62.8 4.5
65+ 8.2 9.2 10.2 1,479 1,658 1,956 18.0 1.5
In sum, by 2005 over 56.7 million workers ages forty-five and
older are expected to be in the labor force-an increase of 16.7
million over the numbers for comparably aged workers in 1994.
This constitutes an overall increase of 41.7% in the numbers of
men and women in this age grouping! Those aged fifty-five and
over will increase from 15.5 million in 1994 to 22.1 million in
2005-a 36% increase. This enormous growth in the numbers of
workers in their mid-forties and up at the least suggests that
"major adjustments in employment patterns must occur if these
older workers are to find productive employment consistent
with their desire for working hours, job conditions, and types of
employment."' (Interestingly, despite the large increases in
numbers and percentages for middle-aged and older workers,
the median age of the work force in fact will be almost exactly
the same in 2005, i.e., 40.6 years, as it was in 1962, when it
was 40.5 years.' This is due to the fact that over the course
223. See id.
224. AMERICAN ASSN OF RETIRED PERSONS, OLDER WORKERS: How Do THEY MEA-
SURE UP? AN OVERVIEW OF AGE DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYEE COSTS AND PERFORMANC-
ES iv (Sara E. Rix ed., 1994).
225. As the baby-boom generation entered the labor force, the median age
of the labor force decreased; once completely in the labor force, this large
group can only age, so the median age has been rising. To illustrate, the
median age of the labor force was 40.5 years in 1962, (the highest level
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of this century the labor force participation rate of older men
has steadily decreased-primarily due to voluntary or health-
related departures from the work force-and it is predicted to
continue to decline.)"5
It takes no predictive skill to conclude that given the bur-
geoning numbers of older workers, employers which are dis-
posed to engage in age-biased decision making are going to
have an enormous available pool of age-qualified targets for
those decisions.
Of course, numbers themselves are not determinative. They
cannot tell us, after all, whether the frequency of age discrimi-
natory actions and decisions in the workplace will remain stat-
ic, or change. Nor, if change in the rate of occurrence of such
actions and decisions is to occur, can the demographic data
confirm in which direction-up or down-that change will go.
attained before the baby-boomers entered the labor force), it dropped
steadily until 1980, and since then, it has been rising. With the labor
force participation rates of older men projected to continue dropping as
rapidly as in the past, the median age of the labor force in 2005 is pro-
jected to just exceed the level reached in 1962 [i.e., it will be 40.6].
Fullerton, supra note 221, at 40.
226. With the availability of early retirement, offered when many corpo-
rations downsize, and benefits under Social Security, men have been
leaving the labor force at younger ages .... During the 1973-78 period,
men 60 to 64 years of age had the most rapid decrease in labor force
participation [ie., -7.1 percent]. This age group continued to experience
the greatest drop in participation though 1988. Starting around 1985,
participation for men 65 and older started to rise, but... this reversal
was short lived. For the 1988-93 period, men 55 to 59 had the sharpest
rate of decrease in labor force participation [ie., 1.2 percent].
Id. at 34. See also supra note 220. The figures regarding labor force participation for
older women present a contrasting picture: for them, the participation rate has been
increasing. However, it appears that insofar as retirement is concerned, men and
women are very similar.
In general, the magnitude and the pace of the decline in the median age
of retirement... have to date been similar for men and women. From
the early 1950's through the late 1980's, the median age fell 4.3 years
among men and 4.9 years among women .... [Tihe pace of decline de-
celerated considerably beginning in the 1970's. Among men, 80 percent of
the total decline occurred by the early 1970's. The comparable figure for
women is more than 95 percent. However, the projected labor force par-
ticipation rates imply a resumption during the late 1990's of the decline,
which accelerates during the interval 2000-05.
Murray Gendell & Jacob S. Siegel, Trends in retirement age by sex, 1950-2005, 115
MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1992, at 22, 25.
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We can venture some informed speculation, however. One might
predict, for example, that the growth in the numbers of older
workers may have the salutary effect of changing lingering
negative attitudes. Or maybe the 'baby bust,' e.g., the decline in
the birth rate that followed the baby boom, combined with
other trends-such as increasing numbers of ill-educated immi-
grants entering the American work force-will make older men
and women more attractive in the employment market. Perhaps
the merits of older men and women simply will come to be
valued more.2" Or-and indeed this may well be the most
likely scenario-perhaps the same misperceptions and negative
attitudes that exist today (to greater or lesser degrees, depend-
ing upon whose ox is gored and who is doing the goring) will
persist. At bottom, of course, these are all realistic, but current-
ly unconfirmable, possibilities. What we can get a firmer grip
on are data, discussed in the next sections, concerning the inci-
dence and bases of age bias in the workplace today. And we
then can use those data to speculate as to whether the phenom-
ena that are disclosed seem to be of such a nature that they
are likely to persist.
That speculation, as discussed below, leads to the unfortunate
conclusion that the perceived age bias that (1) prompted enact-
ment in 1967 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and that (2) has allegedly motivated employer decisions and
actions which in turn have prompted the filing with the EEOC
of thousands of charges of discrimination over the years, and
that (3) has generated hundreds of cases over the years (as well
as uncountable pre-trial settlements) in which ADEA plaintiffs
have prevailed, is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.
227. A recent article in the Chicago Tribune reported that Merrill Lynch & Co.
was seeking to employ older workers because their experience and expertise were
regarded as assets. Andrew Guy Jr., Older Workers Wielding New Clout in Job Mar-
ket, CHIC. TRIB., July 24, 1996, at B1.
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B. Empirical Verification of Age Discrimination in the
Workplace
1. General Data
There are some bases for suggesting that age discrimination
in the workplace today is a relatively minor problem. For one,
most plaintiffs who claim in the court to be victims of age dis-
crimination in employment in fact lose, as discussed earlier.
One also can note data establishing that in recent years older
workers have fared better in the job market than have their
younger counterparts. 8
But there are countervailing points to be made. Though not
constituting a majority, or even a significant plurality, some
plaintiffs do win their cases. Moreover, some grievants no doubt
secure settlements that cannot simply be dismissed as "chump
change" to pay off nuisance claims. What is more, the positive
data regarding employment of older workers is somewhat am-
biguous.' There are other bases for believing that age dis-
crimination in the workplace is operative today, and will be
with us tomorrow.'
228. See infra Part IV.B.2.
229. See infra Part IV.B.2.
230. One might rest one's case for the prevalence of age bias in employment on
the numbers of charges of unlawful discrimination filed with the EEOC, which has
had enforcement authority vis-a-vis the ADEA since mid-1979. (Prior to that time, the
Act had been admini tered by the Department of Labor.) In fiscal year (FY) 1980,
which was the first full year in which the EEOC had enforcement authority, there
were 59,328 charges of unlawful discrimination filed with the agency, which then
(and now) also had jurisdiction vis-a-vis Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994). Of this total, 11,076-18.6%--were ADEA charges. By FY 1986 the total
charges amounted to 68,822; of these, 25.3%--17,443--were ADEA claims. Five years
later, in FY 1991, there were 17,449 ADEA charges out of a total of 62,806. The next
year, of 70,339 charges, 19,253 involved the ADEA. In FY 1993 charges soared to
88,000 due to the EEOC's now having enforcement responsibility as to the newly
activated Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). In
that fiscal year, ADEA claims made up 22.6% of the total. See 1 EGLIT, supra note 2,
at 2-6. There were 17,425 ADEA charges filed with the EEOC in FY 1995. Recent
EEOC Activity: Older Workers' Forum and ADEA Waivers, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA)
July 1, 1996, at 75.
The very large majority of these ADEA charges generated no findings of wrong-
doing on the part of the accused employers. While this phenomenon would suggest
that the volume of charges should not be taken as a barometer of the incidence of
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For example, a study published in 1993 by the Fair Employ-
ment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., relied upon a testing
methodology whereby pairs of resum6s-one for a hypothetical
fifty-seven-year-old and the other for a hypothetical thirty-two-
year-old-were mailed to a random sample of 775 large firms
and employment agencies nationwide. Even though the fictional
job applicants' resums set forth equal qualifications, the favor-
able response rate for older job seekers was 26.5% less than it
was for the younger individuals in those instances where the
companies actually had job vacancies."' In similar vein, it
was recently reported in a popular journal, Money Magazine,
that "[n]early five out of 10 executive search firms say that age
is a 'significant and negative factor' to companies looking at job
candidates ages 40 to 50, according to a 1996 survey by Exec-
U-Net, a networking group for executives." 2  Another
study-involving a survey of the views of senior human resourc-
es managers, who were termed "gatekeepers"--was conducted
by the American Association of Retired Persons in 1985 and
was updated in 1989. While the individuals surveyed reported
generally positive attitudes regarding older workers, the practic-
es of their companies, it turned out, did not parallel the
gatekeepers' representations:
discrimination in the workplace, the countervailing factor to consider is the fact that
in the very large majority of instances the EEOC has not been able to pursue mean-
ingful investigation of the charging parties' claims because it has lacked the resources
to do so. See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TuNrrY-EEOC AND STATE AGENCIES Dm NOT FULLY INVESTIGATE DISCRIMINATION
CHARGES (1988).
Likewise, the fact that the EEOC itself files very few suits should not be read
as signifying the agency's view that there is little out there that merits its litigation
efforts. Again, lack of resources, along with disinterest on the part of some presiden-
tial administrations in aggressively pursuing equal employment opportunity claims,
are more apt explanations for the agency's small annual dockets of cases. (With re-
gard to suits filed to enforce all of the statutes for which it has enforcement re-
sponsibility, i.e., the ADEA, EPA, Title VII, and the ADA, the EEOC filed 398 cases
in FY 1993, 373 cases in FY 1994, 322 in FY 1995, and 160 in FY 1996. Insofar as
ADEA suits, specifically, are concerned, in FY 1990 the EEOC filed 138 ADEA suits;
it filed 102 in FY 1991, 84 in FY 1992, 114 in FY 1993, 73 in FY 1994, and just 37
in FY 1995. See Drop in Fiscal 1995 EEOC Activity, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA), Apr. 8,
1996, at 37. Only 12 ADEA suits were filed by the agency in FY 1996. See 15 Em-
ployee Relations Weekly 292 (Mar. 24, 1997).
231. Marc Bendick, Jr., et al., Employment Discrimination Against Older Workers:
An Experimental Study of Hiring Practices (1993) (monograph distributed by the Fair
Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc.)
232. Ruth Simon, Too Damn Old, MONEY, July, 1996, at 118, 122.
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Nearly four in five gatekeepers (79%) agreed that their
companies were "finding ways to leverage the experience of
older workers,". . . but other data from this survey do not
support this success in tapping older workers[?] skills. One
of the most disturbing findings of this study is the reported
decline in senior management's formal commitment to uti-
lizing older workers. Although 62 percent of all gatekeepers
believe such a commitment would be effective, only one in
four (25%) report that their companies have implemented a
formal program of senior management commitment. This is
down significantly from one in three companies (33%) in
1985. Similarly, six in 10 (58%) of [sic] gatekeepers believe
in the effectiveness of educating managers about ways to
utilize older workers. Yet, only one in three (28%) compa-
nies (a figure similar to 1985) have introduced such a pro-
gram ....
Training in 1989 follows a similar pattern to 1985. In 1989,
over half of the gatekeepers (55% compared to 48% in 1985)
believe that skill training for older employees would be
effective in increasing their utilization, but overall, as in
1985, only three in 10 (29%) companies have implemented
such programs.'
Likewise, it has been pointed out that while "most companies
profess to believe that an employee's value to the company rises
over time or is dependent on training and that their general
policy is to retain all productive employees as long as possi-
ble, . . . their actions indicate otherwise .... "4
Other authoritative voices also have decried, albeit sometimes
without clear documentation, age bias. For example, in The
Untapped Resource, a report issued by the Americans Over 55
at Work Program of the Commonwealth Fund, the following
charges were made:
Age discrimination plays a pernicious role in limiting em-
ployment opportunities for older workers. Negative percep-
tions of older workers persist, and discriminatory practices
continue in both subtle and less-than-subtle ways. Discrimi-
233. A&ERICAN ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, BUSINESS AND OLDER WORKERS 20
(1989).
234. Michael C. Barth et aL, Corporations and the Aging Workforce, in BUILDING
THE COMPETITIVE WORKFORCE 156, 174 (Philip H. Mirvis ed., 1993).
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natory attitudes and practices often reinforce each other.
For example, older workers may be passed over for training
courses and then evaluated negatively on their flexibility in
taking on new assignments, where training might have
made them more versatile.'
In like vein are the following observations:
Stereotypical views depict older workers as potentially less
employable than younger persons, particularly for mana-
gerial positions. Research findings suggest that older per-
sons are seen as less capable of responding creatively, en-
thusiastically, or efficiently to job demands. Moreover, age
stereotypes depict older employees as less interested in
change and less capable of coping with future challenges.
To the extent that these stereotypes [which are not borne
out by the research as being empirically correct] influence
managerial decisions, there are potentially serious conse-
quences for older employees, including lowered motivation,
career stagnation, and eventual career obsolescence."m
2. The Unemployment Rate of Older Workers
Given the burgeoning annual cohorts of men and women who
over the next two decades will successively enter and move
through their fifties and then enter and move through their
sixties, seventies, and beyond, boom times may well be in the
offing for attorneys who specialize in pursuing or defending
against ADEA-based claims of discrimination. This prospect of
millions of more potential ADEA plaintiffs can hardly be a
comforting one, however, from the perspective of employers. (In
theory, for the employer which disavows ageist employment
practices the fear of litigation ought to be registering as a low
level menace on the corporate radar screen, but no doubt even
the best managers cannot avert every potential grievant from
pursuing legal redress.)
235. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE UNTAPPED RESOURCE, THE FINAL REPORT OF
THE AMERICANS OvER 55 AT WORK PROGRAM 50 (1993).
236. BENSON ROSEN & THOMAS H. JERDEE, OLDER EMPLOYEES: NEW ROLES FOR
VALUED RESOURCES 35-36 (1985). See also Stephen R. McConnell, Age Discrimination
in Employment, in POLICY IssuEs IN WORK AND RETIREMENT 159 (Herbert S. Parnes
ed., 1983).
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The fact is, though, that the entry of increasing numbers of
men and women into what amounts to prime time for ADEA
claims, i.e., the decade of their fifties, need not inevitably signal
increased litigation. Indeed, there are some reasons for believ-
ing that the massive growth in those fifty and above need not
generate an explosion in ADEA lawsuits. How so?
As discussed earlier, we know that the most common basis
for ADEA suits today is termination from the job. And we
know, further, that the way the ADEA remedial scheme is
structured, a discharged former employee's incentive to sue is
severely diminished by the mitigation requirement that the
courts impose."' In other words, if Employee X, making
$75,000 a year, is required-as she indeed is-to seek compara-
ble employment following her discharge by Company A, and if
Employee X can readily come up with another job with Compa-
ny B that pays as much or more, she is not going to have much
practical reason to sue, since the income earned working for
Company B will offset her claim for back pay from Company
A.' Thus, if the job market for older workers is a good one,
it follows that the confluence of (1) available jobs and (2) the
mitigation requirement whereby the income earned on the re-
placement job serves to reduce any back pay recovery against a
discriminatory employer, will result in a situation militating
against litigation, or it at least will hold down the increases in
legal claims that otherwise might occur.
How, then, are older workers in fact fairing in the job mar-
ket? Actually, this inquiry is an exceedingly complicated one.
Any answers that are based on present-day data can tell us lit-
tle about the situation that will pertain next year or five or ten
years in the future. Moreover, it turns out that clear answers
are not readily available even for the current state of affairs.
237. See supra note 52.
238. It is true that liquidated damages are recoverable under the ADEA for willful
violations of the Act, but these damages are computed on the basis of the back pay
award: a successful plaintiff recovers an amount equal to the back pay recovery, or,
to put it another way, the back pay award doubled is what the prevailing plaintiff in
a willful violation suit obtains. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). If the plaintiff recovers no
back pay, because the salary she did not receive following discharge by her discrimi-
natory employer is offset by the income earned at the .replacement job obtained fol-
lowing discharge, there is no liquidated damages award to recover. In other words, if
back pay is $0, twice $0 still equals $0.
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Some data suggest that workers ages ffty and over currently
are doing pretty well. 9 But those data are problematic.' °
And other data suggest that workers in their forties and early
fiflies-who of course fit within the ambit of the ADEA-have
not fared well." Still other data can be cited to support the
239. The following analysis was set forth in SECRETARY OF LABOR, LABOR MARKET
PROBLEMS OF OLDER WoRKERs 8-9 (1989):
Prior to the 1970's, the jobless rate for men age 55 and over tended to
be higher than the rate for 25- to 54-year-olds. Since then, not only has
the situation been reversed, but the gap between the older and younger
groups has continued to grow and has tended to widen in recessions and
narrow in recoveries. Some possible reasons for the recent differences in
the rates of joblessness favoring older men include the following.
c Improvements in pension income have made retirement a
viable alternative to employment for many older potential
jobseekers .... Thus, some persons who may have had to find a job
in the past are now better able to retire (or stay retired).
a There has been a considerable increase in the use of early
retirement inducements to lower labor costs and avoid layoffs ....
Thus, older persons may avoid further work, and possibly layoff, by
retiring, an option not available to younger workers.
o Rates of labor force reentry (proportion of workers who were
out of the labor force in the previous month who are in the labor
force in the current month) for older men are generally down from
the late 1960's and early 1970's. That is, retired workers are more
likely to stay retired. Thus, there may have been some downward
pressure on older workers' jobless rates as fewer persons outside the
labor force undertook a job search.
240. The option of being out of the labor force, not feasible for most mid-
dle-aged workers (particularly men), complicates unemployment compari-
sons between age groups in two ways. First, the incidence of unemploy-
ment among older persons is limited by labor force withdrawal. For ex-
ample, a 40-year-old job loser is much more likely to show up in the
CPS [Current Population Survey] as unemployed than is a 62-year-old,
who may choose to retire rather than undertake a job search. Secondly,
duration of unemployment may be lowered by labor force withdrawal
after an unsuccessful job search; in other words, a large proportion of the
unemployment spells of older persons end in labor force withdrawal rath-
er than employment. Had these persons persisted in their job searches,
average durations of unemployment would probably be higher than they
are.
Id. at 9-10.
241. 1. From 1967-71 to 1987-92, males have become much more vulner-
able to unemployment due to permanent layoff than have females. The
rate for males of all ages increased by 108 percent, nearly double the 55
percent increase for female workers.
2. From 1967-71 to 1987-92, males aged 35-54 have become much
more vulnerable to permanent layoff unemployment than males aged 16-
34 and males 55 and above. While the rate increased by 133 percent for
those aged 35-54, the 16-34 rate grew by 99 percent and the rate for
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assertion that insofar as ADEA-protected workers are con-
cerned, it is those men and women ages forty to forty-five who
are more likely than their older counterparts to experience
employment difficulties.'
In sum, recent figures offer a mixed picture as to the employ-
ment situation of workers whose ages bring them within ADEA
coverage. And even though some data support the view that
older workers are faring well, one certainly cannot with any
confidence predict that this state of affairs will persist in the
near or more distant futures.
3. Summary
The past and present are useful predictors for the fu-
ture-particularly the near-future. And so it seems safe to con-
clude that to the extent negative attitudes have held sway, and
continue to do so today, regarding older men and women who
are already in the work force or who are seeking to enter or re-
enter it, these attitudes are likely to continue over the next
decade (and beyond, as well). True, one cannot know this to a
certainty. But certainly there is nothing in the offing to suggest
that some sea change in employer attitudes and in their reli-
ance on negative stereotypes is soon to occur. In brief, we can
expect more of the same.
those 55 grew by only 48 percent.
James L. Medoff, The Mid-Life Job Crisis-Growing Unemployment Due to Permanent
Layoff Among Middle-Aged American Men, NSC REPORT SERIES (National Study Cen-
ter), May 12, 1994.
242. People over 45 years old are far less likely to suffer labor market
problems than younger workers. Unemployment rates are lower for work-
ers over 45 than for younger persons in the same groups; and older
workers generally earn significantly more than younger workers because
the older workers tend to have more work experience and seniority.
NATIONAL COMiSSION FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY, OLDER WORKERS: PROSPECTS, PROB-
LIMS AND POLICIES 13 (1985).
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C. The Generative Forces Underlying Discrimination in the
Workplace
1. Ageist Animus
The ways in which attitudes regarding persons fitting within
the ADEA-protected class, i.e., those over age thirty-nine, play
out are going to vary with the context. For example, an
employer's reluctance to retain a sixty-year-old on her job very
likely is not going to be paralleled by like reluctance of that
older woman's landlord to continue renting an apartment to
her. The relative ages of the parties (or at least the characteris-
tics associated to greater or lesser degree with given age rang-
es) also likely will be relevant to the ways in which attitudes
regarding age factor into relationships. A forty-five-year-old
woman interested in a romantic attachment is going to react
differently, in a social situation, to a sixty-year-old man than
she is to a thirty-year-old.
In any event, putting to the side observations regarding gen-
eral ageist attitudes and age-based or age-related practices, let
us focus on the particular locus of concern here, i.e., the
workplace. In the earlier-cited 1965 report of the Secretary of
Labor that was issued in the birthing days of the ADEA, the
Secretary-who emphasized the problems older individuals
confronted in being hired (as opposed to concentrating on what
in fact has been the far more common basis of complaints, i.e.,
discharges)-rejected deep-seated animus as the explanation for
age bias. In so doing, he contrasted the antipathy directed to-
wards the elderly with what he saw as the much more invidi-
ous bias operative in the context of race relations:
Discrimination in employment based on race, religion,
color, or national origin is accompanied by and often has its
origins in prejudices that originate outside the sphere of
employment. There are no such prejudices in American life
which apply to older persons and which would carry over so
strongly into the sphere of employment.
The process of aging is inescapable, affecting everyone
who lives long enough. It is gradual, minimizing and ob-
scuring differences among people. At all times there are
people of all ages living in close association rather than in
676
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separate and distinct social or economic environments. The
element of intolerance, of such overriding importance in the
case of attitudes toward other groups, assumes minimal
importance in the case of older people and older workers.
It is true that hiring officials are not immune to the
brightness, vigor, and attraction of youth, nor always above
exploiting these attributes for commercial advantage. But
such choices involve preferences for one group, rather than
antagonism against another.
... The issue of discrimination revolves around the
nature of the work and its rewards, in relation to the abili-
ty or presumed ability of people at various ages, rather
than around the people as such. The issue thus differs
greatly from the primary one involved in discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, which is
basically unrelated to ability to perform work.'
In a related vein, it has been observed that "to the extent that
age discrimination is occurring in the workplace, it is quite
subtle and comes in the form of a bias much less harsh and
overt than other forms of discrimination."'
As discussed earlier, the Secretary more or less had it
right.' Ageism is not equivalent, either in its genesis nor its
manifestations, to racism. Thus, the eradication of age bi-
as-either generally, or at least in specific settings-is perhaps
a more realistic aspiration than is the imminent demise of
racist thinking and racist actions. Perhaps in ten, twenty, or
thirty years the ADEA will have become a legislative arti-
fact-interesting for what it was and what it did, but no longer
necessary. Or perhaps not.
2. Age and the Ability to Perform
In contrast to the rejection in 1965 by the Secretary of Labor
of personal animus as an explanation for employers' mistreat-
ment of older workers and job applicants, the Secretary did
ascribe merit to a second postulated source of bias, i.e., errone-
243. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 6, at 5-6.
244. A1IERICAN ASSN OF RETIRED PERSONS, VALUING OLDER WORKERS-A STUDY
OF COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY iii-iv (1996) [hereinafter VALUING OLDER WORKERS].
245. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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ous assumptions about the effect of age on the ability to do a
job. This the Secretary referred to as "arbitrary" discrimina-
tion,' and he concluded that there was reason to believe that
such misassumptions indeed were a real cause of discriminatory
treatment.
Whatever the accuracy of the Secretary's perceptions regard-
ing employers' assumptions in 1965, the data today (in contrast
to the negative, but empirically less supported, stereotypes
prevalent thirty years ago regarding older workers' abilities) in
fact do afford some basis for the conclusion that there are cor-
relations between older age and diminished job performance, at
least in some contexts and in some respects. This conclusion,
however, is a very equivocal one, for a couple of reasons. For
one, it is necessary to assess the data with caution: general
age/performance correlations do not justify either (1) the conclu-
sion that any particular older man or woman is incompetent,
inept, untrainable, or otherwise unable to do the job, or (2) the
conclusion that he or she is unable to do it well. The unsurpris-
ing, and unimpeachable, fact is that individuals vary as to how
they age and how they adapt to aging. "Within the limits of
present knowledge there appears to be no single factor govern-
ing the rate of human aging and this makes for diversity and
individual patterns of aging.' 27 Second, and putting to the
side the matter of taking care to avoid utilizing generalizations
as bases for assessing individual characteristics, there is an-
other matter to note here: depending upon whom one looks to,
the data may be characterized as either unpersuasive or at the
least ambiguous. Expressing the former view are two analysts
who, having conducted a meta-analysis of the literature, con-
cluded that there is very little by way of a meaningful relation-
ship between age and job performance:
The relationship between age and job performance has
long been of interest to psychologists and industrial geron-
tologists .... More recent studies either empirically evalu-
ated the relationship using very large samples of data...
246. THE OLDER AMEMCAN WORKER, supra note 6, at 2.
247. James E. Birren & Wendy L. Loucks, Age Related Change and the Individual,
57 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 833, 841 (1981).
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or employed meta-analysis to integrate empirically the find-
ings of many smaller studies ....
Collectively, these studies, which include more than
60,000 subjects, reveal an exceedingly weak relationship
between age and performance. While this observation may
be counter-intuitive, the large numbers of individuals on
which the studies are based and the consistency of the
results across reviews allow one to place substantial confi-
dence in it.'s
On the other hand, there are unimpeachable data that con-
firm the existence of age-correlated health changes. For exam-
ple, we see that as adults grow older, they experience (as a
group) increases in the incidence of functional limitations, i.e.,
hearing loss, the ability to lift, to walk, to use stairs, etc.2 9 It
would seem logical to conclude that, to the extent that function-
al abilities are correlated with job performance, one could ex-
pect to see some relationship (albeit not necessarily a negative
one, since a given individual might be able to compensate with
experience and reliability for his or her declining physical ca-
pacities)"50 between an impaired functional ability and job per-
formance. In fact, however, it is not at all clear that age-related
health factors do have any effect on job performance.
In some studies . . . where samples are drawn from work-
ing populations, various test results show declines in aero-
bic power and an increase in excessive weight as persons
age, but no evidence as to the relevance of these factors to
individual productivity. Another study by Shepard... did
relate the decline in aerobic power to the arduous task of
inspecting marine vessels and cargo, but even here reliance
248. Harvey L. Sterns & Michael A. McDaniel, Job Performance and the Older
Worker, in OLDER WORKERs: How Do THEY MEASURE Up? 27, 29 (Sara E. Rix ed.,
1994).
249. See Monroe Berkowitz, Functioning Ability and Job Performance as Workers
Age, in THE OLDER WORKER 87, 91-92 (Michael E. Borus et al. eds., 1988).
250. The literature on the effects of health and aging on job performance
does not yield the answers we seek in an unambiguous fashion. Apart
from the measurement problems the studies fail to control for relevant
factors, although there is hardly agreement on what is and what is not
relevant in this context. The generalizations which seem to hold are that
the older worker has assets ... [of] experience and reliability which may
compensate for the deficits in physical functioning ....
Id. at ill.
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was on impressions of performance and logical deductions
rather than work performance records.
Robinson... notes that the reviews of the limited em-
pirical literature on age and productivity... have been
inadequate for drawing useful generalizations. However, she
notes that, in general, variability in performance within age
groups outweighs differences among age groups, but that
age differences can be observed more readily in some occu-
pations than in others. But again it is noted that the pro-
cesses of self-selection and termination tend to reduce age
differences in performance among the surviving work force.
Doering, Rhodes, and Schuster... review several stud-
ies of the age-job performance relationship. In very general
terms, they find that the studies provide mixed results. A
considerable number of studies showed a nonsignificant
relationship. Several studies showed some older workers'
performance to be better in terms of accuracy and steadi-
ness of work output and work level, and others showed that
performance declined with age.
Among the studies that showed an improvement with age
was one of salespersons. . . . Older clerical workers were
found to be more accurate and to have greater steadiness of
output, with performance declining only for those 65 years
of age and older .... Eisenberg ... found that older
examiners and materials handlers in a garment manufac-
turing plant had higher productivity, whereas the productiv-
ity of older sewing machine operators was lower, as mea-
sured by piece-rate earnings.
Decreases in performance were reported in 15 studies
covering such diverse occupational groups as printers, male
production workers, factory workers, mail sorters, and air
traffic controllers. For scholars, engineers, and scientists,
the studies showed essentially an inverted U-relationship
between age and performance." I
Insofar as absenteeism is concerned, the data show that while
older workers are absent less often than their younger counter-
parts, when absences do occur there is a positive correlation
between higher age and increased length of absence from the
job for health-related reasons.'2 The data also show, even
more clearly, a positive correlation between the severity of on-
the-job accidents and increased age. Thus, while the frequency
251. Id. at 105-06.
252. See id. at 106-07.
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of accidents is higher for younger workers, the injuries suffered
when older workers do have accidents are more serious than
are those suffered by younger workers."
Given (1) the correlation between declining functional abili-
ties and advancing age, (2) the increased duration of older
workers' absences (albeit absenteeism per se is more frequent
for younger workers), and (3) the increased severity of older
workers' on-the-job injuries (although the frequency of
workplace injuries is greater for younger workers), it is under-
standable that employers have had concerns about hiring older
workers. Indeed, according to the researcher from whose work
the foregoing excerpts have been quoted, "[t]here would seem to
be some basis, of a statistical nature, for discrimina-
tion .... .'
Apart from the matter of the relationship of older workers'
physical capacities and their work performance, there also are
the relevant matters of intellectual capability and motivation.
Here, the commonly held view is that increasing age carries
with it the inevitable prospect of intellectual decline, as well as
decreasing desire to perform well. The data in good measure
253. While older workers may have lower frequency rates, their severity
rates tend to be higher. Older workers apparently have more serious
injuries and lose more worker time per injury .... Both the compensa-
tion cost per injury and per unit of exposure was considerably more for
the older workers. For the three age groups, the compensation cost per
injury was $789 for the youngest group, $1,421 for the middle group, and
$2,072 for the oldest. The higher frequency rate among the youngest
workers made the compensation cost per unit higher for them ($18,732)
than for the middle group ($17,585), but the cost was greatest for those
45 years -of age and over ($22,550) ....
Occupation exerts a strong influence on accident rates and
costs .... For males, there is a strong age profile, but it is less clear
cut in the case of females except in the white-collar and service occupa-
tions.
Given the finding that severity of accidents increases with age, it
should not be surprising to find that there is an age profile for the most
severe injuries-those that result in death. Kossoris . . . found that the
death rate for the over-50 workers was twice that of the 21 - 25-year-old
worker and that the over-60 death rate was three times that for the 21 -
24-year old category. [In 1981,1 Root . . . , using workers' compensation
data from more states than were available to Kossoris [in 1940], substan-
tiates the nature of the relationship between fatal accidents and age.
Id. at 107-08.
254. Id. at 110.
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dispute these notions, however. For one, it is not the case that
intelligence declines with advancing years per se:
The key finding in terms of intelligence is that age-relat-
ed declines are minimal for many intellectual functions.
Current research has documented that where there is a
marked decline in the intellectual functioning of an older
person, it is usually the result of disease rather than
age ....
Botwinick..., in his review of the literature on intellec-
tual abilities, has shown that the distinction between verbal
and performance abilities is more complex than originally
thought:
A summary of the cross-sectional literature sug-
gests that the age-intelligence relationship tends
to be small, with decline not setting in until rela-
tively late in life. When it does, memory, speed of
response, and perceptual-integrative functions are
involved .... 25
The intellectual capacity to perform on the job also entails
the factor of memory, which is defined as the "retention of
specific events which occurred at a given time at a given
place."' Here, too, the data caution against embracing the
common negative stereotype of the forgetful oldster:
What is important to keep in mind is that, in the ab-
sence of illness, age-related declines in memory may indeed
be slight and have minimal affect on performance. Further-
more, since memory relates to the process by which infor-
mation is acquired, attention must be paid to the learning
situation in which older workers are presented with new
material.
257
Of course, learning ability is also related to work performance.
But again, there is a positive take on this issue which contra-
dicts the overblown generalization that older workers simply
cannot learn new tasks:
255. Dorothy Fleisher & Barbara H. Kaplan, Characteristics of Older Workers:
Implications for Restructuring Work, in WORK AND RETiEMENT: POLICY IsSUES 140,
151 (Pauline K. Ragan ed., 1980) (citations omitted).
256. Fergus I.M. Craik, Age Differences in Human Memory, in HANDBOOK OF THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 384, 385 (James E. Birren & K. Warner Schaie eds., 1977).
257. Fleisher & Kaplan, supra note 255, at 152.
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Concerning learning ability, it has been found that those
who were deemed capable at a younger age and who contin-
ued to use their intellectual abilities maintained their abili-
ty to learn in the later years. Where older persons have
registered lower performance scores than younger persons
in learning new tasks, several explanatory factors have
been identified. Because much of the research on learning
abilities has been conducted in artificial settings, it means
that the tasks older people were required to perform, such
as memorizing nonsense syllables, were meaningless to
them. Their poor performance did not reflect their ability to
learn, but rather their attitudes toward the material pre-
sented. Also, older persons perform more slowly to allow
time to correct for the possibility of errors. Thus, because
older persons are more cautious before responding, they do
not do as well as younger persons on timed tests, but when
they are given sufficient time to respond, their performance
equals that of younger persons.
Finally, there is the matter of motivation. The data suggest
that there is some correlation between age and motivation, but
the causes for that linkage, and the inevitability of that link-
age, are problematic. 9
What has all this to do with predicting employee practices
and decisions in the coming near decades?
For one, it is likely that few employers are going to be famil-
iar with the kinds of studies, and the findings of such studies,
that are outlined in the foregoing excerpts. And so the inaccu-
rate, detrimental assessments of older workers that exist today
are likely to persist into the future.
Second, the data do show that some declines do dccur with
age. And there is no reason to expect that the physiological and
intellectual changes implicated in these declines are not going
to continue to be a part of the life cycle for each of us in 1998,
2010, and 2020. In brief, there are no magic cures for the ef-
fects of aging (minor though some of these effects may be) on
the horizon.
258. Id. at 152-53.
259. See id. at 153-55.
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Third, institutional inertia likewise is likely to persist; ac-
cepted mythologies die slowly, at best. And so, ageist attitudes
and stereotypes are not going to suddenly disappear. (Of course,
this assumes that one accepts the data to the effect that they
indeed do exist.)" ° In this vein, the authors of a 1989 study
by the American Association of Retired Persons reported that
even though senior human resources personnel-individuals
termed "gatekeepers" in the study-in a number of companies
held highly positive views regarding older workers,2"' and
even though they gave older workers high ratings "for compati-
bility, solid work experience and emotional stability,"262 these
gatekeepers "in companies with 1,000 or more employees ...
[were] less likely to give high ratings to older employees on
practical knowledge, compatibility, emotional stability and per-
formance in a crisis."2
3. The Costs Attributable to Older Workers
There is more to the employer-employee calculus than as-
sumptions (accurate or not) about, and actual evaluations (accu-
rate or not) of, older workers' job performance. There is also the
matter of the financial bottom line. More specifically, there are
"the fixed costs of employment that limit the willingness of
firms to hire part-time workers or workers who are expected to
remain with the firm only a short period of time."2" Because
of these fixed costs "firms will tend to offer part-time employees
lower wages, which discourage older workers from applying for
these jobs."2" Other factors also may serve as disincentives to
employers hiring older workers, or may result in such workers
being paid less than their younger counterparts:
260. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
261. See AMERICAN ASSN OF RETIRED PERSONS, BUSINESS AND OLDER WORKERS 8-9
(1989). '[Ojlder employees receive extraordinarily high ratings for attendance, commit-
ment to quality, good performance, loyalty, practical knowledge and reliability in a
crisis." Id. at 8.
262. Id. at 8.
263. Id. at 9. Older employees of large companies also received low ratings on the
critically important issue of ability to cope with new technology.
264. Robert L. Clark, Employment Costs and the Older Worker, in OLDER WORK-
ERS: How Do THEY MEASURE Up? AN OVERVIEW OF AGE DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYEE
COSTS AND PERFORMANCES 1, 4 (Sara E. Rix ed., 1994).
265. Id.
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[TIhe importance of team work in the production process
tends to make firms less likely to offer employment that
allows older persons to work at nonstandard hours. Also,
specific jobs skills obtained on career jobs may not be rele-
vant at new jobs, so that employment for older workers at
new firms may entail lower wages .... These factors,
along with potential higher costs of employee benefits, work
against firms offering acceptable employment opportunities
to older workers.
Benefit costs make older workers more expensive employees.
For example, the data establish that the health insurance costs
associated with older male workers are considerably higher
than those for younger individuals-a reflection of the fact that
health care utilization increases with age:
... In a 1993 report, it was estimate[d] that in 1994 the
average employer cost for insured males between the ages
of 55 and 64 [would] be $3,960 [, compared to $1,500 for
workers 25 to 34. As a percentage of earnings, the health
cost for the older male workers [would] be 14.5 percent,
while employer expenditures for the younger male workers
[was] expected to be only 6.1 percent of salary.27
(The data regarding women produce differing results. One na-
tional consulting firm, the Wyatt Company, developed a model
which, when applied, showed a steady correlation between in-
creasing age and increasing health insurance costs for both men
and women, although the differential between younger and
older women was not as extreme as that between younger and
older men because of the maternity costs associated with youn-
ger females. 2' But others have estimated that the cost of fe-
male workers ages fifty-five to sixty-four would be less than
that for women ages thirty-five to fifty-four.269)
266. Id. at 6.
267. Id. at 17.
268. Id. at 16.
269. Id. at 17. See also Monroe Berkowitz, Functioning Ability and Job Perfor-
mance as Workers Age, in THE OLDER WORKER 87, 108 (Michael E. Borus et. al. eds.,
1988) ("the compensation cost per injury and per unit of exposure was considerably
more for ... older workers").
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Accordingly, it is likely that an employer which pays in
whole or part for its employees' insurance (and does not, as
discussed below, purchase coverage that keeps cost constant for
each employee by varying the coverage provided, the result
being that older workers have less coverage) is going to find
that if its work force is skewed towards the upper end of the
age spectrum, it will experience higher costs than it would were
its workers younger-particularly if a significant majority of its
employees are males."' This relationship between insurance
costs and the employment of older men and women understand-
ably is a key concern of employers:
The increased cost of providing health benefits to older
workers compared to the company worker of average age
has many human resource professionals worried. The 140
gatekeepers who provided an estimate stated that, on aver-
age, it costs their company an additional 15 percent to
insure an older worker compared to the health care benefit
costs of insuring the average age company worker. Further-
more, when asked to evaluate the relative expenditures on
health insurance for several "typical" employee types, this
study found that one in three (33%) human resource deci-
sion-makers (compared with 30 percent in 1985) rated the
health insurance costs of 65-year-old retired workers as "ex-
tremely" or "very costly." What is most significant about
this finding is that in the four years since the last survey
[in 1985], human resource decision-makers estimate that
the costs of company-provided health insurance for retired
workers has overtaken the costs of insuring a 30-year-old
employee with two dependents ....
The perception that older employees are expensive to insure
appears to be most acute in large companies. For instance,
in companies with 1,000 or more employees, a "typical" 55-
year-old male is now considered more costly to insure than
a young employee with dependentsY
270. But see William McNaught & Michael C. Barth, Are Older Workers 'Good
Buys'? A Case Study of Days Inns of America, 33 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 53 (1992) (two
factors-self-selection, whereby it is healthy older workers who remain in the work
force, and the potential likelihood that older workers will have few or no depen-
dents-may offset age-related differences in health care costs).
271. AMERIcAN ASSN OF RETIRED PERSONS, BUSINESS AND OLDER WORKERS 16-17
(1989).
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Pension costs also may make older workers more costly em-
ployees in the case of defined benefit (in contrast to defined
contribution) plans:2 2
[Under one method of computation, s]ince benefits in most
defined benefit plans are based on average final pay, termi-
nation benefits and hence the implied cost of the benefit
plan rise rapidly with age and tenure. The implied costs of
pension compensation can vary from less than 1 percent of
earnings at young ages to over 20 percent as a worker
nears retirement .... Thus, holding earnings constant, the
total cost of employing older workers would significantly
exceed the cost of younger workersY3
It also generally is the case that age and seniority march in
tandem, so that a long-term employee is likely to be older than
a short-term employee. Thus, if benefits are keyed to seniority,
there very likely will be a correlation with age, as well. For
example, in one study assessing the costs of benefits for older
workers versus younger workers, it was noted that "[d]ifferences
in paid vacation... are tenure-based and not strictly age-
based. However, correlation between tenure and age is so high
for most [of the] companies [studied] that differentiating be-
tween the two is not useful."2' 4 Likewise, since wages corre-
late with seniority, and seniority correlates with age, age and
wages typically rise in tandem. 5 (In macro-economic terms,
272. In the case of a defined benefit plan, the employer guarantees that the re-
tired employee will receive a set benefit for a set period of time, usually until he or
she dies. Under a defined contribution plan, the employer only promises to pay a set
amount per month or year into the pension plan. What the actual benefit will be
upon retirement will be a function of how successfully these payments were invested
by the plan manager.
273. Clark, supra note 264, at 14.
274. VALUING OLDER WORKERS, supra note 244, at 9 n.7.
275. See Rachel Floersheim Boaz, The 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act:
Will They Delay Retirement? A Summary of the Evidence, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 151, 154
(1987); NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY, OLDER WORKERS: PROSPECTS,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 17 (1985). This is not always the case, of course. A 40-year-
old supervisor who has worked for her employer for 15 years almost certainly will be
receiving a higher wage than a new hire, even if that new hire is 55 years old. See
Ludovicy v. Dunkirk Radiator Corp., 922 F.2d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1990). Moreover, the
salary differentials between older and younger workers in any event may be diminish-
ing.
[S]ome managers [in the 12 companies surveyed for the study in ques-
tion] said that ... salary differentials had decreased in recent years,
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whereby older workers are addressed as a group, "[v]irtually all
cross-sectional data on earnings show an upward progression
through the prime of the working career (about at age 50 for
men and slightly younger for women), and then a steady fall
through the fifties, with more drastic reductions during the six-
ties .... ")276
In sum, it is probably correct to conclude that, as a group,
older workers, let us say those ages forty-five to sixty-five, are
more expensive to employ than are younger workers-those, for
example, between ages twenty-one and forty. (This is particular-
ly so if the product made by the older workers is one that can
be produced with no loss of efficiency or quality by younger,
less well-paid employees, the result being that the per unit cost
of production is higher in the case of the higher paid employee
than it is for his or her younger counterpart.)277 But what
very significantly should mitigate the legitimacy of employers'
cost concerns insofar as benefits, at least, are concerned is the
fact that the ADEA exempts those employers that are covered
by the Act from liability even if they do not provide the same
level of benefits for their older employees that they do for their
younger employees. More specifically, after its enactment the
ADEA was interpreted by its enforcement agencies-first the
Department of Labor and then the EEOC-as allowing employ-
ers to take into account these benefit cost differentials without
running afoul of the Act. Amendments made to the ADEA in
1990 transposed these administrative interpretations into
statutory form: so long as an employer spends the same amount
of health insurance and/or life insurance dollars on each of its
employees, it will not violate the ADEA, even if it turns out
and would continue to narrow, as their company increasingly linked pay
to performance and substituted bonuses and profit sharing for annual
salary or wage adjustments. Managers also reported that many older
workers had reached the maximum compensation possible for their posi-
tion, and therefor had not received a pay raise for some time.
VALUING OLDER WORKERS, supra note 244, at 10.
276. VALUING OLDER WORKERS, supra note 244, at 7 n.3, citing, inter alia, Michael
C. Barth et al., The Costs and Benefits of Older Workers, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOY-
MENT OF THE ELDERLY (William Crown ed., 1995).
277. This analysis was addressed in Metz v. Transit-Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1209
(7th Cir. 1987). See also James L. Medoff, The Mid-Life Job Crisis-Growing Unem-
ployment Due to Permanent Layoff Among Middle-Aged American Men, NSC REPORT
SERIES 4-6 (National Study Center), May 12, 1994.
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that the actual coverage provided differs as between an older
and a younger employee. 8 In other words, under the "equal
cost or equal benefit" principle incorporated into the statute, it
is legally sufficient that an employer spends, let us say, $1,000
each on its twenty-five-year-old employee and its fifty-five-year-
old employee for health insurance, even though the $1,000
purchases less coverage for the older employee. 9
4. Summary
The past is prologue. The present is, as well. And what we
know of the past and the present counsel us that there is rea-
son to conclude that age bias in the workplace is likely to be a
feature of the workplace in the foreseeable future. Concededly,
one can argue about the depth and breadth of this particular
"ism" over the past thirty years. One's perception of how signifi-
cant age bias is, or has been, will color one's expectations as to
what is going to be. The data leave room both for the
doomsayers and the naysayers. Ultimately, there really is only
one answer that comes even close to being a sure one for this
debate: just wait and see.
D. The Legal and Structural Issues of the Future
Claims arising under the ADEA are not going to go away any
time soon. My aim here is to identify, in abbreviated fashion,
some of the key legal and structural issues likely to generate
litigation, legislation or both over the coming years. In so doing,
I clearly am not endeavoring to be comprehensive in identifying
all the issues that are expectably going to be occupying the
courts' time.
Some of those issues that I am not addressing are so obvious,
yet so case-specific, that on the one hand they need no discus-
sion, and on the other, they best can be discussed only in the
context of specific cases. For example, one can confidently pre-
dict on the basis of already decided cases that the courts will
continue to address questions involving the adequacy of prima
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2XB) (1994).
279. See generally 1 EGLIT, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
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facie cases. But any discussion beyond that bald assertion really
would require specific factual paradigms, and to pose a variety
of hypothetical factual scenarios-none of which would be of
any particularly instructive coloration-would be pointless.
Likewise, recent case law, as exemplified by the survey of 1996
rulings discussed supra, establishes that even more often in the
future the courts are going to be addressing questions involving
whether there are material issues of genuine fact that preclude,
in specific scenarios, the granting of defendants' motions for
summary judgment. Again, having made the point that summa-
ry judgment is a major vehicle for disposition of ADEA claims,
any further discussion would have to focus on specific unknown,
but no doubt unremarkable, factual scenarios.
Some issues are not being addressed here simply because, in
the nature of things, they are of lesser import. For example, in
recent years there have been a number of cases in which courts
have addressed plaintiffs' efforts (which in the main have been
unsuccessful) to hold individual supervisors liable for violations
of the Act. Indeed, in Table 9, supra, I note that this issue was
addressed in eighteen district court rulings entailing opinions
that were published in 1996.'o Presumably, we are going to
see several more rulings until this issue runs its course and is
laid to rest by the Supreme Court or is resolved in the circuits
by a set of uniform court of appeals dispositions.
280. This is an issue of relatively new popularity, so to speak. The probable expla-
nation for this relatively new tack on the part of ADEA plaintiffs relates to the
amending of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17, by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The 1991
Act for the first time made the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages possi-
ble under Title VII. Thereby, it became economically worthwhile to pursue, in particu-
lar, sexual harassment claims, which up until that time had been economically unat-
tractive as a pragmatic matter because the opportunity for financial redress for a
women who had been harassed, but who had not lost her job nor suffered any loss in
income, was non-existent. It seems that ADEA litigants, taking their cue from the
post-1991 Act cases in which plaintiffs have sought compensatory and/or punitive
damages from individual Title VII defendants, increasingly have undertaken to sue
individuals in age discrimination cases, even though the compensatory and punitive
damages prompting such suits in the Title VII context are not recoverable under the
ADEA. See supra notes 25, 26.
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1. The Fallout from Hicks
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks"' the Supreme Court
sent a confusing message as to the nature of the plaintiffs task
in a discriminatory treatment case based on circumstantial evi-
dence. At one point in its opinion the Court seemed to deem
pretext-only analysis to be permissible. 2 Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, wrote the following:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons,
will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of in-
tentional discrimination.'
At another point, however, the Court insisted on pretext-plus
analysis: "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason."'
The lower courts still are trying to sort out the significance
of Hicks. Some courts have reasoned that the Court rejected
both pretext-only and pretext-plus analysis so that, on the one
hand, the plaintiffs debunking of the defendant's explanation
will not inescapably lead to a ruling for the plaintiff and, on
the other hand, a plaintiff need not invariably actually prove
the existence of animus in addition to debunking as pretextual
the defendant's explanation.' Thus, in Rothmeier v. Invest-
ment Advisers, Inc.,' the court reasoned as follows:
281. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
282. As to pretext-only and pretext-plus analysis, see 2 EGL1T, supra note 2, §§
7.29-7.34; Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Falla-
cy of the Pretext-Plus Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57
(1991).
283. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (emphasis in original).
284. Id. at 2752 (emphasis in original).
285. See, e.g., Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir.
1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare, 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994).
286. 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996).
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The Court... struck a middle ground in Hicks, refusing
to adopt either pretext-only or pretext-plus as the exclusive
test for sufficiency of the evidence in employment-dis-
crimination cases. Instead, the test fashioned by the
Court... is more fact sensitive: whether the employee has
provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated
against the employee for a prohibited reason .... [Tihe
Court recognized that in some cases the overall strength of
the prima facie case in conjunction with evidence of pretext
will be sufficient to permit a finding of intentional discrimi-
nation, while in other cases the prima facie case in tandem
with evidence of pretext will not be sufficient to permit a
finding of intentional discrimination .... Whether or not a
case requires evidence beyond a showing of pretext to sup-
port a finding of intentional discrimination is necessarily a
fact-intensive determination and must be decided on a case-
by-case basis."7
Other courts have held that the Hicks Court unquestionably
rejected the pretext-only approach. In other words, for these
courts it is not sufficient to debunk the defendant's excuse; the
plaintiff further must establish that the plaintiffs age was a
motivating factor in the employer's decision.'
Further confusion comes to the fore when trying to determine
what version of Hicks applies in the summary judgment con-
text. Some courts have ruled that if the plaintiff proves his or
her prima facie case and further raises a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employer's excuse is true, sum-
mary judgment is not to be granted.289 Other courts require
the plaintiff to establish both that the employer's reason is false
and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the real reason for the defendant's decision was a discriminato-
ry one.2"
287. Id. at 1334-35.
288. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 39 F.3d 537, 542-43 (5th Cir.
1994); Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1994).
289. See, e.g., Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wis., 79 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.
1996); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
290. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1098 (1994); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th
Cir. 1993).
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One would expect the case law concerning these issues to
continue to percolate.
2. The Use of Age Proxies
Certain factors relevant to the workplace are closely correlat-
ed with, albeit not the same az, age. Salary and seniority are
the key examples. Since salary typically is a function of dura-
tion on the job, and since longer duration-as opposed to short-
er-requires the passage of time, it follows that older employees
are more likely both to have more seniority and to earn more,
on average, in a given company than will younger workers.29" '
Should a company choose to terminate all of its employees in
the high salary range, chances are good that this policy will
home in particularly (but not necessarily exclusively) 2 on the
older members of the company's work force. An attack by a
terminated employee based on disparate impact analysis is
becoming increasingly problematic (and indeed is foreclosed, as
discussed infra, in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits). As far as a
claim based on discriminatory treatment analysis is concerned,
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins" makes the success of attacks on
age proxies very problematic, as well.
Hazen Paper involved a sixty-two-year-old man who was
discharged just weeks before his pension would have vested
pursuant to the terms of the company plan, which provided for
vesting once an employee had worked for the company for ten
years. At the district court level the jury returned a verdict in
his favor. The Court of Appeals sustained the verdict, reasoning
as follows:
The jury could also have reasonably found that age was
inextricably intertwined with the decision to fire Biggins. If
291. See Rachel Floersheim Boaz, The 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act:
Will they Delay Retirement? A Summary of the Evidence, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 151, 154
(1987); Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for the Elderly: Age Discrimination by
Another Name?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 813, 883-84 (1989). See also Gustovich v. AT & T
Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 1992). But see EEOC v. Atlantic
Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989).
292. There may well be, after all, some recent hires who were brought into the
company at high salaries.
293. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
1997] 693
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
it were not for [his] age, sixty-two, his pension rights would
not have been within a hairbreadth of vesting. [He] was
fifty-two years old when he was hired; his pension rights
vested in ten years.'
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that there was case law
involving situations where an employer utilized a "factor, such
as an employee's pension status or seniority, that is empirically
correlated with age." 95 It then went on to firmly reject the
notion that the use of such age-correlated factors could consti-
tute illegal discriminatory treatment in violation of the ADEA:
"We now clarify that there is no disparate treatment under the
ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature
other than the employee's age."296 It went on to explain why a
correlation between age and a factor other than age cannot
suffice to establish that the employer in fact was motivated by
the grievant's age:
Disparate treatment [analysis] . . . captures the essence
of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the
very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to
be fired because the employer believes that productivity and
competence decline with old age ....
When the employer's decision is wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stig-
matizing stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the
motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension status
typically is .... On average, an older employee has had
more years in the work force than a younger employee, and
thus may well have accumulated more years of service [a
factor which is typically correlated with pension eligibility]
with a particular employer. Yet an employee's age is analyt-
ically distinct from his years of service. An employee who is
younger than 40, and therefore outside the class of older
workers as defined by the ADEA, . . . may have worked for
a particular employer his entire career, while an older
worker may have been newly hired. Because age and years
of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take
account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is in-
294. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1412 (1st Cir. 1992), rev'd, 507
U.S. 604 (1993).
295. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 608.
296. Id. at 609.
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correct to say that a decision based on years of service is
necessarily "age-based.""7
Applying these perceptions to the facts, the Court concluded
that Biggins was not the victim of unlawful age discrimination,
even if he had been fired in order to prevent the vesting of his
pension. This was because "[t]he prohibited stereotype ('Older
employees are likely to be -,) would not have figured in this
decision, and the attendant stigma would not ensue. The deci-
sion would not be the result of an inaccurate and denigrating
generalization about age.... ."s
Just how seriously Hazen Paper undercuts any ability to
establish a prima facie claim based upon an employer's use of
an alleged proxy for age is unclear. Commentators range from
expressing the view that nothing really is left of the age/proxy
claim to offering more sanguine assessments of the signifi-
cance of the decision for such claims."' 0 The Supreme Court
itself left open some room for argument:... perhaps most tell-
ing (in terms of still leaving room for making age/proxy claims)
was its following assertion:
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who
targets employees with a particular pension status on the
assumption that these employees are likely to be older
thereby engages in age discrimination. Pension status may
be a proxy for age, not in the sense that the ADEA makes
the two factors equivalent, .. . but in the sense that the
employer may suppose a correlation between the two factors
and act accordingly .... Our holding is simply that an
employer does not violate the ADEA just by interfering with
297. Id. at 610-11.
298. Id. at 612.
299. See generally Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for Age Discrimination: Twi-
light of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1995); Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose by Any
Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the
Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 530 (1996).
300. See Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog
Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J.
391 (1994).
301. The Court pointed out that it was not addressing "the special case where an
employee is about to vest in pension benefits as a result of his age, rather than
years of service .. . and the employer fires the employee in order to prevent vest-
ing." 507 U.S. at 613 (emphasis in original).
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an older employee's pension benefits that would have vested
by virtue of the employee's years of service. 2
Without passing judgment as to whether Hazen Paper's limit-
ing (if not downright destruction) of the age/proxy approach to
establishing age discrimination claims is a good or a bad devel-
opment (although I tend to think it is a bad one), the question
of the legitimacy of age proxies in particular contexts is likely
to continue to generate some degree of attention by the courts
(as it already in fact has3 ) in the near future, until the legal
dust, so to speak, finally settles.
3. Disparate Impact Analysis
Even before the Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper in 1993
there was significant dispute, at least among academics, as to
whether disparate impact analysis properly applied in the
ADEA context."°  On the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist
weighed in with the view that this analysis should not be used
for ADEA claims when he dissented from a denial of certiorari
302. Id. at 612-13.
303. See, e.g., Testerman v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir.
1996); Doan v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974, 978 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 684 (1997); Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir.
1995); Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1995); Allen
v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994).
304. The seminal case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), arose under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
Numerous ADEA courts have embraced such analysis. See, e.g., Holt v. Gamewell
Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318
(11th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 661 F.2d 90, 94 (8th Cir. 1981).
Not surprisingly, numerous commentators have weighed in on the issue. See, e.g., Al-
fred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA- Intent or Impact, in AGE DISCRIUMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT-A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND
PERSONNEL PRACTITIONER (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982); Howard Eglit, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Fac-
tors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155 (1986); Mack A. Player, Proof of
Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on
a Title VI Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 570 (1983); Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose by Any
Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the
Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 530 (1996);
Donald 1. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 (Winter 1984-85); Mara Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact
Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038
(1984).
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in Geller v. Markham."0 5 In Hazen Paper-which actually was
not a case in which the matter of disparate impact analysis
was before the Court-Justices Kennedy and Thomas, joined by
now-Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurrence, hinted that they,
too, shared this view." Taking their cue from the Supreme
Court's 1993 ruling, two federal courts of appeals have now
ruled that disparate impact analysis indeed is inapplicable in
the ADEA setting,3 " and several others have hinted that this
theory of legal liability is in perilous shape. 8  On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has expressly
spurned following Hazen Paper to the logical end to which
these other courts have seen it leading.3"
This is an issue which is going to continue to generate judi-
cial attention.
4. Waivers, or Releases, of Liability
Waivers, or releases, of liability have commonly been used in
the American workplace as a means for employers to secure
insulation from suits filed by departing, or former, employ-
ees.310 Typically, the employer will offer the employee a finan-
305. 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
306. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 617-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
308. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 75 F.3d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Hazen Paper indicates that disparate impact theory is not available under [the]
ADEA."); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof. Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("There is considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination
may exist under a disparate impact theory .... However, this circuit has stated
that a disparate impact theory of discrimination may be possible."); DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir.) (opinion of Greenberg, J.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995). ("[IUn the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional
disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under the ADEA.2).
309. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1486, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996).
310. About 80 percent of Fortune 100 companies sponsored an exit incen-
tive program at least once during 1979 through 1988, according to com-
pany officials. About 30 percent of these companies required their em-
ployees to sign a waiver as a condition for receiving enhanced benefits.
Overall, waiver usage increased during the years 1985-88 and was high-
est in 1987 and 1988, when 35 percent of companies with exit incentives
used them.
UNrrED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
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cial incentive to retire early; that incentive is the quid quo pro
for the release. Congress, concerned about possible abuses by
employers seeking to extract waivers from their employees, in
1990 passed, and the President signed into law, the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA).3 ' This added, inter
alia, a section 7(f) to the ADEA," setting forth a number of
requirements that must be met for a release to be legally bind-
ing upon the party waiving his or her rights.313 Not surpris-
ingly, section 7(f) has generated a number of judicial rulings,
which address such matters as the niceties of releases that are
used in group termination contexts; 4 whether an employer's
efforts to induce an employee to sign a release can itself violate
the OWBPA's waiver protections;" whether an otherwise in-
valid release can be ratified by the releasor's acceptance of the
benefits of the agreement;" 6 whether the benefits received by
the releasor must be tendered back as a predicate to the griev-
ant being able to maintain suit against the releasee;317 and
other issues."8
In 1995 the EEOC decided to engage in negotiated
rulemaking, that is, rulemaking by the interested par-
ties--employers, employees, and their representatives-to devise
regulatory guidance for the implementation of section 7(f). Ac-
cordingly, it convened a panel of these non-EEOC parties to
pursue this task. The proposed regulation ultimately was pub-
AGE DISCRIMINATION-USE OF WAIVERS BY LARGE COMPANIES OFFERING EXIT INCEN-
TIVES TO EMPLOYEES 2 (1989).
311. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104
Stat. 2287 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)).
312. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994).
313. See generally 1 EGL1T, supra note 2, §§ 5.63-5.73; John R. Runyan, Hedging
Betts: The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 72 MICH. B.J. 168 (1993).
314. See Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368 (11th Cir. 1995).
315. See Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996).
316. See Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996).
317. See Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529 (3d Cir. 1997) (negative
answer); Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Oberg v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2104
(1994) (same); Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992) (same).
318. See generally William L. Kandel, Preventive Maintenance Through ADRA Re-
leases: Conflicts among the Circuits Threaten To Unravel OWBPA, 21 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 129 (1996).
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lished in the Federal Register on March 10, 1997."' No doubt,
some version of this proposal will be promulgated in final, le-
gally binding form. No doubt, also, it will not lay to rest occa-
sions for further litigation regarding various facets of the waiv-
er process, particularly in the two or three years immediately
following promulgation of the regulation.
5. Arbitration of ADEA Claims
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,32 the Supreme
Court held that a claimant asserting a violation of the ADEA
had to abide by a compulsory arbitration agreement he previ-
ously had signed, the result being that he was required to pur-
sue his ADEA claim in the arbitral forum. Since, however, the
agreement at issue was with a third party, rather than with
the employer who was alleged to have discriminated against the
grievant, the Gilmer ruling did not, on its face, address the le-
gitimacy of an employer-employee arbitration agreement pur-
porting to foreclose resort by the employee to the courts in the
event that she considered herself to be the victim of a violation
of the ADEA. Indeed, the Court specifically abjured deciding
this issue:
What Gilmer himself did not argue, and what the Court did
not address on the merits, was the contention that the FAA
[Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.], which pro-
vides: "[Nl]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
While the Court ostensibly chose to not address the merits
of the argument based on § 1 because they had not been
raised by Gilmer, it also expressed a view revealing a sub-
stantive basis for its avoiding the import of § 1:
It would be inappropriate to address the scope of
the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause
being enforced here is not contained in a contract
of employment .... "'
319. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,790-793 (Mar. 10, 1997).
320. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
321. 2 EGLIT, supra note 16, § 7-405.
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Notwithstanding that Gilmer did not address the significance
of an arbitration agreement between an employer and an em-
ployee, its analysis left no doubt that it saw no problems with
the arbitral forum as a suitable site for the resolution of statu-
tory employment discrimination claims. Not surprisingly, post-
Gilmer courts-most commonly courts addressing Title VII
claims-have upheld such agreements, the result being to fore-
close the grievant from pursuing his or her claim in federal
court (save for the illusory opportunity to secure review of the
arbitration ruling-a review which is going to be exceedingly
deferential given the general doctrine of federal courts acquiesc-
ing to arbitration decisions.)"
There certainly are very important questions to be raised
about arbitration's use as a dispute resolution mechanism for
addressing employment discrimination claims, the Gilmer
Court's confidence in the arbitral process notwithstanding.
There are numerous factors that come into play here. Some
work to the disadvantage of the grievant. For one, statutory
employment discrimination law is complex; the technical and
doctrinal issues require a large body of expertise and it is
doubtful that many arbitrators are going to have that expertise.
Second, there is a problem resulting from the potential advan-
tage to be gained by large employers who are likely to be en-
gaged in numerous arbitrations. They will be repeat players,
and will develop both expertise as to the process and familiarity
with particular arbitrators' predilections and inclina-
tions-expertise and familiarity which will not similarly be
possessed by the typical grievant, who is almost certainly going
to be only a one-time participant in the arbitral forum.3"
322. See, e.g., Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 933 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1993);
Kaliden v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. Pa. 1991). Cf.
Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994)
(case arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992)
(same); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991)
(same). See generally Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in
the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77 (1996); Michael L. Giovagnoli, To
Be or Not to Be?: Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Em-
ployment Arena, 64 UMKC L. REv. 547 (1996).
323. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case
Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996).
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Third, another very significant factor is the matter of recover-
ies: in terms of financial exposure, the arbitral process arguably
is more beneficial to employers than it is to employees:
In examining the ranges of recovery, we see that it went
from nominal to $8 million in litigation, while in arbitration
it only reached $2,078,123. Likewise, the mean ($417,178)
and median ($106,500) jury verdicts were at least three
times greater than the comparable mean ($114,905) and
median ($32,990) arbitration awards.3"
On the other hand, there are considerations that cut in the
other direction, i.e., in favor of the employee. Dollar amounts
aside (although this factor certainly is a major one and cannot
be discounted), grievants appear to do no worse in the arbitral
forum than in the courts insofar as obtaining some recompense
is concerned. William Howard, writing in the 1995 Dispute
Resolution Journal, reported that plaintiffs received some com-
pensation (typically through settlement) at about the same rate,
i.e., 70% or so, whether they pursued their claims through
litigation or arbitration (so long, at least, as the plaintiff was
represented by counsel). Howard wrote as follows:
I]t is appropriate to compare the occasions of employees
prevailing (by settlement or verdict) in litigation (71%) with
an award in cases arbitrated (68%). On that basis, it ap-
pears that the particular forum, whether litigation or arbi-
tration, has very little effect on which party will prevail in
any given case. Thus, it can be concluded that employees
most likely will receive some recompense as frequently in
arbitration as in litigation. In the latter case... this
presupposes that the employee has been able to find a law-
yer to pursue his or her case, which is clearly the exception
rather than the rule.3"
Apart from the matter of relief, there is also the pro-grievant
fact that arbitrations generally are subject to virtually no judi-
cial review, and so appellate court successes by losing employ-
ers which in the judicial forum have the resources and the will
to appeal their cases, will not be replicated in the instance of
324. Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, supra note 47, at 45.
325. Id.
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arbitral determinations. 26 (On the other hand, losing plaintiffs
sometimes succeed on appeal, 27 and so the loss of an appel-
late forum can be a detriment for grievants, as well as a gain.)
The simplicity and affordability of arbitration theoretically also
offer employees the opportunity for serious and relatively
prompt attention in a formal adjudicative forum that they
would not otherwise be able to obtain, given that (1) litigation
is expensive and slow and (2) the EEOC does little by way of
providing a substantively significant agency alternative to liti-
gation.3  What is more, there are additional factors that in
theory also are favorable to grievants who pursue their claims
in the arbitral forum:
The fact that the employer does not have many of the pro-
cedural weapons available to prevail short of an adjudica-
tion on the merits assures the employee of a full and pre-
sumably fair hearing. Equally as important is the finality of
the arbitration award. The employer does not have the
leverage to negotiate a reduction of an adverse verdict by
the threat of a costly appeal that could result in a reversal
of a successful result. Thus, many reluctant lawyers might
be induced to handle an arbitrated case in which the
arbitrator's decision would be final and from which there
would be no appeal."'
One can safely predict that there is going to be much more
litigation about the enforceability of individual arbitration
agreements, into which employers increasingly are insisting
their employees enter. In addition, no doubt there is going to be
much needed discussion and study of the arbitral process to try
to determine how well, and for whose benefit, it is working.
6. Contingent Workers
It has been estimated that 25 to 30% of the American work
force is now made up of persons who are so-called "contingent
workers."3 0 The contingent workforce is made up of one or
326. See supra Part III.K3.
327. See supra Part III.KI3.
328. See supra note 50.
329. Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, supra note 47, at 46.
330. Susan L. Coskey, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation; A Labor and Employment
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more of seven types of workers: temporary employees, part-time
employees, seasonal workers, independent contractors, leased
employees, involuntarily self-employed workers, and casual
employees." 1 "Contingent employment is growing between 40
to 75% faster than employment for the economy as a whole;
between 40 to 55% of all jobs created between 1980 and 1993
were contingent." 2 The growth of this contingent work force
has been described in a recent report of the National Academy
of Aging:
In the higher-income sectors of the labor market there
is... a newly-emergent model of employment which does
not provide job security in the usual pattern of tenure with
a single employer. It consists of transient or "temp" services
not strongly tied to particular firms. It emphasizes flexibili-
ty, mobility, adaptability, and a generic capacity to deal
with complex problems that may be poorly defined. Al-
though the temporary employee model has been a familiar
phenomenon in secretarial and administrative support posi-
tions, it is now developing for highly-skilled professionals
who will not be tied to a traditional career ladder in one or
a few large firms. Rather, individuals with high-level skills
in generic areas of organizational operations will function
independently, moving from firm to firm, or working simul-
taneously for several firms, on a transient, as needed basis.
This model enables firms to flexibly retain and discharge
employees as labor needs change. Job security is not tied
closely to firm-specific skills, knowledge, institutional memo-
ry, seniority, loyalties, or career ladders.'
Lawyer's Perspective, 48 LAB. L.J. 91, 92 (1997).
331. Scott F. Cooper, The Expanding Use of the Contingent Workforce in the Amer-
ican Economy: New Opportunities and Dangers for Employers, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
525, 526 (1995). Casual employees are individuals who are not on a regular seniority
list in a unionized work setting and who are not serving probationary periods of em-
ployment, but who are used when regular or full time employees are out or when
there is a business need for hiring additional workers for indefinite periods of time.
See id. at 530. As to the mixing of various types of contingent workers in one job
setting, see Timothy Aeppel, Life at the Factory-Full Time, Part Time, Temp-All
See the Job in a Different Light, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1997, at Al.
332. Id. See also Louis Uchitelle, More Downsized Workers Are Returning as Rent-
als, N.Y. TIS, Dec. 8, 1996, at Al.
333. NATIONAL AcADEMY ON AGNG, OLD AGE IN THE 21ST CENTuRY: A REPORT TO
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AGING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ANDi HUiAN
SERvICEs 26-27 (1994).
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The Academy report goes on to observe that "[t]hese character-
istics [i.,e., firm-specific skills, knowledge, etc.] ... are the
[very] assets particularly associated with older workers.""u
Thus, the changing demands of employers, which demands are
being met through growth of the contingent workforce, devalue
those positive factors which older workers bring to the
workplace.
Also either troubling or encouraging (depending upon one's
perspective as a worker or an employer) is the fact that contin-
gent workers generally are not going to be seen as being in
employment relationships with the entities for which they pro-
vide services. And herein lies the sticking point insofar as invo-
cation of the ADEA is concerned. But for the analogical lesson
provided by a very few decisions' mainly decided under Title
VII, which is the ADEA's sister statute, the ADEA typically is
understood as only applying to workplace discrimination perpe-
trated by employers vis-a-vis persons who fit within the statuto-
ry definition of "employee.""3 6 Since people who are not em-
ployees are not protected by the ADEA, and since contingent
workers typically are not understood to be the employees of the
entities to which they provide services, it follows that contin-
gent workers cannot invoke the protection afforded by the age
discrimination statute, no matter how blatantly discriminatory
the entities to which they provide services act towards them.
Of course, since the early days of the statute, there have
been instances-under the ADEA and other statutes-when
questions and disputes have arisen as to whether a given indi-
vidual was or was not an employee. 7 But now the issue has
334. Id. at 27.
335. See, e.g., Sibley Mem'l Hasp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1991). See generally
1 EGLIT, supra note 2, § 3.15.
336. The definitional provisions of the ADEA are circular and therefore provide no
enlightenment as to what an employee is. "Employee" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(1994) as a person who works for an employer. "Employer" is defined in 29 U.S.C. §
630(b) (1994) as an entity having "20 or more employees for each working day of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar years."
337. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (case aris-
ing under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to
1461 (1994), which embraces common law "right of control" test, and which effectively
establishes test to be used, as well, under ADEA); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721
F.3d 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1983) (embracing 'hybrid' test which is very close to Darden
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the potential to become, in my view, a much larger one, calling
into question the viability of the ADEA (and comparable stat-
utes) insofar as they are premised on what is becoming a de-
clining, albeit not outmoded, workplace relationship, i.e., the
classic employer-employee configuration. If we, as a society, are
serious about eradicating age discrimination in the work arena,
it may be that the ADEA will have to be modified, or judicial
doctrine will have to become more flexible, m so as to recog-
nize and protect these growing cadres of independent contrac-
tors and leased workers. Certainly, in any event, this growing
contingent worker phenomenon should generate increasing aca-
demic and political attention.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Age Discr'ination in Employment Act is thirty years
old. It is a mature statute which has generated significant case
law over the years and which no doubt has had considerable
significance in affecting the ways in which employers make
their workplace decisions, as well as the very decisions them-
selves. Demographics and the inescapable process of aging that
affects every individual, as well as well-entrenched views, as-
sumptions and stereotypes that all of us (not just employers)
entertain, ensure that this statute is going to continue to play a
significant role in the workplace in the next thirty years and
beyond.
test).
338. Cf. Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), rehearing en banc
granted, 105 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (persons who had been classified as indepen-
dent contractors by Microsoft were nonetheless eligible for benefits under Microsoft's
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